Chapter 14 – The real meaning of ‘Union’: e.g., Union of the three spheres [U3S], Union of opposites [Uopp], Union of the Two Truths [U2T], Union of the Ground and its manifestations [UGM], Union of the three kayas [U3K].

This chapter refutes independent/inherent/absolute
‘Union’ of opposites (e.g., Union of conceptual opposites, Union of the three spheres, Union of two truths, Union of Ground and manifestation, Union of three kayas)
because the three spheres of the Union of opposites —
opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation –
(generalizable to groups of more than two opposites)
cannot be inherently
(i) dependently-arisen /existent /functional /changing /ceasing,
(ii) non-dependently-arisen /non-existent /non-functional /non-changing /non-ceasing,
(iii) both, or (iv) neither;
cannot be inherently
(i) different /separate /multiple /dual,
(ii) identical /united /one /non-dual,
(iii) both, or (iv) neither;
cannot be inherently
(i) permanent /continuous /eternal /’this’,
(ii) impermanent /discontinuous /annihilated /’non-this’,
(iii) both, or (iv) neither; etc. [Tetralemma]
⇐⇒ thus the three spheres are empty of inherent existence, never absolute [T2-3S]
⇐⇒ they are inseparable, dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S]
⇐⇒ and vice versa, one truth supports/implies/enables the other [U2T-3S]
⇐⇒ they are like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [Illusory]
⇐⇒ so we could use these models /concepts /dualities /triads / quads, like Union of subject/relation/object, actor/action/result, cause/causality/effect, producer/production/product, goer/going/destination, perceiver/perception/perceived, knower/knowing/known, part/composing/aggregate, characteristic/characterising/characterized, definition/defining/defined, origination/duration/cessation, owner/ownership/possession, acquirer/acquiring/acquired, before/during/after, past/present/future, and other dualities/triads/quads, including the two truths, conventionally/relatively, but never in absolute terms [U2T-in-action], using them without apprehending /opposing /unifying /accepting /rejecting /changing /increasing /decreasing /liberating anything in absolute terms.

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Last update: January 10, 2026
Image from: Stoneflower013
Source Text: Garfield, PTG, Streng, Batchelor.  

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A. Introduction – No unification or contact of distinct factors is possible if those factors are assumed to have inherent existence. No inherent union of opposites.

Unification in the Abhidharma – Real Unification / Contact of Distinct Factors to Produce Something Different

To provide a comprehensive understanding of the concept of unification (saṃsarga) in the Abhidharma tradition, particularly in the context of preparing for an analysis of Chapter 14 of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, I’ll expand on the provided description, detailing the examples and situating saṃsarga within the broader Abhidharma framework.

– The term saṃsarga refers to the "combination / union / contact / combination" of multiple factors that interdependently produce conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta-dharmas), such as experiences, karmic results, or suffering, within the cycle of saṃsāra.
– This concept is grounded in dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda),
emphasizing the interdependence of causes and conditions, conceptual opposites, parts...

Unlike the Madhyamaka perspective, which views all phenomena [T1] ⇐⇒ as empty of inherent existence [T2] [U2T],
Abhidharma treats these combinations/unions as conventionally real and causally efficacious, with dharmas (fundamental elements) possessing momentary inherent existence (svabhāva).

Below, I’ll explain the Abhidharma view of saṃsarga, elaborate on the three examples provided, and clarify their significance for understanding conditioned phenomena and samsaric existence.
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The Dualistic Abhidharma Framework and Saṃsarga

In the Abhidharma tradition, particularly in schools like Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda, reality is analyzed through a systematic framework that categorizes experience into dharmas — irreducible, momentary elements such as form (rūpa), consciousness (vijñāna), feelings (vedanā), and volitional formations (saṃskāra). These dharmas are the building blocks of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta-dharmas), which arise, abide, and cease due to causes and conditions, in contrast to unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛta-dharmas) like nirvāṇa, which are permanent and independent of causation. The Abhidharma’s goal is to provide a precise understanding of how these dharmas interact to produce the apparent continuity of samsaric existence, supporting meditation, ethical practice, and liberation by revealing the impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and non-self (anattā) of all conditioned phenomena.

Saṃsarga (unification, combination, or contact) is a key mechanism in this framework, describing how distinct dharmas or factors come together interdependently to produce a resultant phenomenon, such as a sensory experience, karmic consequence, or mental defilement.

Unlike a fusion where elements lose their distinct identities,
saṃsarga is a functional interdependence: each factor retains its role,
but their combination generates something new within the causal web of dependent origination.

The Abhidharma views these combinations as conventionally real — momentary events with causal efficacy—because dharmas possess inherent existence (svabhāva) in their momentary arising.

This contrasts with Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, which would argue that
all such combinations, dharmas, and even Union (saṃsarga) itself [T1]
⇐⇒ are empty of inherent existence [T2]
⇐⇒ existing only interdependently and conventionally [T1] [U2T].

The Abhidharma’s analysis of saṃsarga serves to:

• • • Map Causality: By identifying how factors combine, Abhidharma explains the mechanics of saṃsāra, such as the perpetuation of suffering or the accumulation of karma.

    • Support Practice: Understanding these combinations allows practitioners to intervene at specific points (e.g., countering defilements or craving) to break the cycle of saṃsāra.

    • Reveal Non-Self: The interdependence of factors underscores that no permanent self exists, as phenomena are composites of momentary dharmas.

The three examples provided —
– (1) Actor, Action, Result; Desirer, Desire, Object of desire;
– (2) Greed, Hatred, Delusion; and
– (3) Sense Organ, Sense Object, Sense Consciousness; Perceiver, Perception, Perceived;—
illustrate different types of saṃsarga in the Abhidharma, each highlighting a specific aspect of conditioned existence and its role in dependent origination. We can generalize this with the Union of any group of two, three, four … opposites.

