Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
"Root Verses on the Middle Way" by Nagarjuna
Verses Only - transl. Stephen Batchelor
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
"Root Verses on the Middle Way" by Nagarjuna
Verses Only - transl. Stephen Batchelor
Last update: December 27, 2025
Image from: Stoneflower013
Source Text:
Previous-chapter Home Next-chapter
.
https://www.wisdomlib.org/buddhism/book/mulamadhyamaka-karika-english/d/doc79715.html
.
.
.
Chapter 1 - Investigation of Conditions
Chapter 2 - Investigation of Coming and Going
Chapter 3 - Investigation of the Sense Organs
Chapter 4 - Investigation of the Aggregates
Chapter 5 - Investigation of the Elements
Chapter 6 - Investigation of Desire and the Desirous One
Chapter 7 - Investigation of Birth, Abiding and Perishing
Chapter 8 - Investigation of Act and Actor
Chapter 9 - Investigation of the Presence of Something Prior
Chapter 10 - Investigation of Fire and Firewood
Chapter 11 - Investigation of Extremes of Before and After
Chapter 12 - Investigation of Anguish
Chapter 13 - Investigation of Samskaras
Chapter 14 - Investigation of Connections
Chapter 15 - Investigation of Essences
Chapter 16 - Investigation of Bondage and Freedom
Chapter 17 - Investigation of Actions and Fruits
Chapter 18 - Investigation of Self and Things
Chapter 19 - Investigation of Time
Chapter 20 - Investigation of Combination
Chapter 21 - Investigation of Rising and Passing
Chapter 22 - Investigation of Tathagata
Chapter 23 - Investigation of Error
Chapter 24 - Investigation of the Ennobling Truths
Chapter 25 - Investigation of Nirvana
Chapter 26 - Analysis of the Twelve Links of Becoming
Chapter 27 - Investigation of Views
.
.
.
.
1. No thing anywhere is ever born from itself, from something else, from both or without a cause.
2. There are four conditions: Causes, objects, immediate and dominant. There is no fifth.
3. The essence of things does not exist in conditions and so on. If an own thing does not exist, an other thing does not exist.
4. There is no activity which has conditions. There is no activity which does not have conditions. There are no conditions which do not have activity, and none which do have activity.
5. Since something is born in dependence upon them, then they are known as "conditions". As long as it is not born, why are they not non-conditions?
6. It is impossible for something that either exists or not to have conditions. If it were non-existent, of what would these be the conditions? If it were existent, why would it need conditions?
7. When things cannot be established as either existent, non-existent or both, how can one speak of an "establishing cause." Such would be impossible.
8. An existent phenomenon is clearly said to have no object at all. If the phenomenon has no object, where can the object exist?
9. If phenomena are not born, it is invalid for there to be cessation. Therefore, an immediate [condition] is unreasonable. What, having ceased, can also be a condition?
10. Because the existence of essence-less things does not exist, it is incorrect to say:"When this exists, that arises."
11. There is no effect at all in the conditions individually or together. How can that which is not in the conditions itself be born from conditions?
12. If, although the effect is not there, it is born from those conditions, why is an effect not born from what are not its conditions?
13. Effects [are of] the nature of conditions. Conditions do not have own nature. How can those effects of what does not have own nature [be of] the nature of conditions?
14. Therefore, [it does] not have the nature of conditions, nor is there an effect with the nature of non-conditions. Since there is no effect, what could [be its] non-conditions or conditions?
.
.
.
.
1. Then there is no going in what has gone; there is no going also in what has not [yet] gone. Motion is unknowable apart from what has gone and not [yet] gone.
2. Where there is moving, there there is going. Furthermore, because moving is within motion -- and is neither gone nor not [yet] gone, therefore, there is going within motion.
3. How can going be possible within motion? Because motion that is not going is impossible.
4. For whomever there is going within motion, for him it will follow that there [could be] no going within motion, because there is going within motion.
5. If there were going within motion, it would follow that going would be twofold: that by which one becomes someone in motion [in a place] and [that by which one] goes in that [place].
6. If going were twofold, the goer also would be twofold, because going is impossible without a goer.
7. If there were no goer, going would be impossible. If there were no going, where could a goer be existent?
8. When a goer does not go, a non-goer cannot go; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could go? [cf. v. 15]
9. When a goer* is impossible without going, then how is it possible to say: "a goer goes"?
10. To claim that a goer goes implies that there could be a goer who does not go, because it is asserted that a goer goes. [cf. v. 4]
11. If the goer goes, it would follow that going would be twofold: that which reveals* the goer and that which goes once [one] has become a goer.
12. If a beginning of going does not exist in what has gone, [if] a beginning of going does not exist also in what has not [yet] gone [and if] there does not exist a beginning within motion, wherein is a beginning of going made?
13. Before a beginning of going, there is not any motion or anything which has gone wherein going could begin. How can going exist in what has not [yet] gone?
14. If a beginning of going is simply not apparent in any way, examine: what has gone? what is motion? what has not [yet] gone?
15. When a goer does not stay, a non-goer cannot stay; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could stay? [cf. v. 8]
16. When a goer is not possible without going, how then is it possible [to say]: "a goer stays."
17. There is no reversal of motion*, nor of what has gone [and] what has not [yet] gone. [Reversal of] going, engagement [to stay] and reversal [of staying] are similar to going.
18. It is inappropriate to say: "going and a goer are the same." It is inappropriate to say: "going and a goer are different."
19. If whatever is going were a goer, it would follow that the actor and the act would be the same too.
20. If going and a goer were conceived as different, there could be going without a goer and a goer without going.
21. If things are not established as the same and as different, how can they be established?
22. That very going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because there is no [goer] before going, who would be going where?
23. [A going] which is other than the going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because it is impossible for going to be twofold within a single goer.
24. One who is a goer does not go in the three aspects of going. Also one who is not [a goer] does not go in the three aspects of going.
25. One who is and is not [a goer] also does not go in the three aspects of going. Therefore, going and a goer and also that which is gone over do not exist.
.
.
.
.
1. Seeing and hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind are the six sense organs; their experienced objects are what-is-seen and so forth.
2. Seeing does not see itself. How can what does not see itself see anything else?
3. The example of fire is not able to fully establish seeing. It, along with seeing, has been refuted by gone, not gone and going.
4. When not seeing the slightest thing, there is no act of seeing. How can it [then] be reasonable to say: seeing sees?
5. Seeing does not see; non-seeing does not see. It should be understood that seeing explains the seer too.
6. Without letting go of [seeing] a seer does not exist; in letting go of seeing, there is also [no seer]. If there is no seer, where can there be what-is-seen and seeing?
