Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
"Root Verses on the Middle Way" by Nagarjuna
Verses Only - Translated by Padmakara Translation Group
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
"Root Verses on the Middle Way" by Nagarjuna
Verses Only - Translated by Padmakara Translation Group
Last update: December 27, 2025
Image from: Stoneflower013
Source Text: The Root Stanzas of the Middle Way
Previous-chapter Home Next-chapter
The Root Stanzas of the Middle Way
The Mulamadhyamakakarika
By Nagarjuna
Translated by Padmakara Translation Group
(Via: Barnes & Noble)
.
.
.
Dedicatory Verses
1. An Examination of Conditions
2. An Examination of Motion
3. An Examination of the Sense Powers
4. An Examination of the Aggregates
5. An Examination of the Elements
6. An Examination of Desire and the Desirous
7. An Examination of Arising, Abiding, and Decay
8. An Examination of Agent and Action
9. An Examination of the Foregoing Entity
10. An Examination of Fire and Fuel
11. An Examination of Earlier and Later Limits
12. An Examination of Self-Production and Other-Production
13. An Examination of Compounded Things
14. An Examination of Contact
15. An Examination of Intrinsic Being
16. An Examination of Bondage and Release from Bondage
17. An Examination of Action
18. An Examination of the Self and Phenomena
19. An Examination of Time
20. An Examination of the Confluence of Causes and Conditions
21. An Examination of Arising and Destruction
22. An Examination of the Tathagata
23. An Examination of Mistakes
24. An Examination of the Truths of the Aryas
25. An Examination of Nirvana
26. An Examination of the Twelve Links of Existence
27. An Exmination fo Views
.
.
.
.
Homage to the Three Jewels!
Homage to noble Manjushri, ever youthful!
.
Homage to the noble master Nagarjuna!
To him who taught that things arise dependently,
Not ceasing, not arising,
Not annihilated nor yet permanent,
Not coming, not departing,
Not different, not the same:
The stilling of all thought, and perfect peace:
To him, the best of teachers, perfect Buddha, I bow down.
.
.
.
.
1. Not from itself and not from something else,
Not from both and not without a cause,
Does any thing whatever,
Anywhere, at any time, arise.
.
2. There are four conditions:
The "causal" and the "object,"
The "immediately preceding" and the “dominant.”
There is no fifth condition.
.
3. The intrinsic being of phenomena
Lies not in these conditions or in any others.
When the thing itself has no existence,
The "other" [its conditions] also lacks existence.
.
4. There is no activity that has conditions
And without conditions, there is no activity.
That which lacks activity is no condition;
Neither do conditions have activity.
.
5. Things arise dependently on these,
Which therefore are declared to be conditions.
But inasmuch as things do not arise,
How could these not be nonconditions?
.
6. For nonexistent and existent things,
Conditions are not relevant.
If things do not exist, of what could these conditions be?
If they exist, what would conditions do?
.
7. When a thing is not produced
Whether as existent or as nonexistent or as both together,
How can there be talk of its productive causes?
If such there are, they are illogical.
.
8. Object-conditions of existing entities,
It has been taught, are simply nonexistent.
And if no entities are found,
Object-conditions-how could they exist?
.
9. If things are unproduced,
Cessation [of their cause] is inadmissible.
"Immediately preceding" therefore is absurd,
And if [the cause] does cease, what condition could it be?
.
10. If things without intrinsic being
Are, for that very reason, nonexistent,
It makes no sense to say
That "when this is, that too arises."
.
11. In conditions, single or together,
The effect is not at all existent.
Something that is not in its conditions-
How, from such conditions, could it be produced?
.
12. But if effects result from such conditions
Even though in them they don't exist,
Why should effects not also come
From what are not conditions for them?
.
13. Even if effects possess the nature of conditions,
Conditions lack their own intrinsic being.
How can effects produced from what has no intrinsic being
Have the nature of conditions?
.
14.
And so effects do not possess
The nature of conditions or of nonconditions.
Since effects have no existence, what conditions
And what nonconditions could there be for them?
.
.
.
.
1. There is no motion in the having gone
And in the not yet gone, there is no motion.
Apart from "has gone" and "has not yet gone,"
The "act of going" is not known.
.
2. "Where there's an act of moving," you may say, "it's there that motion is.
And this is found in someone's act of going.
It's not in what has gone; it's not in what has not yet gone.
Motion, thus, is in the act of going."
.
3. How is it acceptable to say
That motion is within the act of going?
For when there is no motion,
The act of going is untenable.
.
4. For those who say
That motion is within the act of going,
It follows that this act of going is motionless.
For motion is within the act of going.
.
5. If motion is within the act of going,
It follows that there are two motions:
The motion thanks to which there is the act of going
And the motion that is in it.
.
6. If it follows that there are two motions,
There are perforce two moving bodies.
For without a moving body,
Motion is untenable.
.
7. If without a moving body,
Motion is untenable,
How, when there's no motion,
Can there be a moving body?
.
8. The body that is moving has no motion in itself;
And that which does not move is destitute of motion.
Aside from what is moving and aside from what is motionless,
What third thing is there that might move?
.
9. If, when destitute of motion,
A moving body is untenable,
How can it be tenable to say
That moving bodies move?
.
10. Those for whom a moving body moves
Must face the consequence that there can be
A moving body without motion.
For, they say, the moving body moves.
.
11. If a moving body moves,
It follows that two motions are possessed by it.
That by which it's called a "moving body,"
And that by which this moving body moves.
.
12. In "what has gone," the motion does not start;
And neither in the "not yet gone" does motion start.
And if it does not start within the "act of going,"
Where can motion be begun?
.
13. Before the start of movement,
There's no going where such motion can begin.
Neither is it in the "having gone."
And how can it occur within the "not yet gone"?
.
14. If the start of motion
Cannot be perceived in any way,
What "having gone," what "going"
Or what "not yet gone" can be conceived?
.
15. A thing that's moving now is not at rest;
And an unmoving thing is not at rest.
Apart from things that move and things that do not move,
What third thing is there that might rest?
.
16. If a moving thing deprived of motion
Cannot be accepted,
How indeed is it acceptable to say
That something moving is at rest?
.
17. Motion cannot be relinquished in the "act of going,"
Neither in the "having gone" nor in the "not yet gone."
To move, to enter [into rest], and leave off from the same
Are all the same as motion.
.
18. To say that motion and the moving body
Are identical is incorrect.
To say that motion and the moving body
Are distinct is also incorrect.
.
19. If motion is itself
The moving body,
It follows that the agent
And the action are identical.
.
20. If between the motion and the moving body
A difference were to be discerned,
Motion there would be without a moving body,
And a moving body without motion.
.
21. If they are not established
Either as the same
Or else as different,
How are these two established?
.
22. The motion due to which it's called a "moving thing"
Is not the motion whereby this thing moves.
Since the moving body does not preexist its motion,
What is it that moves, and where?
.
23. The motion due to which it's called a "moving thing"-
Apart from this, no other motion can it have.
For in a single moving thing
Two motions are untenable.
.
24. That which is a moving body does not move
In any of the three ways mentioned.
And what is not a moving body does not move
In any of the three ways mentioned.
.
25. That which neither is a moving body nor is not a moving body
Does not move in any of the three ways mentioned.
Therefore motion and the moving body
And the space through which they move are all without existence.
.
.
.
.
1. Sight and hearing, smell, the sense of taste,
The sense of touch, and mind-
The scope of these six faculties
Are visible forms, and all the rest.
.
2. The sense of sight
Its own self does not see.
And how can that which does not see itself
See other things?
.
3. As means to prove that sight is real,
The example of a fire is powerless.
By "going, gone, and not yet gone"
The example has been countered, seeing too.
.
4. When there is not the slightest seeing
There can be no sight.
How then can it be logical to say:
"The sense of sight is that which sees"?
.
5. The seeing actually does not see
And the unseeing likewise does not see.
It should be understood that through the sense of sight,
The seer too may be explained.