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Broader Implications of Saṃsarga in Abhidharma

The concept of saṃsarga underscores the Abhidharma’s commitment to analyzing reality as a series of momentary, interdependent events, each with its own svabhāva but arising only through combination/contact/union with other dharmas. 

This contrasts sharply with Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, which would critique Union (saṃsarga) [T1] ⇐⇒ as empty of inherent existence [T2] [U2T], arguing that the factors/opposites (e.g., actor, action, result) and their unification are dependently originated [T1] ⇐⇒ and thus illusory ⇐⇒ lacking any intrinsic reality [T2].

In Chapter 14 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, titled "An Analysis of Union/Contact/Combination (Samsarga)," Nāgārjuna is likely to challenge the Abhidharma’s view by examining the coherence of such unifications, questioning whether distinct factors can truly combine if they have inherent existence [Tetralemma] ⇐⇒ and asserting their emptiness [T2] [U2T].

Key implications of saṃsarga in Abhidharma include:

• • • Causal Efficacy: Combinations are real events that drive saṃsāra, producing experiences, karma, and suffering. This supports the Abhidharma’s ethical and meditative practices, as practitioners can intervene at specific points (e.g., intention, mindfulness) to alter outcomes.

    • Momentary Reality: Each factor in a saṃsarga is a momentary dharma with svabhāva, arising and ceasing rapidly. Their unification is a fleeting event, reinforcing impermanence and non-self.

    • Support for Liberation: By analyzing saṃsarga, practitioners see the conditioned nature of phenomena, reducing attachment and cultivating wisdom to attain nirvāṇa, an unconditioned reality in Abhidharma.
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Final Answer

In the Abhidharma tradition, saṃsarga (unification or contact) is the interdependent union/combination/contact of distinct dharmas to produce conditioned phenomena, such as experiences, karmic results, or suffering, within the framework of dependent origination.
Unlike Madhyamaka, which views all phenomena as empty, Abhidharma considers these combinations conventionally real, with dharmas possessing momentary svabhāva. 

The three examples illustrate this:

• • • Actor/subject, Action/relation, Result/object [U3S]: The unification of a conditioned “self” (aggregates), a volitional act (karma), and its fruition (vipāka) sustains the karmic cycle. For example, a person’s greedy intention to steal produces an unwholesome action, resulting in suffering like poverty (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), while a compassionate act of giving yields happiness.

    • Greed, Hatred, Delusion [Uopp]: The three poisons co-arise to produce unwholesome states and actions, fueling saṃsāra. For instance, desiring a luxurious car (greed), resenting one’s inability to afford it (hatred), and ignoring its impermanence (delusion) lead to actions like theft, reinforcing saṃskāra-duḥkhatā.

    • Sense Organ, Sense Object, Sense Consciousness [U3S]: Contact (sparśa) between the eye, a flower, and visual consciousness produces a pleasant feeling, leading to craving and vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā when the flower wilts. This unification drives the twelve links of dependent origination.

    • In Mahayana, we can generalize this with the Union of opposites in general in dualities, triads, quads… e.g. U2T, U3S, Uopp, U3T, UGM, U3K…

Saṃsarga highlights the causal interplay of dharmas, supporting Abhidharma’s analysis of saṃsāra and practice for liberation. In Chapter 14, Nāgārjuna will likely critique this view, arguing that such combinations are empty, preparing readers to contrast Abhidharma’s realist ontology with Madhyamaka’s non-dual emptiness [U2T].

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Point of View on Saṃsarga in Chapter 14

In contrast to the Abhidharma, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, as articulated in Chapter 14, radically critiques the notion of Union (saṃsarga) by arguing that
no unification or contact of distinct factors is possible
if those factors are assumed to have inherent existence. 

Instead, Nāgārjuna asserts that
all phenomena, including the factors involved in saṃsarga and the process of unification/contact/meeting itself [T1] ⇐⇒ are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva) [T2] ⇐⇒ arising only interdependently within the framework of dependent origination and emptiness [U2T-union: Union of the Two Truths about the Union of opposites].

Chapter 14’s eight verses systematically deconstruct the coherence of unification, using examples like perception (seen, sight, seer), desire (desire, desirer, object), three spheres in general, groups of opposites in any duality / triad / quad…, including the two truths, the ground and its manifestations, and applying the tetralemma (neither identical / united / one, nor different / separate / multiple, nor both, nor neither) to negate the possibility of real union/combination/contact/meeting (to show the absurdity of all extreme positions). 

Nāgārjuna’s goal is not to deny conventional unifications but to reveal their illusory ⇐⇒ empty [T2-union] ⇐⇒ dependently arisen nature [T1-union] [U2T-union] ⇐⇒ aligning with the Middle Way that avoids all extremes positions like: reifying phenomena (naïve realism), rejecting their conventional functionality (nihilism), dualism, monism.

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General Themes in Chapter 14’s Verses

The verses of Chapter 14, as provided, focus on the following themes, which inform Nāgārjuna’s critique of saṃsarga:

• • • Impossibility of inherent Unification/contact/meeting (Verses 1–2): Tetralemma: Factors like the seen, sight, and seer (verse 1) or desire, desirer, and object (verse 2) cannot combine — either in pairs or altogether — if they are assumed to be inherently existent, as their distinctness/difference/separation or unity/identity/union presupposes inherent existence, which is incoherent.

    • Negation of inherent Difference (Verses 3–7): Tetralemma: The concept of “differentness” (distinctness) is central to unification, as saṃsarga requires combining separate entities. Nāgārjuna argues that inherent difference itself is incoherent: one thing is different only in relation to another, and without inherent existence, neither can be truly distinct (verses 5–6). If difference does not exist, unification is impossible (verses 3, 7).

    • Emptiness of Unification (Verse 8): Unification — whether of identical or different things — is not possible, nor are the act of uniting, the state of being united, or the unifier. All aspects of saṃsarga are empty, lacking inherent reality because the three spheres are interdependent.