7. Just as it is said that a child emerges in dependence on a father and a mother, likewise it is said that consciousness emerges in dependence upon an eye and a visual form.
8. Because there is no what-is-seen and no seeing, the four such as consciousness do not exist. How can clinging etc. exist?
9. It should be understood that seeing explains hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind, hearer, what is heard, etc.
.
.
.
.
1. Apart from the cause of form, form is not perceived. Apart from "form", the cause of form also does not appear.
2. If there were form apart from the cause of form, it would follow that form is without cause; there is no object at all that is without cause.
3. If a cause of form existed apart from form, it would exist as a cause without fruit; causes without fruit do not exist.
4. If form existed, a cause of form would be untenable; if form did not exist, a cause of form would be untenable.
5. Forms which do not have a cause are not at all tenable. Therefore, do not conceive the concept of form at all*.
6. It is untenable to say, "the fruit is like the cause." It is also untenable to say, "the fruit is unlike the cause."
7. Feeling and perception, impulses and mind and all things are comparable in every aspect, at every stage with form.
8. When having argued by means of emptiness, everything of that one who objects is not an objection; it is similar to what is to be established .
9. When having explained by means of emptiness, everything of that one who finds fault is not a fault; it is similar to what is to be established.
.
.
.
.
1. Not the slightest bit of space exists prior to the characteristics of space. If [space] existed prior to its characteristics, it would follow that it would be without characteristics.
2. A thing without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all. If a thing without characteristics does not exist, to what do characteristics extend?
3. Characteristics do not extend to that which has no characteristics; nor to what possesses characteristics. They also cannot extend to something other than what either possesses or does not have characteristics.
4. If characteristics do not extend [to something] , something characterized would be impossible. If something characterized is impossible, characteristics too would not exist.
5. Therefore, something characterized does not exist and characteristics do not exist. There also does not exist a thing which is apart from being something characterized or a characteristic.
6. If there is not a thing, of what can there be a non-thing? By whom are the opposites thing and non-thing known [as] a thing and a non-thing?
7. Therefore, space is not a thing; it is not a non-thing; it is not something characterized; it is not a characteristic. The other five elements too are similar to space.
8. Those of small minds see things as existent and non-existent. They do not behold the utter pacification of what is seen.
.
.
.
.
1. If a desirous one without desire exists before desire, desire would exist dependent on that [desirous one]. [When] a desirous one exists, desire exists.
2. If there were no desirous one, how could there be desire? The same follows for the desirous one too: [it depends on] whether desire exists or not.
3. It is not reasonable for desire and the desirous one to arise as co-existent. In this way desire and the desirous one would not be mutually contingent.
4. Identity has no co-existence: something cannot be co-existent with itself. If there were difference, how could there be co-existence?
5. If the identical were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated; if the different were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated.
6. If the different were co-existent, how would desire and the desirous one be established as different or, if that were so, [how would] those two be co-existent?
7. If desire and the desirous were established as different, because of what could one understand them as co-existent?
8. If one asserts them to be co-existent because they are not established as different, then because they would be very much established as co-existent, would one not also have to assert them to be different?
9. Since different things are not established, co-existent things are not established. If there existed any different things, one could assert them as co-existent things.
10. In that way, desire and the desirous one are not established as co-existent or not co-existent. Like desire, all phenomena are not established as co-existent or not co-existent.
.
.
.
.
1. If birth were compounded, it would possess the three characteristics [of a compound]. If birth were uncompounded, how would it be a characteristic of a compound?
2. The three such as birth cannot individually be that which characterizes compounds. How is it possible for one at one time to be compounded [of all three]?
3. If birth, abiding and perishing had another characteristic of being compounded, this would be endless. If not, they would not be compounded.
4. The birth of birth gives birth to the root birth alone. The root birth also is that which gives birth to the birth of birth.
5. If your birth of birth gives birth to the root birth, how does that which is not yet born from your root give birth to that [root birth]?
6. If that which is born from your root birth gives birth to the root, how does that root which is born from that give birth to that [from which it is born]?
7. If that which has not been born is able to give birth to that, that of yours which is being born should be able to give birth to that.
8. Just as lamplight illuminates itself and others, likewise birth too gives birth to both itself and the thing of others.
9. Wherever lamplight is present there is no darkness. How does lamplight illuminate? It illuminates by dispelling darkness.
10. If, when lamplight is being generated, it does not encounter darkness, how does the generation of lamplight dispel darkness?
11. If darkness is dispelled even though it does not encounter lamplight, this [lamplight] dwelling here would eliminate the darkness that dwells in all the worlds.
12. If lamplight illuminated itself and that of others, darkness too would without doubt obscure itself and the thing of others.
13. How can unborn birth give birth to itself? If the born gives birth, when it has been born, what would be born?
14. Born and the unborn - being born does not in any way give birth. That has been explained by the gone, not gone and going.
15. When being born does not arise in what is born, then how can one say "[it is] being born in dependence on the born"?
16. Whatever is dependently arising, such is by nature pacified. Therefore, being born and what is born too are pacified.
17. If any unborn thing existed anywhere, upon being born that [unborn] thing would not exist. If so, what would be born?
18. If that which has been born gives birth to what is being born, what [other thing] that has been born would be giving birth to that which has been born?
19. If another [thing] that has been born gives birth [to it], this would be endless. If it is born without [another] which has been born [OR if it is born without being born], everything would be born like that [i.e. causelessly].
20. Thus it is neither reasonable for what exists nor does not exist to be born. It has been shown above that there is neither existent nor non-existent.
21. It is not tenable for a thing that is perishing to be born. It is not tenable for that which is not perishing to be a thing.
22. A thing that has remained does not remain. A thing that has not [yet] remained does not remain. That which is remaining also does not remain. What unborn [thing] can remain?
23. It is not possible for a thing that is perishing to remain. It is not possible for that which is not perishing to be a thing.
24. If all things at all times are aging and dying phenomena, what things are there which could remain without aging and dying?
25. It is not reasonable for what remains to remain due to something else that remains or due to itself. This is like how what has been born is neither given birth to by itself nor another. [cf. v.18-19]
26. What has ceased does not cease. What has not ceased also does not cease. Likewise what is ceasing also does not. What unborn [thing] can cease? [cf. v. 22]
27. It is not possible for a thing which has remained to cease. It is also not possible for a thing which has not remained to cease.