.
6. With seeing, there's no seer;
There's no seer, either, without seeing.
And if there is no seer,
How can there be seeing and the seen?
.
7. Since there is no seeing
And no object seen,
The four links, consciousness, and so forth, don't exist.
How can grasping and the rest exist?
.
8. And through the sense of sight it should be understood
That hearing, smell, and taste,
The sense of touch and mind,
The hearer and the heard are all explained.
.
.
.
.
1. Separate from the cause of form,
No form is found.
Separate from a so-called form,
The cause of form also does not appear.
.
2. If, separate from the cause of form,
There were a form, this form would be by consequence
Without a cause. But something that's without a cause
Is nowhere to be found.
.
3. If, separate from a form,
There were a cause of form,
This cause would be a cause without effect.
But causes that have no effects do not exist.
.
4. If form exists,
A cause of form is unacceptable.
If form does not exist,
The cause of form is likewise unacceptable.
.
5. Forms bereft of causes
Are untenable, indeed they are!
And thus concerning forms
Conceive no concepts of whatever kind.
.
6. To say the fruit is like the cause
Is unacceptable.
To say the fruit's unlike the cause
Is also unacceptable.
.
7. With feelings and perceptions,
Conditioning factors, consciousness,
With all things, and in all respects,
Apply the same procedure as with form.
.
8. In arguments concerning emptiness,
All statements made to counter it
Are not replies at all.
For they exemplify the thesis to be proved.
.
9. When emptiness is set forth and explained,
All statements made to show its faults,
Reveal no faults at all.
For they exemplify the thesis to be proved.
.
.
.
.
1. Previous to its own defining features
Space does not exist, not even slightly.
If it came before its own defining features,
It follows that it's featureless.
.
2. An entity devoid of features
Can never have existence anywhere.
If there is no thing that's without features,
To what can features then apply?
.
3. No features can apply to what is free of features
Or to what possesses them.
And yet aside from what has features or is featureless,
They can apply nowhere else.
.
4. If features cannot be applied,
A basis for the features is not tenable.
And if a basis for the features is not tenable,
No features, either, can there be.
.
5. And so there is no basis for such features;
And features likewise have no being.
Apart from features and the bases for the same,
There are indeed no real existent things.
.
6. If things do not exist,
Of what can there be nonexistence?
And what is there that, being neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing,
Can have cognizance of existence or nonexistence?
.
7. Therefore space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing;
It's not the basis for defining features, nor those very features.
And the five remaining elements
Are all the same as space.
.
8. Those of little wisdom-
Those who think that things exist or that they don't exist-
Do not behold what should be seen:
The peace that is the stilling [of all thought].
.
.
.
.
1. If before desire there exists,
Without desire, a desiring agent,
Desire exists dependent upon him.
But where there are desiring agents, there must also be desire.
.
2. How, in the absence of an agent of desire,
Can desire exist? And whether there's desire or not,
For agents of desire
The argument is similar.
.
3. Desire and agents of desire
Cannot arise together and at once.
For if desire and agent of desire arise in such a way,
No relation can there be between them.
.
4. In identity there's no coincidence
For with themselves things do not coincide.
And how, if there is separation,
Can there ever be coincidence?
.
5. If in identity there is coincidence,
It happens in the absence of a counterpart.
And if in difference there's coincidence,
It happens too in absence of a counterpart.
.
6. If separate things can coincide,
Are then desire and agent of desire
Established as two separate things,
Whereby the two can coincide?
.
7. If desire and agent of desire
Are established as two separate things,
Why should you consider them
In terms of a coincidence?
.
8. If you claim they coincide,
Because they're not established as two separate things,
Will you also claim that they are separate
Because they are established as coincident?
.
9. Because as separate they are not established,
They are not established as coincident.
But then what separate things are there
That cause you to discourse about coincidence?
.
10. And so desire and the desiring agent
Do not exist together, neither do they not exist together.
And all things, like desire,
Do not exist together, neither do they not exist together.
.
.
.
.
1. If arising were compounded,
It would have a threefold character.
And were arising to be uncompounded,
How could it be a feature of compounded things?
.
2. Arising and abiding and decay, each one taken on its own,
Cannot be the character of a compounded thing.
And how at one time and within one thing
Can it be right for them to coincide?
.
3. If arising and abiding and decay
Display the character of compounded things,
There is regression to infinity.
If they do not have such features, they are uncompounded.
.
4. The arising of arising just gives rise, you say,
To basic, root arising.
This root arising then gives rise
To the arising of arising.
.
5. If this root arising is engendered
By what you call arising of arising,
How does the latter, which the root arising
Did not generate, give rise to it?
.
6. If the arising to which your root arising once gave rise
s that which gives rise to the root itself,
How does this root, to which arising has not given rise,
Give rise to this arising?
.
7. If that which has not been produced
Were able to produce it,
You could indeed affirm that this,
As it arises, can give rise to that.
.
8. "Just as a flame illuminates [you say]
Itself and other things,
Arising likewise makes arise
Itself and other things."
.
9. In the flame and in its ambient space
There is no darkness.
What then does the flame illuminate?
Illumination means to drive away the dark.
.
10. If the flame, when being kindled,
Makes no contact with the dark,
How can the kindling of a flame
Cause darkness to be dissipated?
.
11. If, even without meeting it,
The flame dispels the dark,
The darkness found throughout the world
Is scattered by the flame that's present here.
.
12. If the flame illuminates
Itself and other things,
There is no doubt that darkness too
Obscures itself and other things.
.
13. How could this arising, unarisen,
Generate itself?
But if, arisen, it so generates,
Then, being arisen, what is there to generate?
.
14. The born, the not yet born, the being born
Are not produced in any way.
This has been explained
By means of "going, gone, and not yet gone."
.
15. Since, even if arising does exist,
Something that's arising is not found,
How can you say that something that's arising
Does so in dependence on arising?
.
16. Whatever is dependently arisen
Is by its very nature "peaceful."
Therefore something that's arising,
And arising too, are peace itself.
.
17. If somewhere there existed
An unarisen thing,
That very thing must needs arise.
But how will it arise, if it is nonexistent?
.
18. If that arising generates
What is now arising,
What arising is it that
Produces that arising?
.
19. If it's produced by yet one more arising,
Then we have an infinite regress.
If it arises unproduced,
Then likewise all things will arise.
.
20. For what exists and what does not exist
Arising is untenable.
The same applies for things that both exist and don't exist,
As we have previously explained.
.
21. For something that is in the act of ceasing,
Arising is not tenable.
Whatever is not in the act of ceasing
Cannot be accepted as a real existent thing.
.
22. An abiding entity does not abide;
A nonabiding entity does not abide.
What is actually abiding even this does not abide.
And what thing, unarisen, can abide?
.
23. For something that is in the act of ceasing
Abiding is not tenable.
Whatever is not in the act of ceasing
Cannot be accepted as a real existent thing.
.
24. Since at all times everything
Is subject to both age and death,
What abiding thing is there
That does not age and does not die?
.
25. Through itself the abiding thing cannot abide
Nor through an abiding other than itself—
Just as an arising thing
Is not produced through itself or another.
.
26. For what has ceased there is no ceasing.
No ceasing is there for the not yet ceased,
Nor even for what's in the act of ceasing.
What unarisen thing can cease?
.
27. For something that's abiding
Ceasing is not tenable.
For something that does not abide
Ceasing is not tenable.
.
28. One stage of abiding
Is not ended by the self-same stage.
And one stage of abiding
Is not ended by another stage.
.
29. As much as the arising of all things
Is unacceptable,
To that extent the ceasing of all things
Is likewise unacceptable.
.
30. Indeed for an existent thing
Cessation is not tenable.
For it cannot be that in a single object
Being and nonbeing coincide.
.
31. Neither is cessation tenable
For a nonexistent thing.
It's just as there's no cutting
Of one's head a second time.
.
32. There's no cessation through itself
Or yet by virtue of another,
Just as arising is not brought about
Either by itself or by another.