    • Middle Way Approach: The verses implicitly point to the Middle Way, where unifications are conventionally valid (e.g., perception or karma function in everyday life) [T1-union / T1-3S / T1-opp / T1-3S / T1-opp / T1-2T / T1-GM] ⇐⇒ but ultimately empty [T2-union / T2-3S / T2-opp / T2-2T / T2-GM / T2-3K] ⇐⇒ existing only interdependently ⇐⇒ not as real combinations of inherently existent factors [U2T-union / U2T-3S / U2T-opp / U2T-2T / U2T-GM / U2T-3K].

Nāgārjuna’s critique targets the Abhidharma’s assumption that dharmas have momentary svabhāva and that their unions/combinations /contacts/meetings are causally real.
– He argues that if dharmas were inherently existent, they could not combine (as fixed entities cannot interact),
– and if they lack inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ their unification is merely a conventional appearance [T1] ⇐⇒ empty of ultimate reality [T2] [U2T].
– This aligns with your Chapter 13 titles, particularly verse 1’s formula:
“Dependently Originated ⇔ Empty of inherent existence ⇔ Illusory,”
and verse 7’s realization that even emptiness ⇐⇒ and dependent origination
are not things to reify [U2T-2T].

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Nāgārjuna’s Broader Perspective on Saṃsarga

Nāgārjuna’s critique in Chapter 14 aligns with his broader Madhyamaka philosophy, as seen in Chapter 13:

• • • Emptiness of All Phenomena (including Unions): All factors in saṃsarga (e.g., actor, greed, eye) and their unifications [T1-3S / T1-] ⇐⇒ are empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ arising only through dependent origination [T1] [U2T]. Your Chapter 13, verse 1 title captures this: “Dependently Originated ⇔ Empty of inherent existence ⇔ Illusory.”

    • Two Truths and Middle Way: Unifications are conventionally valid [T1] (e.g., karma, defilements, and perception function in experience) ⇐⇒ but ultimately empty [T2] [U2T]. ⇐⇒ The Middle Way uses them without reifying them, as your verse 8 title states: “Emptiness, a conventional tool … not an ultimate to grasp.”

    • Non-Grasping Realization: Chapter 14, like Chapter 13, aims for non-grasping, dissolving illusions of real unifications. Your verse 7 title’s realization—“Fully realizing all phenomena as dependently arisen and empty leaves no illusions to counter” — applies here, as Union (saṃsarga) is an illusory process transcended in liberation.

    • Generalization to all ‘Unions’: We can generalize the discussion about ‘Union’ to the ‘Union of the three spheres in general [U3S], the ‘Union’ of opposites in general [Uopp], the ‘Union’ of the Two Truths [U2T], the ‘Union’ of the Ground and its manifestations [UGM], the ‘Union’ of the three kayas [U3K], the ‘Union’ of the three times [U3T], etc.
      In each case, the ‘Union’ is not the inherent coming together of inherently existing different separate things, but the realization of the true nature of these opposites and of their relation/union: their inseparability, dependent co-origination, interdependence, co-definition, co-evolution, co-imputation by the mind, mere designation/naming, as conventional truths/tools [T1-union / T1-3S / T1-opp] ⇐⇒ thus emptiness of inherent existence, never absolute [T2-union / T2-3S / T2-opp] ⇐⇒ their illusoriness ⇐⇒ and the need to use them conventionally without using them in absolute terms, without attachment, reification, effort or absolute, non-dualistically, without opposing anything in absolute terms, without accepting/rejecting/changing anything in absolute terms; thus acting more and more in accord with the Middle Way and with reality as it is (tathātā, suchness) as pointed out by the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] and its corollaries [U3S / Uopp / U3T / UGM / U3K / U2T-2T].
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Final Answer

Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka in Chapter 14 critiques the Abhidharma’s notion of Union (saṃsarga) as a real combination/contact/meeting of inherently existent dharmas, arguing that unifications [T1-union] ⇐⇒ are empty of inherent existence [T2-union] ⇐⇒ arising only interdependently [T1-union] [U2T-union]. 

Applying this to the Abhidharma examples:

• • • Actor, Action, Result [U3S]: The unification of actor, action (e.g., stealing), and result (poverty) is empty, as the factors lack inherent distinctness or unity (verses 1, 3–7). Their “union/combination” is an illusory ⇐⇒ dependently arisen process ⇐⇒ not a real causal event (verse 8).

    • Greed, Hatred, Delusion [Uopp]: The three poisons’ unification to produce unwholesome states is empty, as greed, hatred, and delusion are not inherently distinct dharmas (verses 2, 5–6). Their combination is a conventional appearance ⇐⇒ not ultimately real (verse 8).

    • Sense Organ, Sense Object, Sense Consciousness [U3S]: Contact between eye, flower, and consciousness to produce feeling is empty, as these factors cannot combine if inherently existent or distinct (verse 1, 3–7). The sensory experience is an interdependent ⇐⇒ illusory process (verse 8).

Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way uses these unifications conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ without reifying them, recognizing their emptiness [T2] [U2T], aligning with Chapter 13’s non-grasping realization and preparing for Chapter 14’s deconstruction of saṃsarga as an empty, illusory concept.

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Chapter 14 introduces the inseparable relativity [T1] and emptiness of inherent existence [T2] of Unions of opposites, of
opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation
(generalizable to groups of more than two opposites) –
It affirms that there is no inherent/absolute ‘Union’.
Meaning the three spheres of the ‘Union’ –
opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation –
cannot be
(i) identical/united/one/non-dual/’this’,
(ii) different/separate/multiple/dual/’non-this’,
(iii) both, or (iv) neither.
Meaning there is no (i) continuity or (ii) discontinuity of any thing, being, process or cycle in the three times (before, during and after the actual action/perception/acquisition/ownership);
no (i) permanent or (ii) impermanent essence, self, definition, elements, or 5 aggregates.
Instead of indulging in any to those four extreme positions (i-iv),
Nagarjuna proposes a Middle Way free from all extremes (‘this’, ‘non-this’) and middle (both, neither), with nothing to accept/reject/change in absolute terms, only conventionally/relatively/temporarily if it helps on the path at this point.