28. A particular state [of something] does not cause that particular state itself to cease. Moreover, another particular state does not cause that particular state to cease.
29. When the birth of all phenomena is not possible, then the cessation of all phenomena is not possible.
30. Cessation is not possible in an existent thing. Thingness and nothingness are not possible in one.
31. Cessation is not possible also in what is not a thing. This is similar to how there is no cutting off a second head. [i.e. a person cannot be beheaded twice]
32. Cessation does not exist by its own self, nor does cessation [exist] by something else. This is like how what has been born is neither given birth to by itself nor another [cf. 25]
33. Because birth and remaining and perishing are not established, there is no conditioned. Because the conditioned is utterly unestablished, how can the unconditioned be established?
34. Like a dream, like a magician's illusion, like a city of gandharvas, likewise birth and likewise remaining, likewise perishing are taught.
.
.
.
.
1. One who exists as an actor does not do that which exists as an act. One who does not exist as an actor also does not do that which does not exist as an act.
2. One who exists has no activity; [something] would also exist as an act without an actor. One who exists has no activity; [something] would also exist as an actor without an act.
3. If one who does not exist as an actor did that which does not exist as an act, the act would have no cause; the actor too would have no cause.
4. If there were no cause, effect and cause would not be evident. If they were non-existent, activity and agent and doing would not be evident.
5. If activity etc. did not appear, dharma and adharma would not be evident. If dharma and adharma did not exist, there would be no fruit that comes from them.
6. If there were no fruit, the path of liberation and higher states would not be appropriate. Also it would follow that all activities are meaningless.
7. One who exists and does not exist as an actor does not do what exists and does not exist [as an act]. Since existence and non-existence are mutually contradictory in one [thing], where can they exist?
8. One who exists as an actor does not do an act which is not existent. One who does not exist [as an actor] also does not do what exists [as an act]. Here too faults will follow for one.
9. One who exists as an actor does not do what does not exist as an act and what neither exists or not [as an act], because of what was demonstrated by the proof above.
10. One who does not exist as an actor does not do what exists as an act and what neither exists or not [as an act], because of what was demonstrated by the proof above.
11. One who neither exists nor does not exist as an actor does not do that which exists and does not exist as an act. Here too this is to be known through the proof demonstrated above.
12. An actor depends on acts and acts too occur in dependence on an actor. Apart from this, one does not see a cause which is established.
13. Likewise, one should understand clinging, because act and actor are dispelled. Remaining things too should be understood by means of actor and act.
.
.
.
.
1. Some say that whatever is involved in seeing, hearing, and feeling etc. exists prior to them.
2. If [that] thing is not evident, how can there be seeing etc? Therefore, the presence [of that] thing [must] exist before them.
3. What configures / makes known that thing which is present before seeing, hearing, and feeling, etc.?
4. If it were present even without seeing, etc., there would be no doubt that they would exist even without it.
5. It is illuminated by them; they are illuminated by it. How could it exist without them? How could they exist without it?
6. It is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc. From among seeing etc. a different one illuminates [it] at different times.
7. If it is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc., how can it be evident prior to [each of them] seeing etc. individually?
8. If the seer itself [were] the hearer and the feeler [were] it too, if it existed prior to each, in that way it would not make sense.
9. If the seer were different, the hearer different, the feeler different, at the time the seer exists, there would be a hearer. Many selves would come about.
10. Also it is not evident in the elements from which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. occur.
11. If that to which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. belong is not evident, they too could not be evident.
12. Reject the concepts "it exists," "it doesn't exist" about that which is not evident prior to, now or after seeing etc.
.
.
.
.
1. If firewood were fire, actor and act would be one. If fire were other than wood, it would occur even without wood.
2. [Fire] would burn permanently and would not arise from causes for burning. Starting [a fire] would be meaningless. If it were like that, there would also be no act.
3. Because [fire] does not depend on anything else, it would not arise from causes for burning. If it burned permanently, starting it would be meaningless.
4. Concerning this, if one thinks that while burning it is firewood, if it is such only at that time, by what could that firewood be ignited?
5. Because [fire] is other, it would not connect; if it did not connect, it would not ignite; if it did not ignite, it would not die; if it did not die, it would also remain in possession of its own characteristic.
6. Just as a woman connects with a man and a man too with a woman, although fire is other than wood, it is fit to connect with wood.
7. If fire and wood eliminated each other, even though fire is something other than wood, it would have to connect with wood.
8. If fire were dependent on wood and wood were dependent on fire, of what becomes fire and wood dependently, which would be established first?
9. If fire were dependent on wood, [already] established fire would be established [again]. Firewood also would be [such] even without fire.
10. If a thing (A) is established dependently (on B), [but] if what it depends upon (B) is established also in dependence on that very thing (A), what would be established in dependence on what?
11. How can a thing (A) which is established dependently (on B) be dependent (on B) when it (A) is not established? If one asks, "how can establishment be dependent?" It is not reasonable for it (A) to be dependent.
12. There is no fire that is dependent on wood; there is also no fire that is not dependent on wood. There is no wood that is dependent on fire; there is also no wood that is not dependent on fire.
13. Fire does not come from something else; fire also does not exist in wood. Likewise, the remainder of wood has been shown by gone, not-gone and going.
14. Wood itself is not fire; fire is also not something other than wood. Fire does not possess wood; wood does not exist in fire; that (fire) does not exist in it.
15. Through fire and wood is explained without exception all the stages of self and the grasped and at the same time jugs, cloth and so on.
16. I do not think those who teach the identity or difference of self and things are wise in the meaning of the teaching.
.
.
.
.
1. When asked, "is a before-extreme evident?" the great Muni said, "it is not." Samsara has no beginning, no end; it has no before, no after.
2. For that without beginning [and] end, where can a middle be in that? Therefore, it is not possible for it to have before, after, and simultaneous phases.
3. If birth were before and aging / death after, there would be birth without aging / death and also without dying one would be born.
4. If birth were after and aging / death before, how could there be an uncaused aging / death which has no birth?
5. It is not suitable for birth and aging / death to be simultaneous; that which is being born would be dying and both would be without cause.
6. Why fixate on that birth, that aging / dying, for which the phases of before, after, simultaneity are impossible?
7. It is not just samsara alone that has no before-extreme, cause and fruit themselves, and characteristics and the basis for characteristics themselves,
8. Feeling and the feeler, whatever is suitable to bear meaning, also all things have no before-extreme.
.
.
.
.
1. Some assert that anguish arises from being made by self, made by other, by both, without cause. To do that is not suitable.