.
33. Arising and abiding and decay are not established.
Thus compounded things do not exist.
And since compounded things are not established,
How could the uncompounded be established?
.
34. Like a dream and like a mirage,
Like a city of gandharvas,
So arising and abiding
And cessation have been taught.
.
.
.
.
1. An existent doer
Does not do existent deeds;
Neither does a nonexistent doer
Do a nonexistent deed.
.
2. In what exists, no doing can be present,
For then there'd be a deed without a doer.
In what exists no doing can be present,
For then a doer there would be without a deed.
.
3. If a nonexistent doer
Did a nonexistent deed,
Of such a deed there'd be no cause,
And also of the doer there would be no cause.
.
4. If these are without cause,
Both fruit and cause will be untenable.
If these do not exist,
The "done," the "doer," and the "doing" are impossible.
.
5. If doing and the others are impossible,
There is neither virtue nor nonvirtue.
If there's neither virtue nor nonvirtue,
No effects will come from them.
.
6. If there are no effects,
To freedom and to higher realms no path can we accept.
Our doings, each and every one,
It follows, must be meaningless.
.
7. A doer that exists and yet does not exist
Does not do an action that exists and yet does not exist.
For where can "is" and "is not"-mutual contradictories—
Be present in a single thing?
.
8. An existent doer does not do
A nonexistent deed;
Neither does a nonexistent doer do existent deeds,
For here too all the faulty consequences follow.
.
9. An existent doer
Does not do a nonexistent deed
Nor one that both exists and yet does not exist,
And this for reasons that were shown above.
.
10. A nonexistent doer
Does not do existent deeds,
Nor yet a deed that is both nonexistent and existent—
For the reasons that were shown above.
.
11. A doer that is nonexistent and existent
Does not do a deed that's nonexistent and existent.
This also should be understood
For reasons that above were shown.
.
12. The doer, then, depends upon a deed;
The deed occurs depending on that very doer.
Apart from this, we do not see
A cause for their establishment.
.
13. It's thus that we should understand appropriation—
As in this refutation of the doer and the deed.
And through the doer and the deed
Let all remaining entities be understood.
.
.
.
.
1. "Sight and hearing and so forth,
Feeling and the rest?—
Their appropriator comes before them."
This some people have declared.
.
2. For if there were not such an entity
How could sight and all the rest arise?
Consequently prior to them,
This entity is present and exists.
.
3. But this entity existing prior
To sight and hearing and the other senses,
Feeling and the rest-
By what means can it be affirmed?
.
4. And if it could be there,
When sight and all the rest are absent,
There's no doubt that these in turn
Could, in its absence, also come to be.
.
5. Someone is revealed by something;
Something is revealed by someone.
How can there be someone without something?
How can there be something without someone?
.
6. Granted [you may say] there is no entity
Preceding sight and all the other senses.
But the different senses, sight and so forth,
Make it clear at different times.
.
7. But if it does not preexist
The senses sight and so forth-all together,
How could it then precede
The senses, sight and so forth, separately?
.
8. If that which sees is also that which hears
As well as that which feels,
These senses it must needs precede.
But this does not make sense.
.
9. If the seer is different from the one who hears
And different also from the one who feels,
Then, when there is the seer, there would also be the hearer
And thus there would be many selves.
.
10. Neither does this self exist
In what gives rise
To seeing, hearing, and so forth,
Feeling and the rest.
.
11. Sight and hearing and so forth,
Feeling and the rest—
If what possesses them does not exist,
They too do not exist.
.
12. And so, regarding that which does not come before
The senses, such as sight, and all the rest,
Which does not coincide with them nor follow after,
The notions that "it is" or "is not" are arrested.
.
.
.
.
1. If the [burning] fuel were fire,
The agent and the object would be one.
If the fire were other than the fuel,
It could arise with no fuel present.
.
2. The fire would blaze for evermore;
And since it did not come from any cause for burning,
No purpose would there be in making it.
This being so, no action would occur.
.
3. Not dependent upon something else,
It would not come from causes for its burning.
And since it would always be burning,
There would be no need for making it.
.
4. If, by thinking thus, one understands
That what is burning is the fuel,
If the burning is just this,
Then what is it that burns the fuel?
.
5. If fire is other than the fuel, the fire and fuel don't meet;
And if there is no meeting, there's no burning.
If there is no burning, there is no extinguishing.
Not extinguished, fire remains just as it is.
.
6. It's just as when a woman joins with a man [you say]
And a man is joined with a woman.
Though fire is other than the fuel,
It's fitting that it meets with it.
.
7. If fire and fuel were mutually
Excluded, one from the other,
It could be said that, though they are distinct,
The fire and fuel can meet.
.
8. If fire depends on fuel
And fuel depends on fire,
Which of them comes first,
Whereon the other, fire or fuel, depends?
.
9. If fire depends on fuel,
A fire will be established that's already there.
And you would have a fuel
That on the fire does not depend.
.
10. If something that has been established in dependence on a thing
Is that on which depends
That very thing's existence,
What has been established in dependence upon what?
.
11. If something you establish in dependence
Is not itself established, how can it depend?
If you say "established things depend,"
This makes no sense. They cannot be dependent.
.
12. There is no fire dependent on its fuel,
Or fire that's not dependent on its fuel.
There is no fuel dependent on the fire,
Or fuel that's not dependent on the fire.
.
13. Fire does not emerge from other sources,
Nor is fire within the fuel.
All the other arguments concerning fuel
Are shown in "going, gone, and not yet gone."
.
14.
The fuel is not the fire;
Neither is there fire apart from fuel.
The fire is not a thing possessed of fuel.
The fuel is not within the fire, nor fire in fuel.
.
15. This analysis of fire and fuel
Exhaustively explains
The links between the self and what it grasps,
Together with all other things like pot and cloth.
.
16. Those who teach identity or difference
With regard to self and other entities,
Are not, I think, proficient
In the meaning of the Doctrine.
.
.
.
.
1. To the question: "Is the earliest limit known?"
The Mighty Sage replied that it is not.
Samsara is beginningless and has no end:
No earlier or later limit does it have.
.
2. To what has no beginning and no end
What midpoint can there be?
Thus the earlier and the later stages
And the two at once are all untenable.
.
3. If Birth comes first
With Age-and-Death to follow,
Birth is free of Age-and-Death
And without dying one would come to birth.
.
4. If Birth comes afterward,
With Age-and-Death preceding,
Age-and-Death are without Birth.
But how can they arise without a cause?
.
5. Birth and Age-and-Death
Can't happen both at once.
One would be dying in the act of being born;
Both birth and death would be uncaused.
.
6. Why therefore should we theorize
On Birth and Age-and-Death,
Which are impossible as steps that happen
Earlier, or later, or together both at once?
.
7. Samsara's not the only thing
That has no earlier limit.
It is the same for cause and fruit,
For character and characterized,
.
8. For feeling and the one who feels-
And indeed for anything at all.
Indeed it's true for every thing:
There is no earlier limit.
.
.
.
.
1. Some say that suffering is self-produced;
Some say that it's produced from something else;
Some that it's produced from both, and others that it has no cause.
None of these positions is correct.
.
2. If it is self-produced,
Then it does not arise dependently.
Yet it is on the basis of foregoing aggregates
That present aggregates arise.
.
3. If those [that went before] were alien to the ones here present,
And the present alien to the ones that went before,
Then suffering would be made by something else;
These aggregates would be produced by other ones.
.
4. If by one's own person
Suffering is produced,
What is this pain-producing person
That from suffering stands apart?
.
5. If from another person
Suffering arises,
How can there be someone, who from suffering stands apart,
To whom the pain is given, made by someone else?
.
6. If from another person
Suffering comes,
What is this person that from suffering stands apart
Who, making it, bestows it on another?
.
7. If it is not established as created by oneself,
How could suffering be created by another?
For the suffering that the other has produced
Was, for that other, created by himself.