The Madhyamaka logic is always similar [Tetralemma ⇔ Emptiness ⇔ Dependent Origination ⇔ Illusory ⇔ Middle Way ⇔ Acting-without-acting]: by showing that in the various dyads/triads/quads —
e.g., subject/relation/object, cause/causality/effect,
goer/going/destination, perceiver/perception/perceived-world,
part/composing/whole, characteristic/defining/characterized,
producer/production/produced, opposite-1/union/opposite-2,
acquirer/acquiring/acquired, owner/ownership/possession —
the apparent opposites cannot be
(i) existent/real/identical/united/simultaneous/one/non-dual/’this’,
(ii) non-existent/non-real/different/separate/multiple/dual/’non-this’,
(iii) both, or (iv) neither, and there is no fifth [Tetralemma];
⇐⇒ this implies that the apparent opposites are empty of inherent existence, never absolute [T2/Emptiness];
⇐⇒ but dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truth/tools [T1/Dependent-Origination];
⇐⇒ one aspect/truth supports/implies the other [U2T];
⇐⇒ like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [Illusory];
⇐⇒ Pointing to the Middle Way free from all extremes and middle;
⇐⇒ so we can use them conventionally/relatively but never in absolute terms [Acting-without-acting].
(Where ‘⇐⇒’ means one side implies the other.)

B. Analysis – There is no inherent ‘Union’ of different/separate or identical/united opposites. ‘Union’ means that the opposites and their ‘relation’ are inseparable, dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1] ⇐⇒ thus empty of inherent existence, never absolute [T2] ⇐⇒ and vice versa, one aspect/truth supports/implies/enables the other [U2T] ⇐⇒ the opposites and their ‘relation’ are like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ ⇐⇒ the Middle Way free from all extremes and middle ⇐⇒ Acting without acting ⇐⇒ Primordial Purity.

• • There is no inherent Union of opposites in the three times.
    We cannot find the beginning of the ‘Union’ in the three times.

  • There are no absolute
    opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
    relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
    opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation
    (generalizable to groups of more than two opposites) –
    they are all relative = Middle Way.

  • The three spheres –
    opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
    relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
    opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation
    (generalizable to groups of more than two opposites) –
    are not inherently existent/functional,
    not completely non-existent/non-functional,
    not both, not neither [Tetralemma].

  • The three spheres –
    opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
    relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
    opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation
    (generalizable to groups of more than two opposites) –
    are not different/separate/multiple/dual/’this’,
    not identical/united/one/non-dual/’non-this’,
    not both, not neither [Tetralemma].

  • The three spheres –
    opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
    relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
    opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation
    (generalizable to groups of more than two opposites) –
    are not permanent/continuous/eternal,
    not impermanent/discontinuous/annihilated,
    not both, not neither [Tetralemma].

  • The three spheres –
    opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground,
    relation/action, union/opposition, identity/difference,
    opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation
    (generalizable to groups of more than two opposites) –
    are thus empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ inseparable, dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S] [U2T-3S] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [Illusory].

  • The three stages of becoming – origination/beginning/coming, duration/middle/transformation, cessation/ending/going — relative to any composite/product
    are not inherently existent,
    not completely non-existent,
    not both, not neither [Tetralemma].

  • The three times relative to any phenomena/dharmas – before/past, during/present, after/future –
    are not inherently existent,
    not completely non-existent,
    not both, not neither [Tetralemma].

  • Acting without acting: So we can use those concepts conventionally/relatively but never in absolute terms; without attachment, reification, effort or absolute; without apprehending anything in absolute terms; non-dualistically, without opposing/uniting anything in absolute terms; without accepting/rejecting/changing anything in absolute terms; thus acting more and more in accord with the Middle Way free from all extremes and middle, and with the true nature of reality as it is (tathātā, suchness) as pointed out by the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] and its corollaries [U3S / Uopp / U3T / UGM / U3K / U2T-2T].

  • There is no continuity or discontinuity of any being (e.g., actor, perceiver, acquirer, owner or continuum), thing (e.g. 5-aggregates), process, cycle, or karma, across the three times of any activity, association, aggregation, definition.

  • It is a limitless and centerless fractal karmic cycle: All opposites-1, subjects, actors, dependent-origination, ground are both opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground and opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation (updated opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground /5-aggregates, rebirth); are multiple opposites-1, subjects, actors, dependent-origination, ground and opposites-2, objects, results, emptiness, manifestations depending on the perspective (fractal), all merely imputed by the mind in dependence of its past experience, conditioning, karma (individual, collective, cosmic).

  • It is like a limitless centerless empty fractal karmic cycle — the opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation becomes an updated opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground: All opposites-1, subjects, actors, dependent-origination, ground are both opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground and opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation (updated opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground /5-aggregates, rebirth); have/are an infinity of opposites-1, subjects, actors, dependent-origination, ground and opposites-2, objects, results, emptiness, manifestations in space, time and nature depending on the perspective; are ever changing, never the same for two consecutive infinitesimal moments. There is no first inherent/absolute opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground, no final inherent/absolute opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation (updated opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground), no middle inherent/absolute ‘Union’. Union is conventionally/relatively functional/useful to navigate the world [T1], but never absolute [T2] [U2T]. Absolute three spheres of ‘Union’ are impossible. The three spheres of ‘Union’ – opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground, Union, opposite-2, object, result, emptiness, manifestation (or updated opposite-1, subject, actor, dependent-origination, ground, rebirth) – are interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed after the fact [T1-3S] ⇐⇒ empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [U2T-3S].