2. If it were made by self, therefore it would not be contingently arising, because those aggregates arise contingently on these aggregates.
3. If that were other than this and if this were other than that, anguish would be made by other and that would be made by those others.
4. If anguish were made by one's own person, who would that person be who has made anguish by himself, but is not included in the anguish?
5. If anguish arose from another person, how could it be suitable for there to be [someone] not included in the anguish, who has been given it by another who made the anguish?
6. If anguish arose [from] another person, who would that other person be who, having made it, gives it to someone else, but is not included in the anguish?
7. Since it is not established as made by self, how can anguish have been made by other? [For] whatever anguish is made by other, that has been made by his self.
8. Anguish is not made [by] self; that is not made by that itself. If it is not made by an other self, how can anguish be made by other?
9. If it is made by each, anguish would be made by both. Not made by self, not made by other, how can anguish have no cause?
10. Not only does anguish alone not have the four aspects, external things too do not have the four aspects.
.
.
.
.
1. The Bhagavan said that whatever dharma is deceptive, that is false. All conditions [are] deceptive dharmas, thus they are false.
2. If whatever is a deceptive phenomenon is false, what is deceptive about it [in what way is it deceptive]? That statement by the Bhagavan is a complete presentation of emptiness.
3. Things have no essential nature because they are seen to change into something else. Things do not lack an essential nature because things are emptiness.
4. If there were no essential nature, whose [nature] would it be to change into something else? If there were an essential nature, how would it be possible to change into something else?
5. This itself does not change into something else. The other itself too does not [either]. Because youth does not age. Because age too does not age.
6. If this itself changes into something else, milk itself would be curds. Something other than milk would be the being of curds.
7. If a bit of the non-empty existed, a bit of the empty would also exist. If there did not exist a bit of the non-empty, how could the empty exist?
8. The Conquerors taught emptiness as the forsaking of all views. Those who view emptiness are taught to be without realisation [incurable / incorrigible].
.
.
.
.
1. The seen, the seeing and the seer: these three do not mutually connect [as] pairs or all [together].
2. Likewise desire, desiring and the desired, the remaining afflictions and also the remaining sense-fields do [not connect] by three aspects.
3. If the other connects to the other, because the seen and so forth do not exist [as] other, therefore there is no connection.
4. Not only are the seen and so forth alone not existing as other, it is invalid for anything simultaneous with something to be other [than it].
5. The other is other in dependence upon the other. Without the other, the other would not be other. It is invalid for whatever is dependent on something to be other than that.
6. If the other was other than the other, then, without the other, it would be other. Without the other it would not be other. Therefore, it does not exist.
7. Otherness does not exist in the other. Nor does it exist in what is not other. If otherness does not exist, neither the other nor that itself exists.
8. That does not connect with that. The other too does not connect with the other. The connecting, the connection and the connector too do not exist.
.
.
.
.
1. It is unreasonable for an essence to arise from causes and conditions. Whatever essence arose from causes and conditions would be something that has been made.
2. How is it possible for there to be "an essence which has been made?" Essences are not contrived and not dependent on anything else.
3. If an essence does not exist, how can the thingness of the other exist? [For] the essence of the thingness of the other is said to be the thingness of the other.
4. Apart from an essence and the thingness of the other, what things are there? If essences and thingnesses of others existed, things would be established.
5. If things were not established, non-things would not be established. [When] a thing becomes something else, people say that it is a non-thing.
6. Those who view essence, thingness of the other, things and non-things do not see the suchness in the teaching of the awakened.
7. Through knowing things and non-things, the Buddha negated both existence and non-existence in his Advice to Katyayana.
8. If [things] existed essentially, they would not come to non-existence. It is never the case that an essence could become something else.
9. If essences did not exist, what could become something else? Even if essences existed, what could become something else?
10. "Existence" is the grasping at permanence; "non-existence" is the view of annihilation. Therefore, the wise do not dwell, in existence or non-existence.
11. "Since that which exists by its essence is not non-existent," is [the view of] permanence. "That which arose before is now non-existent,"leads to [the view of] annihilation.
.
.
.
.
1. If it is said that impulses are "samsara", if they were permanent, they would not move around. Even if impermanent, they would not move around. Sentient beings too are similar in this respect.
2. If it is said that persons "move around," if they are non-existent when searched for in five aspects among the aggregates, sense fields and elements, what would move around?
3. If one moves around in having clung [to something] and then clinging [to something else], there would be no becoming. If there were no clinging and no becoming, who would move around?
4. It is in no way feasible that impulses go beyond misery. And it is in no way feasible that living beings go beyond misery.
5. Impulses that have the properties of being born and dying are not bound and will not be freed. In the same way as above living beings too are not bound and will not be freed.
6. If clinging binds, the one who has clinging would not be bound. And there would be no bondage without clinging. In what situation would there be bondage?
7. If binding existed prior to one who is bound, [that unbound person] would depend on binding. That too cannot be. The rest has been explained by the gone, the not-gone and the going.
8. Those who are bound will not be free. And those who are not bound will not be free. If those who are bound become free, bondage and freedom would be simultaneous.
9. "I, without clinging, am beyond misery. Nirvana is mine." Those who grasp in that way have great grasping and clinging.
10. When nirvana is not born and samsara not eliminated, then what is samsara? And what is considered as nirvana?
.
.
.
.
1. Restraining oneself well and loving thoughts that benefit others are the Dharma which is the seed of fruits here and elsewhere.
2. The great sage has taught all actions to be intention and what is intended. The specifics of those actions are well known to be of many kinds.
3. In this respect action spoken of as "intention" is regarded as being that of mind. That spoken of as "what is intended" is regarded as being that of body and speech.
4. Whatever (1) speech and (2) movements and (3) "unconscious not-letting-go," (4) other kinds of unconscious letting-go are also regarded like that.
5. (5) Goodness that arises from enjoyment / use and in the same manner (6) what is not goodness, [and] (7) intention. These seven dharmas are clearly regarded as action.
6. If the action remained until the time of ripening, it would become permanent. If it stopped, by having stopped, how could a fruit be born?
7. The continuum of sprouts and so on clearly emerges from seeds, and from that fruits. If there were no seeds, they too would not emerge.
8. Because continuums are from seeds and fruits emerge from continuums and seeds precede fruits, therefore, there is no annihilation and no permanence.
9. The continuum of mind clearly emerges from mind, and from that fruits. If there were no mind, they too would not emerge.