.
8. Suffering is not "self-made”-
It does not make itself.
And if another does not make it,
How is suffering "other-made"?
.
9. If suffering were produced by each of these,
It could be made by both of them.
It is not self-produced, nor made by something else.
And how could suffering be uncaused?
.
10. That which is but pain
Occurs in none of these four ways.
And what is more, no outer entities exist
In any one of these four ways.
.
.
.
.
1. "All deceptive things are false,”
The Lord has said.
All compounded things deceive
And therefore they are false.
.
2. If all deceptive things are false,
What is it in them that deceives?
The utterance of the Lord
Has perfectly revealed their emptiness.
.
3. [Some say that] it's because phenomena appear to change
That they are lacking in intrinsic being.
But nothing lacks intrinsic being
[Precisely] on account of emptiness.
.
4. "If things are lacking in intrinsic being,
What [they ask] could be transformed?"
But how could there be transformation,
If things possessed intrinsic being?
.
5. The thing itself does not transform;
And that which has been changed likewise does not transform.
There is no aging in a youthful man,
No aging, either, in a man grown old.
.
6. If the thing itself could be transformed,
The milk itself would be the curd.
And something different from the milk
Could be the actual curd.
.
7. If there were but a tiny thing not empty,
That much of the empty there would be,
But since there's not the slightest thing not empty,
How could "emptiness" exist?
.
8. The Conquerors have all declared that emptiness
Will extricate us from all views.
They said there is no cure for those
Who make of emptiness a view.
.
.
.
.
1. The thing that's seen,
The seeing, and the one who sees,
In pairs or all together,
Do not meet.
.
2. And for desire, the one desiring,
And the thing desired, the same is true.
And in this threefold mode the same applies
To all defilements that remain and all the other spheres of sense.
.
3. Contact must take place between a thing and something other.
Therefore, since there is no "other"
In seen, the seeing, and the seer,
No contact can there be between them.
.
4. Not only is no "other" found
In seen, in seeing, and the seer,
But in all coexistent things,
Otherness is likewise inadmissible.
.
5. The other thing is "other" in dependence on an other.
The other is not "other" in the absence of an other.
But that which is dependent upon something else
Is not admissible as "other than it."
.
6. If what is "other" is other than the other,
It would be "other" even in the absence of the other.
But in the absence of the other, there's no "other";
Therefore it has no existence.
.
7. In the other, "otherness" does not inhere,
Nor yet does it inhere in that which is not other.
Since "otherness" has no existence,
Things are neither "other" nor "the same."
.
8. One thing cannot meet itself
And other does not meet with other.
Neither meeting nor the met with
Nor the thing that meets exist at all.
.
.
.
.
1. It is wrong to say that the intrinsic being of a thing
Derives from causes and conditions.
Produced from causes and conditions,
Such intrinsic being would be fabricated.
.
2. And how can it be right to speak
Of an intrinsic being that's contrived?
Intrinsic being is not fabricated,
Is not contingent upon something else.
.
3. And if there's no intrinsic being,
How can things exist as "other"?
The intrinsic being of the other thing
Is what we call the "other thing."
.
4. Apart from an intrinsic being and otherness,
How can there be things?
If intrinsic being and otherness exist,
Then things indeed will be established.
.
5. If things are not established,
Neither will their nonexistence be.
It's when a thing turns into something else
That people talk about its nonexistence.
.
6. Those who think in terms of an intrinsic being and of otherness,
Who hold the view that things exist or don't exist,
Have failed to understand the suchness
That Buddha has set forth.
.
7. In his Counsel to Katyayana,
The Lord, through understanding
Both existent things and nonexistent things,
Has rejected both the views: "this is” and “this is not.”
.
8. If a thing exists by way of its intrinsic being,
It can never cease to be.
Intrinsic being never can admit
A change into another state.
.
9. If a thing has no intrinsic being,
What [you ask] is changing?
But if it has intrinsic being,
How could it be changed to something else?
.
10. To say that things exist means grasping at their permanence;
To say they don't exist implies the notion of annihilation.
Thus the wise should not remain
In "this exists" or "this does not exist."
.
11. Something that exists by its intrinsic being,
Since it cannot not exist, is permanent.
To say that what once was is now no more
Entails annihilation.
.
.
.
.
1. Suppose one says the aggregates are circling in samsara.
But if they're permanent, they cannot circle;
They cannot circle, either, if they are impermanent.
This mode of argument applies to living beings also.
.
2. Suppose one says the person circles in samsara.
But when one searches for the person in the fivefold way
Amid the aggregates and sense-spheres and the elements,
It is not found." So what is it that circles in samsara?
.
3. If it transfers from one existence to another,
It passes through a state of nonexistence.
But then, with no state of existence and no [aggregates] appropriated,
What is it that circles in samsara?
.
4. It is in no way possible
For aggregates to reach nirvana.
It is in no way possible
For beings to pass into nirvana.
.
5. Subject to both birth and death,
The aggregates are neither bound nor freed.
And sentient beings, as before,
Are neither bound nor are they freed.
.
6. One might suppose that grasping binds,
And yet it will not bind the one already grasping.
It does not bind the one that does not grasp;
In what state therefore can it bind?
.
7. If bondage comes before the thing that's bound,
The latter must depend on it. But this is not the case.
The remaining refutation is supplied by the analysis
Of the “going, gone, and the not yet gone.”
.
8. First, the “bound" is not set free,
And neither is the "not-bound" freed.
If something bound is being released,
Then bondage and release both coincide.
.
9. "Free from grasping I will pass into nirvana,
And nirvana will be mine"-
One who thinks like this
Truly has great grasping, great attachment.
.
10. If nirvana, then, is not produced,
Neither is samsara cleared away.
What indeed is this samsara?
What is labeled as nirvana?
.
.
.
.
1. Restraining oneself perfectly
And doing good to others with a loving mind:
All these are virtue-seeds that bear their fruit
In this and other lives.
.
2. The Supreme Sage has said that actions
Are intentions and the deeds intended.
Specific cases of these acts have been explained
In all their many aspects.
.
3. Deeds referred to as intentions
Are the movements of the intellect.
Deeds intended by the mind
Are acts of body and of speech.
.
4. Speech and motions of the body,
Imperceptible nonvows
And vows, which also cannot be perceived,
And "other acts" asserted in like terms,
.
5. Merit and demerit also,
Deriving from enjoyment,
Together with intention—
As action have these seven been defined.
.
6. If until the moment of its ripening
An action stays, it must be permanent.
But if it ceases, how can what has ceased
Give rise to a result?
.
7. "The continuum of shoot and plant [some say]
Is manifested from its seed,
And thence the fruit derives.
Without a seed, no shoot or fruit appears.
.
8. "The continuum arises from the seed,
And from this same continuum the fruit derives.
The seed therefore precedes the fruit
And thus there's no annihilation, there's no permanence.
.
9. "Likewise from intention
A continuum of mind derives-
From which arises a resultant state.
This could not occur without intention.
.
10. "The continuum of mind arises from intention,
And from this same continuum resultant states derive.
Acts therefore precede resultant states
And thus there's no annihilation, there's no permanence.
.
11. "The tenfold path of virtuous action
Is the method whereby good is done.
In this and other lives the fruits of goodness
Are the five enjoyments of the senses."
.
12. "This way of thinking [others say]
Displays a multitude of faults.
It therefore is an explanation
Not to be accepted in the present case."
.
13. They will declare instead
A tenable analysis,
The one that all the buddhas and pratyekabuddhas
And the shravakas set forth.
.
14. "Action is conserved; it's like a debt [they say]
Recorded on a promissory note.
This conservation, neutral in its nature,
Varies in four ways, according to the realm.
.
15. "Not eliminated through elimination,
But through meditation will it be eliminated.
Thus the fruits of action are produced
By that which is conserved.
.
16. "If it were eliminated through elimination,
If action were destroyed by an opposing action,
Faults would be entailed,
Such as the destruction of [the fruits of] action.