  • The three spheres of 'Union’, and other dualistic concepts, are an oversimplification of an inconceivable continuous limitless and centerless nonlinear fractal-like cycle / flux / continuum of interconnection, interdependence, co-definition, co-conditioning, co-evolution, co-creation.

  • A timeless multidimensional fluid dance of related/opposite appearances (non-duality), with nothing existing independently, separately, inherently, or individually within it.

  • Everything is fully continuous and dynamic (not discrete or static), interconnected (not just in the triad), equal, pure, perfect, complete, divine, ‘One’ in the non-dual sense: not many, not one, not both together, not neither.

  • No absolute view to grasp.

  • Saṃsāra is ignoring this; nirvāṇa is living an ordinary life (chopping wood, carrying water) while being continually fully aware of this.

  • Emptiness is absolute freedom, even from emptiness.

C. Verses – 4 translations – 8 verses – ‘Union’ is not an inherent spatio-temporal coming together of different/identical, separate/conjoined things; but an inconceivable primordial inseparability, dependent co-origination, interdependence, co-definition, co-evolution, co-imputation by the mind, co-designation/co-naming ⇐⇒ and emptiness of inherent existence: e.g., U2T / U3S / Uopp / UGM / U3K.

D. Summary – The unification of inherently existing and different/separate/dual/opposite or identical/united/non-dual/related things is illogical. ‘Union’ is merely a pointer to the inconceivable.

(i.e. The unification of inherently existing and different/separate/dual/opposite things is illogical.
– The apparent opposites in any triads cannot be (a) different/separate/dual, (b) identical/united/non-dual, (c) both together, or (d) neither, and there is no fifth ⇐⇒ impling that they are empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ they are inseparable, interdependent, co-evolving [T1] [U2T].
– The same thing for the duality differentness/separation vs. identity/unification: these apparent opposites cannot be themselves (a) different/separate/dual, (b) identical/united/non-dual, (c) both together, or (d) neither, and there is no fifth ⇐⇒ because they are inseparable, interdependent, co-evolving [T1] ⇐⇒ they are also empty of inherent existence [T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ illusory ⇐⇒ MIddle Way.
– So there cannot be any real unification or presumably different/separate/dual things: these are empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ they are inseparable, interdependent, co-evolving [T1] [U2T].
– [[T1-triad] ⇐⇒ [T2-triad] [U2T-triad]] ⇐⇒ [U2T-Unification] ⇐⇒ [U2T-Product] for any triad or dyad.)

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Chapter 14 systematically deconstructs the concept of saṃsarga (unification / contact / meeting), arguing that no unification/combination/contact/connection of factors — whether in the three spheres of perception, desire, impurities, causality, the two truths, of any group of opposites… — is possible if those factors are assumed to have inherent existence (and really different/identical, separate/united, ‘this/’non-this’…).
– Using triads like seen, sight, seer (verse 1) and desire, desirer, object (verse 2), Nāgārjuna shows that factors are interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names [T1] ⇐⇒ negating their svabhāva ]T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ and the possibility of real/inherent unification.
– The core argument hinges on the incoherence of “differentness” (verses 3–7), as difference is relational [T1] ⇐⇒ not intrinsic [T2] [U2T], collapsing the basis for combining distinct entities.
– The chapter concludes (verse 8) that all aspects of saṃsarga — process, state, and agent — are empty, aligning with the Middle Way ⇐⇒ where unifications are conventional appearances [T1] ⇐⇒ ultimately empty [T2] [U2T].
– Critiquing Abhidharma’s view of saṃsarga as real, Nāgārjuna extends Chapter 13’s insights, negating reification and leading to liberation through the realization of the true nature & dynamic of all phenomena [U2T].
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Chapter 14’s eight verses analyze saṃsarga (unification), critiquing the realist assumption that inherently existent factors can combine to produce conditioned phenomena.

• • • Verse 1 negates the unification of seen, sight, and seer, as their interdependence undermines inherent existence.

    • Verse 2 extends this to desire, impurities, and sense bases, applying the same logic of emptiness.

    • Verse 3 introduces the opponent’s view of unifying different things, refuted by the non-existence of differentness.

    • Verse 4 broadens this to causal differentness, negating real causation.

    • Verse 5 establishes difference as relational, not intrinsic.

    • Verse 6 exposes the contradiction in inherent difference, requiring interdependence.

    • Verse 7 concludes that without differentness, distinct or non-distinct entities are incoherent.

    • Verse 8 declares all aspects of saṃsarga empty, as unification is impossible for identical or different things.

The chapter aligns with the Middle Way, using unifications conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ while recognizing their emptiness [T2] [U2T], critiquing Abhidharma’s realist saṃsarga and leading to liberation through the realization of the true nature & dynamic of all phenomena [U2T].

E. Conclusion – ‘Union’ means Union of interdependence, co-definition, co-evolution, co-imputation [T1] and emptiness [T1] of apparent opposites [U2T-opp]. It applies recursively to all ‘Unions’. Reality is beyond all dualities/triads, like: difference/identity, separation/union, multiplicity/oneness, duality/non-duality, permanence/impermanence, continuity/discontinuity, eternity/annihilarion, purety/impurity, subject/object, cause/effect, producer/product, actor/result, perceiver/perceived, knower/known, owner/own, dependent-origination/emptiness, ground/manifestation, three kayas, saṃsāra/nirvāṇa.

Chapter 14 of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, titled "An Analysis of Unification (Samsarga)," delivers a profound and systematic deconstruction of the concept of saṃsarga — the union, combination, contact … of factors presumed to produce conditioned phenomena or to explain their true nature.

Through eight meticulously crafted verses, Nāgārjuna challenges the realist assumption, exemplified by the Abhidharma tradition, that distinct dharmas with inherent existence (svabhāva) can unite to form causally efficacious phenomena, such as sensory experiences, mental states, or karmic outcomes. 

By focusing on triads like the seen, sight, and seer, and extending the critique to desire, impurities, and causal relationships, Nāgārjuna reveals that no ‘unification/combination/contact/connection’ is possible if factors are inherently existent, as their interdependence and the relational nature of difference ⇐⇒ negate any intrinsic reality.