10. Because continuums are from minds and fruits emerge from continuums and actions precede fruits, therefore, there is no annihilation and no permanence.
11. The ten paths of white action are the means of practising Dharma. Here and elsewhere, the fruits of Dharma are the five kinds of sensual qualities.
12. If it were as that investigation, many great mistakes would occur. Therefore, that investigation is not valid here.
13. I will fully declare the investigation which is taught by the Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas and Sravakas, which is valid here.
14. Just like a contract, irrevocable action is like a debt. In terms of realms, there are four types. Moreover, its nature is unspecified.
15. It is not let go of by letting go, but only let go of by cultivation. Therefore through irrevocability are the fruits of acts produced.
16. If it perished through being let go of by letting go and the transcendence of the action, then faults would follow such as the perishing of actions.
17. The very [irrevocability] of all actions in similar or dissimilar realms, that one alone is born when crossing the boundary [i.e. reborn].
18. In the visible world there are two kinds. Actions of all [types] and that [irrevocability] of actions are produced as different things and remain [so?] even on ripening.
19. When the fruit is transcendent and when one dies, that ceases. One should know its divisions to be without-corruption and with-corruption.
20. Emptiness is not annihilation and samsara is not permanent. The dharma of the irrevocability of actions is taught by the Buddha.
21. Because actions are not born, in this way they have no nature. Therefore, because they are not born, therefore they are irrevocable.
22. If actions existed [by] nature, without doubt they would be permanent. Actions would not be done [by an agent] because what is permanent cannot be done.
23. If actions were not done [by anyone], one would fear meeting what [one] has not done. Also the fault would follow for that [person] of not dwelling in the pure life.
24. All conventions also without doubt would be contradictory. Also the distinction between doing good and evil would not be valid.
25. [When] the ripening of that [action] has ripened it would ripen again and again, because if it existed [by] nature, it would [always] remain.
26. This action has the character of affliction and afflictions are not real. If affliction is not real, how can action be real?
27. Actions and afflictions are taught to be the conditions for bodies. If actions and afflictions are empty, how can one speak of bodies?
28. People who are obscured by ignorance, those with craving, are the consumers [of the fruits of action]. They are not other than those who do the action and they are also not those very ones.
29. Because the action does not emerge from conditions and does not emerge from non-conditions, therefore, the agent too does not exist.
30. If neither the action nor the agent exists, where can there be a fruit of the action? If the fruit does not exist, where can the consumer exist?
31. Just as a teacher creates a creation by a wealth of magical powers, and just as if that creation too created, again another would be created,
32. Like this, whatever action too done by that agent [is] also like the aspect of a creation. It is just like, for example, a creation creating another creation.
33. Afflictions, actions and bodies and agents and fruits are like a city of gandharvas, a mirage, a dream.
.
.
.
.
1. If the aggregates were self, it would be possessed of arising and decaying. If it were other than the aggregates, it would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.
2. If the self did not exist, where could what is mine exist? In order to pacify self and what is mine, grasping I and grasping mine can exist no more.
3. The one who does not grasp at me and mine likewise does not exist. Whoever sees the one who does not grasp at me and mine does not see. ([c-d are omitted from the translated verse on the grounds of their being a reiteration of a-b])
4. When one ceases thinking of inner and outer things as self and mine, clinging will come to a stop. Through that ceasing, birth will cease.
5. Through the ceasing of action and affliction, there is freedom. Action and affliction [come] from thoughts and they from fixations. Fixations are stopped by emptiness.
6. It is said that "there is a self," but "non-self" too is taught. The buddhas also teach there is nothing which is "neither self nor non-self." (Tsongkhapa (325) cites the Kasyapaparvrtti as a source here).
7. That to which language refers is denied, because an object experienced by the mind is denied. The unborn and unceasing nature of reality is comparable to nirvana. [Tsongkhapa (326) explains that c-d are an answer to the question implied in 5c-d, i.e. "how does emptiness stop fixations?"]
8. Everything is real, not real; both real and not real; neither not real nor real: this is the teaching of the Buddha.
9. Not known through others, peaceful, not fixed by fixations, without conceptual thought, without differentiation: these are the characteristics of suchness.
10. Whatever arises dependent on something else is at that time neither that very thing nor other than it. Hence it is neither severed nor permanent.
11. That ambrosial teaching of the buddhas, those guardians of the world, is neither the same nor different, neither severed nor permanent.
12. When perfect buddhas do not appear, and when their disciples have died out, the wisdom of the self-awakened ones will vividly arise without reliance.
.
.
.
.
1. If the present and the future were contingent on the past, then the present and the future would have existed in the past.
2. If the present and future did not exist there, then how could the present and the future be contingent on it?
3. Without being contingent on the past neither can be established. Hence the present and the future times also do not exist.
4. These very stages can be applied to the other two. Superior, inferior, middling etc., singularity and so on can also be understood [thus].
5. Non-dwelling time cannot be apprehended. Since time which can be apprehended, does not exist as something which dwells, how can one talk of unapprehendable time?
6. If time depended on things, where would time which is a non-thing exist? If there were no things at all, where would a view of time exist?
.
.
.
.
1. If a fruit is born from the combination of cause and conditions and exists in the combination, how can it be born from the combination itself?
2. If a fruit is born from the combination of cause and conditions and does not exist in the combination, how can it be born from the combination itself?
3. If the fruit exists in the combination of cause and conditions, it would be correct for it to be apprehendable in the combination but it is not apprehendable in the combination.
4. If the fruit does not exist in the combination of cause and conditions, the causes and conditions would be comparable to non-causes and conditions.
5. If the cause stops once it has given the cause to the fruit, there would be a double nature of the cause: one that gives and one that stops.
6. If the cause stops without having given the cause to the fruit, those fruits which are born after the cause has stopped would be uncaused.
7. If the fruit were also born at the same time as the combination, it would follow that the producer and the produced would be simultaneous.
8. If the fruit were born prior to the combination, there would occur an uncaused fruit which has no cause and conditions.
9. If [when] a cause stops, it is forever transferred to the fruit, then it would follow that the cause which was born before would be born again.
10. How can the production of fruit be produced by the stopping and disappearing [of something]? Also how can fruit be produced by related causes which persist with it?
11. If cause and fruit are not related, what fruit can be produced? Causes do not produce fruits they either see or don't see.
12. The simultaneous connection of a past fruit with a past, a future and a present cause never exists.
13. The simultaneous connection of a present fruit with a future, a past and a present cause never exists.
14. The simultaneous connection of a future fruit with a present, a future and a past cause never exists.
15. When there is no connection, how can a cause produce fruit? Even when there is connection, how can a cause produce fruit?