.
17. "All one's conserved acts
Belonging to a given realm,
Similar and dissimilar as these acts may be,
Arise within a single type on entering a new existence.
.
18. "Within this life, the conservation
Of all actions of both kinds
Arises separately for every act
And, even after ripening, subsists.
.
19. "This conservation ends
At death or with the gaining of the fruit.
It should be understood
That it's distinguished as defiled or undefiled.
.
20. "Emptiness and nonannihilation,
Transmigration and impermanence:
These the Buddha has set forth
As qualities of action's conservation."
.
21. Since action is without arising,
It is lacking in intrinsic being.
It is because it's not arisen
That it is conserved.
.
22. If action were possessed of an intrinsic being,
It would be permanent without a doubt.
But action then could never be performed
For there is no activity in what is permanent.
.
23. If actions, then, are not "performed,"
One risks encountering results of what one has not done.
And those who live in purity
Must have the defect of not doing so.
.
24. And all conventions also
Would be flouted, there's no doubt.
And there would be no way to tell
A virtuous from a sinful man.
.
25. The act that has already ripened
Would, then, ripen time and time again.
For, having an intrinsic being,
Such an action would remain.
.
26. Action has defilement for its nature
And defilements have no real existence.
If defilement has no real existence,
How could karmic action in itself be real?
.
27. It has been taught that karma and defilement
Are conditions that produce embodied beings.
If karmic action and defilements are both empty
How can they be called conditions of embodied beings?
.
28. One who has desire and whom ignorance enshrouds
Is the consumer [of the fruit of action]:
Not different from the doer
Nor yet identical therewith.
.
29. Since from conditions
Action does not come
And since from nonconditions it does not derive,
It follows that there is no agent either.
.
30. If there is no action and no agent,
How can there be fruits produced by action?
And if there are no fruits,
How can there be those consuming them?
.
31. Just as an illusory form, which Our Teacher emanated
Through the perfection of miraculous power,
Gave rise to yet another magical appearance,
And this in turn produced another,
.
32. Likewise, agent and the deed performed
Resemble magical appearances.
They're like illusory forms produced
By what is also an illusion bodied forth.
.
33. Defilements, actions, and embodied beings;
Agents and the fruits of action
Are like cities of gandharvas.
They're like mirages and dreams.
.
.
.
.
1. If the aggregates were “I,”
This "I" would be the subject both of birth and of decay.
If it were other than the aggregates,
It would not have the character of the aggregates.
.
2. If the "I" has no existence,
How can there be such a thing as "mine"?
When "I" and "mine" are laid to rest,
There will be no more clinging to an "I" and "mine.”
.
3. Those who do not cling to "I" or "mine"
Are also lacking in existence.
No clinging to an "I" and "mine"-
Those who see this do not see.
.
4. Regarding the internal and external spheres,
When thoughts of "I" and "mine” have ceased,
Grasping too will be arrested.
Since this ceases, birth will also cease.
.
5. Release occurs when action and defilements cease.
Actions and defilements are derived from thoughts,
And these come from the mind's construction.
Emptiness is what arrests them.
.
6. The buddhas said "I am."
They taught as well that self does not exist.
They also said that self
And no-self are completely nonexistent.
.
7. All that can be said is halted,
For all that can be thought is halted:
Not arisen and not ceased,
The nature of phenomena is like nirvana.
.
8.All is real; all is unreal;
All is both unreal and real;
All is neither real nor yet unreal:
Thus by steps the buddhas taught.
.
9.It is not known through other sources; it is peace;
And not through mind's construction can it be constructed;
It is free of thought; undifferentiated:
This describes the character of suchness.
.
10.What arises in dependence on another
Is not at all that thing itself.
But neither is it something else—
There is no annihilation, there's no permanence.
.
11. This is the teaching the draught of immortality—
Of all the buddhas, guardians of the world:
There is no identity and there's no difference
There is no annihilation, there's no permanence.
.
12. When the perfect buddhas do not manifest,
And even when the shravakas have disappeared,
The primal wisdom of pratyekabuddhas,
Though there be no teacher, manifests completely.
.
.
.
.
1. If the present and the future
Depend upon the past,
Then both the present and the future
Are existent in the past.
.
2. If the present and the future
Are not present then,
How could the present and the future
Be dependent on it?
.
3. If they are not dependent on the past,
Then both are unestablished.
Thus the present and the future time
Do not exist.
.
4. To the two remaining times, it should be understood,
This same procedure is applied.
And likewise it applies to high and low and medium,
And to the singular and so forth.
.
5. Time that does not stay we cannot grasp;
And time that could be grasped
Does not remain. So how can time,
Ungraspable, be said to be?
.
6. If time depends on things,
Then how can there be time if things do not exist?
And since there are no things at all,
How can time exist?
.
.
.
.
1. If the result arising from the confluence
Of causes and conditions
Is within that confluence,
How can it arise from such a confluence?
.
2. If the result arising from the confluence
Of causes and conditions
Is not within the confluence,
How can it arise from such a confluence?
.
3. If the result is in the confluence
Of causes and conditions,
It should be detectable within that confluence.
But in the confluence it's not detectable.
.
4. If the result is not within the confluence
Of causes and conditions,
Then these causes, these conditions
Are equal to noncauses, nonconditions.
.
5. If, giving to the fruit its causal strength,
The cause comes to an end,
The cause will have two natures:
One as giving, one as ceasing.
.
6. And if the cause came to an end
Without imparting to the fruit its causal strength,
The fruit that came from such an ended cause
Would be in fact without a cause.
.
7. If the fruit arises
In the selfsame moment as the confluence,
It follows that producer and produced
Are simultaneous.
.
8. If the fruit arises
Prior to the confluence,
This fruit would be uncaused,
Its causes and conditions being absent.
.
9. If the cause, on ceasing,
Is transferred into the fruit,
It follows that this cause,
Which previously was born, is born again.
.
10. How can something that has ceased and disappeared
Engender the effect produced?
How can a cause engender its result
When still existent and conjoined with it?
.
11. But if the cause and fruit are not connected,
What fruit is it that is engendered?
Whether it can or cannot "see" them,
A cause does not produce effects.
.
12. There can never be
A meeting of the past effect
With a cause that's past,
That has now arisen, or is yet to come.
.
13. There can never be a meeting
Of the effect that's now arisen
With a cause not yet arisen,
Or that's past or else is now arisen.
.
14. There can never be a meeting
Of an effect not yet arisen
With a cause that's now arisen,
Or is yet to come, or is already past.
.
15. If there is no meeting,
How is a result engendered by a cause?
But even if there is a meeting,
How is a result engendered by a cause?
.
16. How can a cause that's empty of effect
Bring about this same effect?
How can a cause not empty of effect
Bring about this same effect?
.
17. An effect that is not empty cannot come to be.
An effect that is not empty cannot cease to be.
Since it is not empty,
It's unceasing and unborn.
.
18. But how can what is empty come to be?
And how can what is empty cease to be?
It follows too that what is empty
Is unceasing and unborn.
.
19. That cause and fruit are one
Is never tenable.
That cause and fruit are different
Is never tenable.
.
20. If cause and fruit are one,
The product and producer are identical.
If cause and fruit are different,
Then cause and non-cause are equivalent.
.
21. If the effect possesses an existence in and of itself,
What is it that the cause produces?
If the effect has no existence in and of itself,
What is it that the cause produces?
.
22. What is not productive
Is not tenable as cause.
But if the cause is inadmissible,
From what will the effects derive?
.
23. Since the confluence
Of causes and conditions
Is not self-produced,
How can it produce effects?
.
24. Thus a confluence does not produce effects;
And neither are effects produced from what is not a confluence.
Since therefore there are no effects,
Where is the confluence of causes and conditions?
.
.
.
.
1. Without or with arising,
There is no destruction.
Without or with destruction,
There is no arising.
.
2. How could there be destruction
In the absence of arising?
For then there would be death when there's no birth.