The chapter culminates in a sweeping negation of all aspects of saṃsarga — the process of becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites — declaring them empty of inherent existence.

Nāgārjuna’s dialectical method, employing the tetralemma and logical reductio, exposes the incoherence of inherent difference and unification, showing that factors like producer, production, and product, or sense organ, object, and consciousness, are not inherently distinct or unified.

This emptiness (śūnyatā) does not deny the conventional functionality of these relationships — perception, desire, and causality (or even the two truths) operate in everyday life — but reveals their illusory nature, akin to dreams or mirages, arising only through dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). 

The Middle Way, central to Madhyamaka, emerges as the guiding principle, harmonizing the two truths: the conventional truth of interdependent appearances [T1] and the ultimate truth of their emptiness [U2T]. Practitioners are urged to engage with these unifications conventionally without reifying them, without making them absolute.

Building on Chapter 13’s exploration of conditioned phenomena as empty and illusory, Chapter 14 deepens this insight by negating the very mechanisms presumed to produce such phenomena.

The chapter’s universal critique applies to all dyads, triads, quads… — whether subject-object, cause-effect, actor-action-result, the two truths, the ground and its manifestations — affirming that no relational structure escapes the logic of the inseparable interdependence [T1] and emptiness [T2] [U2T-opp].

By dismantling the foundations of realist ontologies, Nāgārjuna invites readers to transcend (without rejection) conceptual fixations, aligning with the soteriological aim of Madhyamaka: liberation through the direct realization of the true nature of all phenomena (composite or non-composite, pure or impure) [U2T]. 

Chapter 14 thus stands as a powerful testament to the Middle Way, guiding practitioners to a profound freedom where nothing absolute remains, only the skillful means of wisdom and compassion illuminating the path to awakening [U2T].
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We can analyse ‘unification/combination/contact/connection’ / ‘dependent origination’ in terms of the three spheres of any relation/action (physical, conceptual, mental), and in terms of the opposites of any duality, triad, quad … Why? Because that is the way our ordinary conditioned dualistic conceptual mind(s) operates/creates; and because our goal is to transcend (without rejecting) it by realizing the way it naturally functions and the real nature of its fabrications.

There is useful relative conventional dependent origination (causality) [T1] ⇐⇒ but it is never absolute, never reality as it is [T2] [U2T]. There are no independent/absolute/inherently-existing/sure causes, conditions, causal relations and effects about anything anytime. Reality as it is is not causal nor dual in absolute terms. So we can use those concepts conventionally/relatively [T1] but never in absolute terms [T2] [U2T-in-action]; without attachment, reification, effort or absolutes; without apprehending anything in absolute terms; non-dualistically, without opposing/uniting anything in absolute terms, without accepting / rejecting / changing anything in absolute terms; thus acting more and more in accord with the Middle Way free from all extremes and Middle, acting more and more in accord with reality as it is (tathātā, suchness) as pointed out by the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] and its corollaries [U3S / Uopp / U3T / UGM / U3K / U2T-2T].

Union of the Two Truths [U2T]: All phenomena/dharmas are empty of inherent existence, never absolute, not really dependent, originating/coming, conditioned, existent, changing, increasing, decreasing, ceasing/going, /liberated [T2] ⇐⇒ precisely because they are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflection, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yer not there’ [Illusory] ⇐⇒ not inherently existent/functional, not completely non-existence/non-functional, not both, not neither; not different/separate/multiple/dual, not identical/united/one/non-dual, not both, not neither; not permanent/continuous/eternal, not impermanent/discontinuous/annihilated, not both, not neither; not dependently-arisen [T1-only], not empty of inherent existence [T2-only], not both truths together and in opposition [2T], not neither of the two truths [1T]; not ‘this’, not ‘non-this’, not both, not neither, and there is no fifth, for whatever ‘this’ is [Tetralemma]. They are conventionally relatively functional and useful but never in absolute terms.

Union of opposites [Uopp]: The opposites of any duality/triad/quad (including the three spheres [3S] of any relation/activity, self-others [opp], the three times [3T], the two truths [2T], the Ground and its manifestations [GM], the three kayas [3K], the four noble truths, the 12 links or dependent oritination, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa [opp]) are empty of inherent existence, never absolute, not really dependent, originating/coming, conditioned, existent, changing, increasing, decreasing, ceasing/going, afflicted/liberated [T2] ⇐⇒ precisely because they are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflection, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yer not there’ [Illusory] ⇐⇒ not inherently arising/existent/functional/changing/ceasing, not completely non-arising/non-existent/non-functional/non-changing/non-ceasing, not both, not neither; not different/separate/multiple/dual, not identical/united/one/non-dual, not both, not neither; not permanent/continuous/eternal, not impermanent/discontinuous/annihilated, not both, not neither; not dependently-arisen [T1-only], not empty of inherent existence [T2-only], not both truths together and in opposition [2T], not neither of the two truths [1T]; not ‘this’, not ‘non-this’, not both, not neither, and there is no fifth, for whatever ‘this’ is [Tetralemma]. They are conventionally relatively functional and useful but never in absolute terms.

F. Questions and Answers

Question: Does this apply to all dyads and triads?

Q: Does this apply to all dyads and triads? Like: subject-relation-object, cause-causality-effect, producer-production-product, actor-action-result, goer-going-destination, perceiver-perception-perceived, knower-cognition-kown, dhatus-composing-skandhas, parts-composing-wholes, characteristic-characterizing-characterized, definition-defining-defined, opposite1-opposing-opposite2, desirer-desiring-object, owner-owning-possession, acquirer-acquisition-acquired, error-causing-impurities, previous-moment-causing-next-moment, etc.