16. If a cause is empty of fruit, how can it produce fruit? If a cause is not empty of fruit, how can it produce fruit?
17. Unempty fruit would not be produced; the unempty would not stop. That unempty is unstoppable and also unproducable.
18. How would empty [fruit] be produced? And how would the empty stop? It follows that that empty too is unstoppable and also unproducable.
19. It is never possible that cause and fruit are identical. It is never possible that cause and fruit are other.
20. If cause and fruit were identical, produce and producer would be identical. If cause and fruit were other, cause and non-cause would be similar.
21. If fruit existed essentially, what would a cause produce? If fruit did not exist essentially, what would a cause produce?
22. If it were not productive, the cause itself would be impossible. If the cause itself were impossible, whose would the fruit be?
23. If whatever is a combination of causes and conditions does not produce itself by itself, how could it produce fruit?
24. Therefore, there is no fruit which has been made by combination [or] made by non-combination. If fruit does not exist, where can a combination of conditions exist?
.
.
.
.
1. Passing does not exist without or together with rising. Rising does not exist without or together with passing.
2. How can passing exist without rising? Is there death without birth? There is no passing without rising.
3. How could passing exist together with rising? Death does not exist at the same time as birth.
4. How could rising exist without passing? Things are never not impermanent.
5. How could rising exist together with passing? Birth does not exist at the same time as death.
6. How can those that are not established either mutually together or not mutually together be established?
7. The finished does not rise; the unfinished too does not rise; the finished does not pass; the unfinished too does not pass.
8. Rising and passing do not exist without the existence of things. Things do not exist without the existence of rising and passing.
9. Rising and passing are not possible for the empty; rising, passing are not possible for the non-empty also.
10. Rising and passing cannot possibly be one; rising and passing also cannot possibly be other.
11. If you think that you can see rising and passing, rising and passing are seen by delusion.
12. Things are not created from things; things are not created from nothing; nothing is not created from nothing; nothing is not created from things.
13. Things are not created from themselves, nor are they created from something else; they are not created from [both] themselves and something else. How are they created?
14. If you assert the existence of things, the views of eternalism and annihilationism will follow, because things are permanent and impermanent.
15. If you assert the existence of things, eternalism and annihilationism will not be, because the continuity of the rising and passing of cause -effect is becoming.
16. If the continuity of the rising and passing of cause-effect is becoming, because what has passed will not be created again, it will follow that the cause is annihilated.
17. If things exist essentially, it would be unreasonable [for them] to become nothing. At the time of nirvana [they] would be annihilated, because the continuity of becoming is totally pacified.
18. If the end stops, it is unreasonable for there to be a beginning of becoming. When the end does not stop, it is unreasonable for there to be a beginning of becoming.
19. If the beginning is created while the end is stopping, the stopping would be one and the creating would be another.
20. If it is also unreasonable for stopping and creating to be together, aren't the aggregates that die also those that are created?
21. Likewise, if the continuity of becoming is not reasonable at any of the three times, how can there be a continuity of becoming which is non-existent in the three times?
.
.
.
.
1. Not the aggregates, not other than the aggregates; the aggregates are not in him; he is not in them: the Tathagata does not possess the aggregates. What is the Tathagata?
2. If the buddha depends on the aggregates, he does not exist from an own-nature. How can that which does not exist from an own-nature exist from an other-nature?
3. It is not tenable for something dependent on other-nature to be self-existent. How can that which has no self-existence be tathagata?
4. If self-nature does not exist, how can there be the existence of other-nature? What is a Tathagata apart from own-nature and other-nature?
5. If there exists a tathagata [who is] not depending on the aggregates, he exists in depending [on them] now and will henceforth depend.
6. If there does not exist a tathagata [who is] not depending on the aggregates, how does he grasp [depend on? them]?
7. [Since] there is nothing to be grasped / dependent on, there can be no grasping / depending. There is no tathagata at all who is without grasping / depending.
8. If having examined in five ways, how can that tathagata who does not exist as that one or the other be [conventionally] understood by grasping / depending?
9. That which is grasped / depended on does not exist from its own nature. It is impossible for that which does not exist from its own nature to exist from another nature.
10. In that way, what is grasped / depended on and what grasps / depends are empty in every aspect. How can an empty tathagata be [conventionally] understood by what is empty?
11. Do not say "empty," or "not empty," or "both," or "neither:" these are mentioned for the sake of [conventional] understanding.
12. Where can the four such as permanence and impermanence exist in this peaceful one? Where can the four such as end and no-end [of the world] exist in this peaceful one?
13. Those who hold the dense apprehension, "the tathagata exists" conceive the thought, "he does not exist in nirvana."
14. For that one empty of own-nature, it is entirely inappropriate to think that once the buddha has nirvana-ed he either "exists" or "does not exist."
15. Those who make fixations about Buddha who is beyond fixations and without deterioration -- all those who are damaged by fixations do not see the tathagata.
16. Whatever is the own-nature of the tathagata, that is the own-nature of this world. The tathagata has no own-nature. This world has no own-nature.
.
.
.
.
1. It is said that desire, hatred, stupidity arise from conceptuality; they arise in dependence on the pleasant, the unpleasant and confusion. [they arise in dependence on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant]
2. Whatever arises in dependence upon the pleasant, the unpleasant and confusion, (whatever arises in dependence on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant) they have no own-nature, therefore, afflictions do not really exist (do not exist in themselves).
3. The existence or non-existence of self is not established in any way. Without that, how can the existence or non-existence of afflictions be established?
4. These afflictions are someone's. But that [someone] is not established. Without [someone], the afflictions are not anyone's.
5. Like [the self apprehended in] the view of one's own body, the afflictions do not exist in five ways in the afflicted. Like [the self apprehended in] the view of one's own body, the afflicted does not exist in five ways in the afflictions.
6. If confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant does not exist from its own nature, what afflictions can depend on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant?
7. Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these six are conceived as the basis of desire, hatred and stupidity.
8. Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these are like gandharva-cities (dri za'i grong khyer) and similar to mirages, dreams.
9. How can the pleasant and unpleasant occur in those [things] which are like phantoms and similar to reflections?
10. Something is called "pleasant" in dependence on the unpleasant. Since that would not exist without relation to the pleasant, therefore, the pleasant is not tenable.
11. Something is called "unpleasant" in dependence on the pleasant. Since that would not exist without relation to the unpleasant, therefore, the unpleasant is not tenable.