There's no destruction, therefore, when there's no arising.
.
3. How could destruction happen
Together with arising?
Death and birth do not take place
Within a single instant.
.
4. How can there be arising
In the absence of destruction?
For from all things
Impermanence is never absent.
.
5. How could arising happen
Together with destruction?
Birth and death do not take place
Within a single instant.
.
6. Since these can be established
Neither as occurring at the same time,
Nor as not occurring at the same time,
How are they to be established?
.
7. For that which has subsided, there is no arising;
For what has not subsided, there is no arising either.
For that which has subsided, there is no destruction;
For what has not subsided, there is no destruction either.
.
8. Without existent things,
There's no arising or destruction.
Without arising or destruction,
There are no existent things.
.
9. For something that is empty,
Arising and destruction are not tenable.
And even for what is not empty
Arising and destruction are not tenable.
.
10. That arising and destruction
Should be one thing and the same is inadmissible.
That arising and destruction
Should be different-this too is inadmissible.
.
11. "I see arising and destruction,"
If such a thought occurs to you-
Only through confusion
Are arising and destruction seen!
.
12. From things that are existent, existent things do not derive;
Existent things do not derive from nonexistent things.
Nonexistent things do not derive from nonexistent things;
And from existent things derive no nonexistent things.
.
13. A thing is not born from itself,
Nor from another is it born.
It is not born from self and other,
How therefore is it produced?
.
14. To say that things exist entails
The view of permanence or of annihilation.
For it signifies that things
Are permanent or transient.
.
15. One might claim that things exist—
That there is neither permanence nor yet annihilation.
For existence is a continuity
Of causes and effects that rise and then subside.
.
16. But if existence is a continuity
Of causes and effects that rise and are destroyed,
Since what has been destroyed does not arise again,
It follows that the cause has been annihilated.
.
17. If a thing exists by its intrinsic being,
It's impossible that it should cease to be.
At nirvana there must be annihilation
Since the existential stream is brought completely to an end.
.
18. If the last point [of existence] ceases,
The first point [of the next existence] makes no sense.
When the last point [of existence] has not ceased,
The first point [of the next existence] makes no sense.
.
19. If, as the last point is subsiding,
The first point is arising,
That which is subsiding would be one thing,
That which is arising would be something else.
.
20. If it is absurd to say
That what is ceasing coincides with what's arising,
Are [we ask] the aggregates in which one dies
The ones in which one takes one's birth?
.
21
Spanning the three times therefore
There is no existential stream.
But how can that which does not span the three times
Be an existential stream?
.
.
.
.
1. He is not the aggregates; nor other than the aggregates;
No aggregates are there in him, and in the aggregates he is not found.
The Tathagata is not the owner of the aggregates.
What then is the Tathagata?
.
2. If the Buddha is dependent on the aggregates,
He does not exist by virtue of his own intrinsic being.
How can what does not exist through its intrinsic being
Exist by virtue of another thing?
.
3. Whatever is dependent upon something else
Cannot be said to have existence in itself.
And how can what has no existence in itself
Become the Tathagata?
.
4. If there's no intrinsic being [of the Tathagata],
How can there be otherness [of the aggregates]?
And aside from an intrinsic being and otherness,
What Tathagata will there be?
.
5. Even if the Tathagata
Existed independent of the aggregates,
He would become dependent afterward
And thus he would exist dependently.
.
6. Without depending on the aggregates,
No Tathagata can exist in any sense.
And if without depending on them, he does not exist,
How can he then appropriate the same?
.
7. Why does he not appropriate
What is not appropriated?
The Tathagata who does not appropriate
Does not exist at all.
.
8. If looked for in the fivefold way,
The Tathagata is not one with,
Nor is other than [the aggregates].
How can he be described as their "appropriator"?
.
9. Whatever is appropriated
Lacks intrinsic being.
That which does not have intrinsic being
By no means can exist by virtue of another thing.
.
10. Appropriated therefore and appropriator
Are in all their aspects empty.
This being so, the Tathagata too is empty;
Therefore how shall we affirm him?
.
11. Do not say that he is empty.
Do not say that he is not empty.
Don't say both and don't say neither—
Use such terms for the sake of indication.
.
12. Permanence, impermanence-all the four alternatives:
Where are they in the Peaceful One?
Finite, infinite all the four alternatives:
Where are they in the Peaceful One?
.
13. Those who crudely think:
"The Tathagata does exist,"
Will think, regarding his nirvana,
"He does not exist."
.
14. Regarding Buddha, who is empty of intrinsic being,
It's untenable to think
That, having gained nirvana,
He exists or else does not exist.
.
15. Those who have conceptions of the Buddha,
Who, beyond conception, is unbounded,
Are blinded by those very concepts;
They do not behold the Tathagata.
.
16. The nature of the Tathagata
Is the nature of this world of beings.
The Tathagata is without intrinsic being;
This world of beings is without intrinsic being.
.
.
.
.
1. Desire, aversion, ignorance
Derive, the teachings say, from thought—
Arising in dependence upon that which is attractive,
Unattractive, and mistaken.
.
2. Since what arises in dependence
On the attractive, unattractive, and mistaken
Does not exist by its intrinsic nature,
Defilements are devoid of real existence.
.
3. In no way has the existence
Or the nonexistence of the self been proved.
And without the self, how is the existence
Or the nonexistence of defilements proved?
.
4. Defilements must be someone's,
But this "someone" is not proved.
In the absence of this "someone"
Defilements do indeed belong to none.
.
5. As with the view of one's own body,
In five ways defilements are not found in the defiled.
As with the view of one's own body,
In five ways the defiled is not found in defilements.
.
6. If the attractive, unattractive, and mistaken
Don't exist by their intrinsic being,
What defilements are there that depend
On the attractive, unattractive, and mistaken?
.
7. Form and sound and taste and touch,
Odor and the objects of the mind.
These six are thought of as the basis
Of desire, aversion, and confusion.
.
8. Yet form and sound and taste and touch,
Odor and the objects of the mind
Are like the cities of gandharvas;
They're like mirages and dreams.
.
9. In those who are like phantom beings,
In [objects] that are like reflections,
How could the attractive and the unattractive
Possibly arise?
.
10. The attractive so-called is imputed
Based upon the unattractive,
Which from the attractive is not independent.
Therefore the attractive is not tenable.
.
11. The so-called unattractive is imputed
Based on the attractive,
Which from the unattractive is not independent.
Thus the unattractive is not tenable.
.
12. If the attractive is not found,
How can there be desire?
If the unattractive is not found,
How can there be aversion?
.
13. Suppose it's wrong to apprehend
That "the impermanent is permanent."
But since there's no impermanence in what is empty,
How is such an apprehension incorrect?
.
14. Suppose it's wrong to apprehend
That "the impermanent is permanent";
How is it not wrong to apprehend and say
That "what is empty is impermanent"?
.
15. The apprehension and the mode thereof,
The apprehender and the apprehended
All subside
And thus there is no apprehension.
.
16. If there is no apprehension,
Whether wrong or right,
Who will have mistaken concepts?
Who will then be unmistaken?
.
17. In one who is mistaken
Mistakes cannot occur,
In one who's unmistaken
Mistakes cannot occur.
.
18. In one who's making a mistake
Mistakes cannot occur.
Who therefore can be mistaken?
That you should examine for yourself.
.
19. If mistakes have not arisen,
How can they exist?
If mistakes do not arise,
How can there be someone who's mistaken?
.
20. Real existent [errors] are not self-produced,
And they are not produced from something else.
Since they are not produced from self, nor from another,
How can there be someone who's mistaken?
.
21. If the self, the pure,
The permanent, the happy all exist,
The self, the pure, the permanent,
The happy-none of these are errors.
.
22. If the self, the pure,
The permanent, the happy don't exist,
The no-self, the impure, the impermanent,
The unhappy-these do not exist.
.
23. Thus by halting these mistakes,
Ignorance is likewise halted.