Short Answer 

Yes, Nāgārjuna’s critique of saṃsarga in Chapter 14 applies to all dyads and triads, including the examples you’ve listed (e.g., subject-relation-object, cause-causality-effect, actor-action-result, etc.). The chapter’s logic — centered on the interdependence of factors, the incoherence of inherent difference, and the emptiness of unification — extends universally to any conceptual or experiential framework where distinct factors are presumed to combine, whether in pairs (dyads) or groups of three (triads).
Nāgārjuna argues that no factors can be inherently existent or distinct, and thus no unification (saṃsarga) can be inherently real, rendering all such relationships empty of svabhāva (inherent existence) [T2] ⇐⇒ and existing only interdependently within the conventional truth [T1] ⇐⇒ ultimately empty [T2] [U2T].
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Detailed Analysis

To determine the applicability of Chapter 14’s critique, let’s break down the key arguments in the verses and assess how they extend to the dyads and triads you’ve listed, considering the Madhyamaka principles and the Abhidharma context.

a) Key Arguments in Chapter 14

Chapter 14 deconstructs saṃsarga by arguing that unification (the combination or contact of factors) is incoherent if the factors are assumed to have inherent existence. 

The verses focus on triads (e.g., seen-sight-seer, desire-desirer-object) but generalize to all forms of combination:

• • • Interdependence Negates Inherent Existence (Verses 1–2): Factors like seen, sight, and seer (verse 1) or desire, desirer, and object (verse 2) cannot combine—either in pairs or altogether—because they are interdependent. Each factor presupposes the others (e.g., the seen requires sight and seer), negating their independent svabhāva. This interdependence applies to any set of factors, whether two or three.

    • Incoherence of Differentness (Verses 3–7): The opponent’s view that unification involves combining different things (verse 3) is refuted by showing that “differentness” (distinctness) is relational, not intrinsic. A thing is different only in relation to another (verse 5), and without inherent existence, no factor can be truly distinct (verses 6–7). If differentness is illusory, unification of distinct entities is impossible, as saṃsarga requires separate factors to combine.

    • Emptiness of Unification (Verse 8): Unification is not possible for identical or different things, nor are the process, state, or agent of uniting inherently real.
      This applies universally, as any conceptual framework involving combination — whether dyadic or triadic — relies on the flawed assumption of inherent existence or distinctness.

    • Middle Way and Two Truths: The critique aligns with the Middle Way, where unifications are conventionally valid [T1] (e.g., perception or karma function in everyday life) ⇐⇒ but ultimately empty [T2] ⇐⇒ existing only interdependently [T1] [U2T]. This is consistent with your Chapter 13 titles, particularly verse 1’s formula: “Dependently Originated ⇔ Empty of inherent existence ⇔ Illusory,” and verse 7’s realization: “Fully realizing all phenomena as dependently arisen and empty leaves no illusions to counter.”
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b) Applying the Critique to Dyads and Triads

Nāgārjuna’s arguments are not limited to the specific triads in Chapter 14 (e.g., seen-sight-seer) but apply to any conceptual or experiential structure involving the combination of factors, whether dyads (e.g., subject-object, cause-effect) or triads (e.g., actor-action-result, perceiver-perception-perceived). 

The logic of interdependence, the incoherence of inherent difference, and the emptiness of unification are universal, as they target the foundational assumption of inherent existence (svabhāva) in any relational framework.
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Let’s examine how this applies to your listed examples, grouping similar ones for clarity:

1) Subject-Relation-Object, Perceiver-Perception-Perceived, Knower-Cognition-Known:

• • • These triads resemble the seen-sight-seer triad in verse 1. Nāgārjuna would argue that the subject (e.g., perceiver), relation (perception), and object (perceived) are interdependent [T1]: the subject requires an object and relation to exist as a perceiver, the relation (perception) depends on subject and object, and the object is perceived only through the subject and relation (verses 1–2). Their “differentness” is relational [T1] (verses 5–6), not inherent, and without distinctness, their unification is empty [T2] (verses 3, 7–8). For example, in perceiving a flower, the perceiver (mind), perception (seeing), and perceived (flower) are empty [T2], as none exists independently.

    • Dyadic Reduction: These triads can be reduced to dyads like subject-object or knower-known. Nāgārjuna’s logic applies equally: the subject and object are not inherently distinct (verse 5: difference presupposes another), and their “unification” (e.g., knowing) is empty [T2] (verse 8).
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2) Cause-Causality-Effect, Producer-Production-Product, Actor-Action-Result, Previous-Moment-Causing-Next-Moment:

• • • These triads involve causal relationships, akin to the Abhidharma’s Actor, Action, Result example. Verse 4 explicitly negates the “differentness of something coming from another” (e.g., effect from cause), arguing that causes and effects are not inherently distinct, as effects depend on causes and conditions. For example, in actor-action-result (stealing produces poverty), the actor, action, and result are interdependent [T1] (verses 1–2), lacking inherent differentness (verses 3–7), and their unification is empty [T2] (verse 8). Similarly, a producer (e.g., artisan), production (crafting), and product (pot) or previous-moment-causing-next-moment (e.g., mental continuity) are empty [T2], as no factor exists independently.

    • Dyadic Reduction: Dyads like cause-effect or producer-product are equally empty [T2]. Verse 5’s relational [T1] difference and verse 8’s negation of unification apply, as causes and effects presuppose each other, negating svabhāva.
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3) Goer-Going-Destination:

• • • This triad, relevant to motion or samsaric transmigration, is critiqued similarly. The goer (e.g., a being), going (motion or rebirth), and destination (place or next life) are interdependent [T1]: the goer exists only in relation to going and destination, going requires a goer and destination, and the destination depends on the goer and act of going (verses 1–2). Their differentness is illusory (verses 3–7), and their unification (e.g., reaching a destination) is empty [T2] (verse 8). For example, a being moving to a new life in samsara is an empty [T2] process, not a real combination of distinct entities.