12. If the pleasant does not exist, how can desire exist? If the unpleasant does not exist, how can hatred exist?
13. If such an apprehension as "the impermanent is permanent" is confused, since impermanence does not exist in the empty, how can such an apprehension be confused?
14. If such an apprehension as "the impermanent is permanent" is confused, how would the apprehension "there is impermanence in the empty" also not be confused?
15. [The means] by which one apprehends, the apprehension [itself], the apprehender and the apprehended: all are completely pacified, therefore there is no apprehending.
16. If there is neither confused nor right apprehension, who is confused and who is not confused?
17. Confusions do not occur for those who are [already] confused; confusions do not occur for those who are not [yet] confused;
18. confusions do not occur for those who are being confused. For whom do confusions occur? Examine this by yourself!
19. If confusions are not born, how can they exist? If confusions are not born, where can there be someone who has confusion?
20. Things are not born from themselves, not born from others. If they are also not from self and others, where can there be someone who has confusion?
21. If self and purity and permanence and happiness were existent, self and purity and permanence and happiness would not be confusions.
22. If self and purity and permanence and happiness were non-existent, selflessness, impurity, impermanence and anguish would not exist.
23. Thus by stopping confusion, ignorance will stop. If ignorance is stopped, impulsive acts etc. will stop.
24. If the afflictions of some existed by their own nature, how could they be let go of? Who can let go of what exists by nature?
25. If the afflictions of some did not exist by their own nature, how could they be let go of? Who can let go of what does not exist?
.
.
.
.
1. "If all were empty, nothing could come about or perish. It would follow for you that the four ennobling truths could not exist.
2. "Since the four ennobling truths would not exist, understanding, letting go, cultivating and realizing would no longer be valid.
3. "Since they would not exist, the four fruits would also not exist. If the fruits did not exist, there could be no abiding in the fruits. Experiencing them would also not exist.
4. "If those eight beings did not exist, the Community would not exist. Since there would be no ennobling truths, the sublime Dharma could also not exist.
5. "If the Community and the Dharma did not exist, how could Buddha exist? When you talk of emptiness, the three Jewels are maligned.
6. "The existence of actions and fruits, what is not Dharma and what is Dharma, the conventions of the world: all these too are maligned."
7. An explanation for that: since you do not understand the need for emptiness, the nature of emptiness, and the point of emptiness, therefore in that way you malign.
8. The Dharma taught by Buddhas perfectly relies on two truths: the ambiguous truths of the world and the truths of the sublime meaning.
9. Those who do not understand the division into two truths, cannot understand the profound reality of the Buddha's teaching.
10. Without relying on conventions, the sublime meaning cannot be taught. Without understanding the sublime meaning, one will not attain nirvana.
11. If their view of emptiness is wrong, those of little intelligence will be hurt. Like handling a snake in the wrong way, or casting a spell in the wrong way.
12. Therefore, knowing how difficult it is for the weak to understand the depths of this Dharma, the heart of the Muni strongly turned away from teaching the Dharma.
13. Since [those] erroneous consequences do not apply to emptiness, whatever rejections you make of emptiness do not apply to me.
14. Those for whom emptiness is possible, for them everything is possible. Those for whom emptiness is not possible, for them everything is not possible.
15. You are transferring your own mistakes onto me. This is like mounting a horse but forgetting about the horse itself.
16. If you view all things as existing from their own nature, then you would view all things as not having causes and conditions.
17. Cause and effect itself, agents, tools and acts, production and cessation, the effects too would be undermined.
18. Whatever is contingently related, that is explained as emptiness. That is contingently configured; it is the central path.
19. Because there are no things at all, which are not contingently emergent, therefore, there are no things at all, which are not empty.
20. If all were not empty, nothing could come about or perish. It would follow for you that the four ennobling truths could not exist.
21. If things were not contingently emergent, how could anguish exist? Impermanent things are taught to be anguish; in their very own nature they do not exist.
22. If it did exist from its own nature, why would it have an origin? Therefore, for those who undermine emptiness, it can have no origin.
23. If anguish existed by its own nature, there could be no cessation. Because its own nature would be totally present, cessation too would be undermined.
24. If the path existed by its own nature, cultivation would not be appropriate. If the path is to be cultivated, your own nature cannot exist.
25. When anguish, origins and cessation cannot exist, what ceasing of anguish could one seek to attain by the path?
26. If non-understanding existed by its very own nature, how could one ever understand? Doesn't it abide also - by nature?
27. In the same way, your letting go, realizing, cultivating and the four fruits too are as impossible as understanding.
28. How can any fruits, which totally hold their own nature and by their own nature are unattained, be attained?
29. If the fruits did not exist, there could be no abiding in the fruits. Experiencing them would also not exist. If those eight beings did not exist, the Community would not exist.
30. Since there would be no ennobling truths, the sublime Dharma could also not exist. If the Community and the Dharma did not exist, how could Buddha exist?
31. It would also follow that your Buddha does not depend on awakening. It would also follow that your awakening does not depend on Buddha.
32. For you, someone who by their very nature is not Buddha, could not attain awakening however much you strive in the practice of awakening for the sake of awakening.
33. No one would ever do what is Dharma and what is not Dharma. What can that which is not empty do? Inherent nature is inactive.
34. Even without Dharma and not-Dharma, you would have the fruits. You would not have the fruits which have arisen from the causes of Dharma and not-Dharma.
35. If you have the fruits which have arisen from the causes of Dharma and not-Dharma, why are the fruits which have arisen from the Dharma and not-Dharma not empty?
36. Whoever undermines emptiness which is contingent emergence also undermines all the conventions of the world.
37. If one undermines emptiness, there would be no actions at all and actions without an author and agents who do not act.
38. If there were inherent nature, all beings would be unborn and unceasing, would be fixed in place forever, separated from the variety of situations.
39. If [things] were not empty, there could be no attainment of what had not been attained, no ending of anguish and no letting go of all actions and afflictions.
40. He who sees contingent emergence sees anguish and origins and cessation and the path itself.
.
.
.
.
1. If everything were empty, there would be no arising and perishing. From the letting go of and ceasing of what could one assert nirvana(-ing)?
2. If everything were not empty, there would be no arising and perishing. From the letting go of and ceasing of what could one assert nirvana(-ing)?
3. No letting go, no attainment, no annihilation, no permanence, no cessation, no birth: that is spoken of as nirvana.
4. Nirvana is not a thing. Then it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There does not exist any thing that is without aging and death.