And if ignorance is halted,
Actions and the rest are also halted.1
.
24. If an individual's defilements
Exist by their intrinsic being,
How indeed can they be banished?
Who can banish what exists?
.
25. If an individual's defilements
Don't exist by their intrinsic being,
How indeed can they be banished,
Who can banish what does not exist?
.
.
.
.
1. "If all phenomena are empty [it is argued]
They do not arise nor do they cease to be.
It follows that for you [Madhyamikas]
The four truths of the Aryas do not exist.
.
2. "And since the four truths of the Aryas do not exist,
Perfect understanding and relinquishing,
Meditation and attainment
None of these is tenable.
.
3. "If these do not exist, the four results also do not exist,
And if the four results do not exist,
There are no 'beings who abide by the result,'
There are no 'candidates for the result.'
.
4. "If these eight kinds of person don't exist,
It follows that there is no Sangha.
Since the four truths of the Aryas do not exist,
The supreme Dharma, too, does not exist.
.
5. "If there is no Dharma and no Sangha,
How can Buddha come to be?
If thus you speak of emptiness,
You have impugned the Triple Gem—
.
6. "And likewise the existence of results [of actions],
Virtue and nonvirtue.
And the world's conventions-
All these things you have impugned as well."
.
7. To you who thus object, I say:
You have no understanding of the need of emptiness,
Of emptiness itself, and of the sense of emptiness.
And therefore it is you who have impugned these things!
.
8. The Dharma that the buddhas teach
Is wholly founded on two truths:
The "all-concealing" truth of mundane beings
And the truth of ultimate reality.
.
9. Whoever fails to understand
How the two truths are distinguished
Also fails to understand
The profound suchness taught by the enlightened ones.
.
10. Without recourse to the conventional,
The ultimate cannot be shown.
Without the realization of the ultimate,
There is no gaining of nirvana.
.
11. Because their view of voidness is inept,
Those with little wisdom are brought low.
It is as if they grasped a snake ineptly
Or ineptly cast a magic spell.
.
12. Knowing thus how hard it is
For feeble minds to sound its depths,
The Buddha's heart did utterly draw back
From setting forth the Dharma.
.
13. Falsely do you draw your consequences.
With regard to emptiness, they are not valid.
Your denial of emptiness
For me has no validity.
.
14. Where emptiness is granted,
Everything is likewise granted.
Where emptiness is unacceptable,
All is likewise unacceptable.
.
15. You charge me with a fault
That is your very own.
You're like the mounted man
Who overlooks the horse on which he rides!
.
16. If you think phenomena exist
By virtue of their own intrinsic being,
Your view must be that, this being so,
All things are without causes and conditions.
.
17. Thus results, together with their causes,
Agents, tools, and objects of activity,
Production and cessation and results:
All this you have disproved by such a ploy!
.
18. Whatever is dependently arisen
This has been explained as empty.
In dependence upon something else it is imputed [as existent].
This is the Middle Way indeed.
.
19. Because there's nothing that is not
Dependently arisen,
There is nothing
That's not empty.
.
20. And if they were not empty, all these things
Could not arise, nor could they cease.
For you it therefore follows
That the four truths of the Aryas do not exist.
.
21. How can suffering come to pass
If it does not dependently arise?
Impermanence, it has been taught, is suffering.
It cannot therefore have intrinsic being.
.
22. If it has intrinsic being
How can it have origins?
For those therefore who impugn emptiness,
There is no [truth of] origin.
.
23. If suffering has intrinsic being,
No cessation can it have.
By nature it will utterly remain.
Cessation therefore is refuted.
.
24. If the path possesses an intrinsic being,
Its cultivation is untenable.
If the path is something we must cultivate,
It does not have the being you ascribe to it.
.
25. If suffering, origin, cessation,
All are inexistent,
What end of sorrow, through the path,
Do you believe can be attained?
.
26. If the lack of perfect understanding
Has itself intrinsic being,
How can perfect understanding come?
Do not intrinsically existent things remain?
.
27. Likewise, what you call
Relinquishing, attainment, meditation,
Together with the four results,
These will, like perfect understanding, be impossible.
.
28. For those who cling to an intrinsic being,
How can the result be gained,
When, through its own intrinsic being,
Nonachievement also has existence?
.
29. If the result does not exist, there's no one who abides by the result,
Nor are there candidates for it.
Since these eight beings have no existence,
It follows that there is no Sangha.
.
30. And since there are no Noble Truths,
Neither is there sacred Dharma.
And if there is no Dharma and no Sangha,
How could Buddha come to be?
.
31. It follows that the Buddha, in your view,
Does not depend upon enlightenment.
And, in your view, enlightenment
Does not depend upon the Buddha.
.
32. Those who are not buddhas (in your view intrinsically)
Although they strive in bodhisattva deeds
That they may gain enlightenment,
Enlightenment they cannot gain.
.
33. No one ever practices
Virtue or nonvirtue.
For what is to be done with what's not empty?
There is no activity in that which has intrinsic being.
.
34. And even when there is no right or wrong,
Their fruits, in your view, must exist.
Results that come from right or wrong,
According to your view, do not exist.
.
35. If, in your view, results exist,
And come from good or ill,
Results like these how could they not be empty,
Coming as they do from right or wrong?
.
36. Those who have rejected emptiness
Of that which is dependently arisen
Have rejected likewise
All the common practices of worldly beings.
.
37. If you do away with emptiness,
There's no activity at all.
For there would be activity without its being started,
And agents there would be who do not act!
.
38. If beings have intrinsic being,
They are unborn, and they can never cease.
They abide forever,
Free of any change of situation.
.
39. If there is no emptiness,
No attainment can there be of what is unattained,
No ending can there be of sorrow,
No relinquishing of karma and defilements.
.
40. But those who understand that things arise dependently
See likewise [the four truths]
Of Suffering and Origin,
Cessation and the Path.
.
.
.
.
1. "If all these things are empty [you object]
There's no arising and there's no cessation.
What has been relinquished and what ceases
Whereby nirvana, as you claim, occurs?"
.
2. If all these are not empty
There is no arising, and there is no cessation.
What has been relinquished and what ceases
Whereby nirvana, as you claim, occurs?
.
3. No relinquishment and no attainment,
No permanence and no annihilation,
No cessation, no arising-
In these terms has nirvana been described.
.
4. Indeed nirvana cannot be a real existent thing,
For this would mean it's marked by both decay and death.
For there is no existent thing
Exempt from both decay and death.
.
5. If nirvana is a thing,
It is in consequence compounded
For nowhere is there found
A thing that's uncompounded.
.
6. If nirvana is a thing,
How is nirvana not dependent?
A thing that's not dependent
Has no existence anywhere.
.
7. If nirvana's not a real existent thing,
How can it be something that does not exist?
For those for whom nirvana's not a real existent thing,
It cannot be a nonexistent thing.
.
8. If nirvana's not a real existent thing,
How is it independent?
For there is no "nonexistent thing"
That's not dependent [on its contrary].
.
9. Things that come and then depart-
That are dependent things or active causes-
Are not dependent things or active causes:
This is taught to be nirvana.
.
10. Our Teacher has instructed us
That we should leave aside all notions of arising and cessation.
Therefore of nirvana it is rightly said
That it is neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing.
.
11. If nirvana is concurrently
An existent and a nonexistent thing,
A thing that both exists and yet does not exist is liberation.
This, however, makes no sense.
.
12. If nirvana were concurrently
An existent and a nonexistent thing,
Nirvana is not independent
For both depend upon each other.
.
13. How can nirvana be concurrently
An existent and a nonexistent thing?
Nirvana is an uncompounded state,
While both existent things and nonexistent things are composite.
.
14. How could nirvana be concurrently
An existent and a nonexistent thing?
For these two cannot coincide;
They are like light and dark.
.
15. The statement that nirvana's neither
An existent nor a nonexistent thing
Would be established only if
The existent and the nonexistent were established.
.
16. If nirvana's neither an existent
Nor a nonexistent thing,
Who is it who knows this saying:
"It is neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing”?
.
17. Now that the Lord has passed into nirvana,
We cannot say that he exists.
Likewise "he does not exist" we cannot say.
And neither both nor neither can we say of him.
.
18. And when the Lord was still alive,
We cannot say that he existed.
Likewise "he did not exist" we cannot say.
And neither both nor neither can we say of him.
.
19. Samsara does not differ
Even slightly from nirvana.
Nirvana does not differ
Even slightly from samsara.
.
20. The ultimate nature of nirvana
Is the ultimate nature of samsara;
And between these two, the slightest difference,
Even the most subtle, is not found.
.
21. Views concerning what occurs beyond cessation,
The universe's end, its permanence, and all the rest,
Are based upon [the notion of] nirvana,
On a later and an earlier limit.
.
22. Since all existent things are empty,
What is finite; what is infinite?
What's both infinite and finite?
What is neither infinite nor finite?
.
23. What's identical and what is different?
What is permanent and what is impermanent?
What is both impermanent and permanent?
And what indeed is neither of these two?
.
24. Every point of reference subsides;
All conceptual constructs utterly subside.
At no time, nowhere, and to no one
Did the Buddha any Dharma teach.
.
.
.
.
1. Enveloped in the dark of Ignorance,
Beings perform three kinds of Action
That their existence might continue,
Proceeding by such actions to their destiny.
.
2. Conditioned by such actions,
Consciousness arises in the various worlds.
When consciousness has thus migrated,
Name-and-form occur.
.
3. When name-and-form occur,
The six Senses arise.
On the basis of six senses,
Genuine Contact then arises.
.
4. This is only born dependent
On the eye, on form, and on attention.
Dependent upon name-and-form
[Visual] consciousness occurs.
.
5. The gathering of these three
(Of eye and form and consciousness)
Is contact; and from contact,
Feeling comes to pass.
.
6. Through the circumstance of feeling,
Craving comes craving for a feeling.
When craving has arisen, there is
Grasping And of this there are four kinds.
.
7. With grasping, the Becoming
Of the grasper does indeed arise.
But if there is no grasping, there is freedom;
No becoming will there be.
.
8. Becoming presupposes the five aggregates,
And through becoming, Birth occurs,
Then Age-and-Death and misery,
Lamentation, and all sorrow.
.
9. Mental turmoil and unhappiness
Arise because of birth.
And therefrom there arises
What is but a mass, a heap of suffering.
.
10. Actions are samsara's root.
And so the wise refrain from action.
The unwise are the ones who act-
Not the wise indeed, for they see suchness.
.
11. If ignorance is halted,
Actions also do not manifest.
And ignorance in turn is halted
Through discernment and through meditation upon suchness.
.
12. When one link has been stopped,
The link that follows does not manifest.
And thus the mass of suffering itself
Is brought completely to an end.
.
.
.
.
1. To think that in the ages past
One has existed or did not exist,
Or that the world is permanent and so forth—all these views
Depend upon an earlier limit.
.
2. To think that in the ages yet to come
One will exist or else will not exist,
To think this world will have an end-all these views
Depend upon a later limit.
.
3. The claim that "I existed in the past"
Is not acceptable.
For what existed in the past
Is not what is existing now.
.
4. Perhaps you think the former self became the self existing now.
But that which they appropriate is not the same.
Aside from such appropriation,
What is this self of yours?
.
5. You may say that there is no self
Apart from that which it appropriates,
And claim that what's appropriated is the self.
If so, this self of yours does not exist.
.
6. The appropriated [aggregates] are not the self,
For these same aggregates arise and cease.
How could what's appropriated
Be itself appropriator?
.
7. A self apart from the appropriated is not tenable.
For if it were distinct from them,
It should be apprehended separately,
And yet it is not apprehended.
.
8. Thus the self is not distinct from the appropriated,
And it is not that which it appropriates.
There is no self without the latter;
Neither can we certify that it does not exist.
.
9. To say that in the past
The self did not arise is inadmissible.
The self in this life is not alien
From what existed in a previous life.
.
10. For if this present self were alien,
It would exist in absence of the previous self.
And the past self would persist,
And here there would be birth without a perishing in the past.
.
11. This would entail annihilation; actions would not be conserved.
One would suffer the results of deeds
Another had performed:
This and other consequences follow.
.
12. The self is not arisen from a state of nonexistence:
Fallacies would be entailed thereby.
The self would be produced
Or its arising would occur without a cause.
.
13. Thus the views that, in the past,
One has existed or did not exist,
Or both or neither-
None of these are tenable.
.
14. The views that, in the future,
One will come to be
Or else will not exist-
These are like the view related to the past.
.
15. If the human were the god,
There would be permanence.
The god indeed would be unborn,
For in the permanent there is no birth.
.
16. If from the god the man were different,
Then there'd be impermanence.
If the god and man were different,
Then a continuity would be untenable.
.
17. If one part were divine
And one part human,
There would be impermanence and permanence,
And this is also unacceptable.
.
18. If impermanence and permanence
Were both established,
One could claim establishment
Of both nonpermanence and nonimpermanence.
.
19. If one came from somewhere
And then migrated elsewhere,
One's wandering has no starting point.
But this is not the case.
.
20. If nothing permanent exists,
What is it that's impermanent?
What is it that is both impermanent and permanent,
And what is neither of these two?
.
21. If this world had an end,
How could there be a further world?
And if this world had no end,
How could there be a further world?
.
22. Since the aggregates' continuum
Is like the light shed by a lamp,
To say they have an end is incorrect—
As also that they are unending.
.
23. If the past ones were destroyed
And if, depending on the same,
The subsequent did not arise,
The world indeed would have an end.
.
24. If the past ones weren't destroyed
And if, depending on the same,
The subsequent did not arise,
The world indeed would be unending.
.
25. If one part had an end
And one part were unending,
The world would have an end and yet be endless.
This indeed would be absurd.
.
26. How could what appropriates
Be partially destroyed
And partly undestroyed?
Such a thing would be absurd.
.
27. How could what's appropriated
Be in part destroyed
And partly undestroyed?
Such a thing would also be absurd.
.
28. If the finite and the infinite
Were both established,
One could assert establishment
Of both nonfinite and noninfinite.
.
29. And yet, since each and every thing is empty,
To whom and where,
And for what reason should the views
Of permanence and all the rest occur?
.
.
.
.
To him who in compassionate wisdom taught
the Sacred Dharma
For the shunning of all views,
To him, to Gautama, I bow.
.
.
.
.
This concludes the Root Stanzas of the Middle Way Called Supreme Wisdom. This text, which presents the Abhidharma of the Great Vehicle and reveals the nature of the ultimate truth by throwing light upon the method of transcendent wisdom, was composed by the sublime master and great being, the noble Nagarjuna whose wisdom and compassion are beyond compare, inasmuch as, having explained the unsurpassed vehicle of the tathagatas, he attained the ground of Perfect Joy and de- parted for the buddhafield of Sukhavati, thence to become in the world system called Shining Light-the buddha known as Wisdom- Granting Light.
.
At the behest of his glorious and divine majesty, the great king, the mighty and most holy sovereign [Trisong Detsen], this text was translated by the great Indian abbot Jnanagarbha, a master of the Mid- dle Way, and the monk translator Chokro Lui Gyaltsen, who edited and finalized its meaning, in a text of 449 stanzas in twenty-seven chapters, thus equivalent to one and a half books.
.
Later, during the reign of King Aryadeva, in the monastery of Ratnagupta, the Hidden Jewel, in the incomparable city of Anuparna in Kashmir, the translation was revised according to Chandrakirti's com- mentary, the Prasannapada, by the Kashmiri abbot Hasumati and the Tibetan translator Patsap Nyima Drak.
.
Finally, at the temple of Rasa Trulnang (in Lhasa), the definitive version of the text was established by the Indian abbot Kanaka and the <same translator Patsap Nyima Drak.