5. If nirvana were a thing, nirvana would be a conditioned phenomenon. There does not exist any thing anywhere that is not a conditioned phenomenon.
6. If nirvana were a thing, how would nirvana not be dependent? There does not exists any thing at all that is not dependent.
7. If nirvana were not a thing, how could it possibly be nothing? The one for whom nirvana is not a thing, for him it is not nothing.
8. If nirvana were nothing, how could nirvana possibly be not dependent? There does not exist any nothing which is not dependent.
9. Whatever things come and go are dependent or caused. Not being dependent and not being caused is taught to be Nirvana.
10. The teacher taught [it] to be the letting go of arising and perishing. Therefore, it is correct that nirvana is not a thing or nothing.
11. If nirvana were both a thing and nothing, it would follow that it would be a thing and nothing. That is incorrect.
12. If nirvana were both a thing and nothing, nirvana would not be not-dependent, because it would depend on those two.
13. How could nirvana be both a thing and nothing? Nirvana is unconditioned; things and nothings are conditioned.
14. How could nirvana exist as both a thing and nothing? Those two do not exist as one. They are like light and dark.
15. The presentation of neither a thing nor nothing as nirvana will be established [only] if things and nothings are established.
16. If nirvana is neither a thing nor nothing, by who could "neither a thing nor nothing" be perceived?
17. After the Bhagavan has entered nirvana, one cannot perceive [him? it?] as "existing," likewise as "not existing," nor can one percieve [him? it?] as "both" or "neither".
18. Even when the Bhagavan is alive, one cannot perceive [him? it?] as "existing," likewise as "not existing," nor can one percieve [him? it?] as "both" or "neither".
19. Samsara does not have the slightest distinction from Nirvana. Nirvana does not have the slightest distinction from Samsara.
20. Whatever is the end of Nirvana, that is the end of Samsara. There is not even a very subtle slight distinction between the two.
21. Views about who passes beyond, ends etc. and permanence etc. are contingent upon nirvana and later ends and former ends.
22. In the emptiness of all things what ends are there? What non-ends are there? What ends and non-ends are there? What of neither are there?
23. Is there this? Is there the other? Is there permanence? Is there impermanence? Is there both permanence and impermanence? Is there neither?
24. Totally pacifying all referents and totally pacifying fixations is peace. The Buddha nowhere taught any dharma to anyone.
.
.
.
.
1. In order to become again, those obscured by ignorance are moved into destinies by actions which are impelled [by] the three kinds of formative impulses.
2. Consciousness conditioned by formative impulses enters into destinies. When consciousness has entered, name and form develop.
3. When name and form develop, the six senses emerge. In dependence upon the six senses, impact actually occurs.
4. Just as [it] only arises in dependence on the eye, [visual] form and attention, so consciousness arises in dependence on name and form.
5. The gathering of the three: eye and [visual] form and consciousness, that is "impact." From impact feeling totally arises.
6. Due to the condition of feeling, there is craving; one craves for what is felt. When one craves, one clings to the four aspects of clinging [sense objects, views, morals and rules, and views of self].
7. When there is clinging, the becoming of the clinger fully arises. When there is no clinging, one is freed; there is no [more] becoming.
8. Becoming is the five aggregates; from becoming one is born. Aging, death, torment, lamentation, pain,
9. Mental unhappiness, anxiety: these vividly emerge from birth. Likewise, the entire mass of anguish emerges.
10. The root of life is formative impulses. Therefore, the wise do not form impulses. Therefore, the unwise are formers, but not the wise since they see reality.
11. When ignorance stops, formative impulses too do not occur. The stopping of ignorance [comes] through practising that with understanding.
12. By the stopping of the former, the latter will clearly not occur. The entire mass of anguish will likewise completely stop.
.
.
.
.
1. Those views such as "I occurred or did not occur in the past," "the world is permanent," are dependent on the extreme of Before.
2. Those views such as "I will occur or not occur at another time in the future," "the world has an end," are dependent on the extreme of Later.
3. It is incorrect to say: "I occurred at a time in the past." Whatever occurred before, that is not this.
4. If you think that that became me, then that-which-is-clung-to would be something else. What is your self apart from that-which-is-clung-to?
5. Were you [to say] that there exists no self apart from that-which-is-clung-to, if the very that-which-is-clung-to were the self, your self would be non-existent.
6. The very that-which-is-clung-to is not the self: it arises and passes away. How can that-which-has-been-clung-to be the one that clings?
7. It is not correct for the self to be other than that-which-is-clung-to. If it were other, with nothing to cling to, then something [i.e. the self] fit to be apprehended would not be apprehended.
8. In that way, it is not other than that-which-is-clung-to nor is it that-which-is-clung-to. The self is not not that-which-is-clung-to, nor can it be ascertained as nothing.
9. It is incorrect to say: "I did not occur at a time in the past." Whatever occurred before, this is not other than that.
10. If this were other, it would arise even without that. Likewise, that could remain and be born without dying in that [former life].
11. Cut off and actions wasted, acts committed by others would be experienced by someone else. Such would be the consequences.
12. There is no occurence from what has not occured. In that case faults would follow: the self would be something made or even though it occured it would be uncaused.
13. Therefore, "the self occured, did not occur, both or neither:" all those views of the past are invalid.
14. "I will occur at another time in the future," "I will not occur:" all those views are similar to [those of] the past.
15. If the divine were human, then there would be something permanent. The divine is utterly unborn, because there is no birth in permanence.
16. If the human were other than the divine, then there would be no permanence. If the divine and the human were different, there could be no continuity [between them].
17. If one part were divine and one part were human, there would be both permanence and no permanence. But that is not reasonable.
18. If both permanence and impermanence were established, you would have to assert non-permanence and non-impermance as established.
19. If something came from somewhere and went somewhere, then samsara would be without beginning. That is not the case.
20. If there were nothing permanent at all, what thing could be impermanent, permanent and impermanent, free of both?
21. If this world had an end, how would the next world come to be? If this world had no end, how would the next world come to be?
22. Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end is unreasonable.
23. If the former perished and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would have an end.
24. If the former did not perish and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would not have an end.
25. If one part had an end and one part did not have an end, the world would be with and without an end. That too is unreasonable.
26. How can one part of the one-who-clings perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable.
27. How can one part of that-which-is-clung-to perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable.
28. If both the presence and absence of an end were established, you would have to assert non-presence and non-absence as established.
29. And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth?
30. I bow down to Gautama, whose kindness holds one close, who revealed the sublime dharma in order to let go of all views.