    • Dyadic Reduction: The dyad goer-destination (e.g., being-rebirth) is empty [T2], as neither exists without the other (verse 5).
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4) Dhatus-Composing-Skandhas, Parts-Composing-Wholes:

• • • These triads involve composition, where elements (dhatus or parts) combine to form aggregates (skandhas or wholes). Nāgārjuna would argue that dhatus (e.g., form, feeling), the act of composing, and skandhas (e.g., a person) are interdependent [T1] (verses 1–2). The parts are not inherently different from the whole (verses 5–7), as the whole depends on parts and parts on the whole (e.g., a table’s parts define the table, and the table defines the parts). Their unification is empty [T2] (verse 8), negating the Abhidharma’s view of real composition.

    • Dyadic Reduction: The dyad parts-whole is empty [T2], as neither exists independently (verse 5).
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5) Characteristic-Characterizing-Characterized, Definition-Defining-Defined:

• • • These triads involve attribution or definition. For example, a characteristic (e.g., red), the act of characterizing (attributing), and the characterized (e.g., a flower) are interdependent [T1]: the characteristic requires the object and attribution, the attribution depends on characteristic and object, and the object is characterized only through the others (verses 1–2). Their differentness is relational [T1] (verses 5–7), and their unification (e.g., calling a flower red) is empty [T2] (verse 8). Similarly, a definition, defining act, and defined entity (e.g., defining a table) are empty [T2].

    • Dyadic Reduction: The dyad characteristic-characterized or definition-defined is empty [T2], as each presupposes the other (verse 5).
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6) Opposite1-Opposing-Opposite2, Error-Causing-Impurities:

• • • These triads involve opposition or causation of mental states. For example, in opposite1-opposing-opposite2 (e.g., big-opposing-small), the opposites and their relation are interdependent [T1]: big exists only relative to small, and opposing requires both (verses 1–2). Their differentness is illusory (verses 5–7), and their unification (e.g., opposition) is empty [T2] (verse 8). In error-causing-impurities (e.g., ignorance-causing-greed), the factors are empty [T2], as ignorance and greed depend on each other and conditions (verse 2’s “impurities”).

    • Dyadic Reduction: Dyads like big-small or ignorance-greed are empty [T2], as difference is relational [T1] (verse 5).
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7) Desirer-Desiring-Object, Owner-Owning-Possession, Acquirer-Acquisition-Acquired:

• • • These triads, like verse 2’s desire-desirer-object, are directly critiqued. The desirer, desiring, and object (e.g., person-craving-car) are interdependent [T1], lacking inherent distinctness (verses 1–2, 5–7), and their unification is empty [T2] (verse 8). Similarly, owner-owning-possession (e.g., person-owning-house) or acquirer-acquisition-acquired (e.g., person-buying-car) are empty [T2], as no factor exists independently.

    • Dyadic Reduction: Dyads like desirer-object or owner-possession are empty [T2], as each requires the other (verse 5).
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c) Universality of the Critique

Nāgārjuna’s critique in Chapter 14 is universal because it targets the logical and ontological foundations of saṃsarga—the assumption that factors can be inherently existent or distinct and combine to produce phenomena. The verses’ arguments apply to all dyads and triads for the following reasons:

• • • Interdependence (Verses 1–2): Any dyad or triad involves factors that presuppose each other (e.g., subject-object, cause-effect, actor-action-result). This interdependence negates their svabhāva, as no factor can exist independently, a principle universal to all relational frameworks [T1].

    • Relational Difference (Verses 3–7): The concept of difference is central to unification, as saṃsarga requires combining separate entities. Nāgārjuna’s deconstruction of differentness—showing it is relational [T1], not intrinsic—applies to any pair or group of factors. Whether it’s subject-object, parts-whole, or knower-known, difference depends on another, negating inherent distinctness and undermining real unification.

    • Emptiness of Unification (Verse 8): The conclusion that unification is impossible for identical or different things, and that the process, state, and agent of uniting are empty [T2], is a general principle. It applies to all conceptual or experiential unifications, as any saṃsarga presupposes factors with svabhāva, which Nāgārjuna negates.

    • Broad Scope of Verses:

      • Verse 2 extends the critique to desire, impurities, and sense bases, covering mental, sensory, and defilement-related unifications, suggesting applicability to all triads.

      • Verse 4’s negation of causal differentness (“something coming from another”) encompasses all causal relationships (e.g., cause-effect, actor-action-result).

      • Verses 5–7’s critique of differentness is abstract and universal, applying to any relational structure [T1].

      • Verse 8’s conclusion is categorical, negating all forms of saṃsarga, making it clear that no dyad or triad escapes this logic.

    • Madhyamaka’s Universal Emptiness: Nāgārjuna’s broader philosophy, as seen in Chapter 13 (your verse 1 title: “All conditioned phenomena … are Dependently Originated ⇔ Empty ⇔ Illusory”), asserts that all phenomena are empty [T2], including dharmas, processes, and concepts. Saṃsarga, as a conceptual framework, is no exception, whether applied to dyads, triads, or larger sets. Your verse 7 title—“Fully realizing all phenomena as dependently arisen and empty [T2] leaves no illusions to counter”—reinforces this universality, as all unifications are illusions to be transcended.

    • Abhidharma Contrast: Abhidharma’s view of saṃsarga as real combinations of dharmas with svabhāva (e.g., Actor-Action-Result, Greed-Hatred-Delusion, Sense Organ-Object-Consciousness) is a specific target, but Nāgārjuna’s critique applies to any system assuming inherent existence, including non-Buddhist philosophies (e.g., Nyāya’s cause-effect dyads). Your listed examples, spanning causality, perception, composition, and opposition, all fall under this critique, as they involve relational structures [T1] presupposing distinctness or svabhāva.
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d) Specific Examples and Their Emptiness

To confirm, let’s briefly apply the critique to a few representative examples from your list, beyond the Abhidharma ones, to demonstrate universality:

• • • Subject-Relation-Object: The subject (e.g., mind), relation (perceiving), and object (e.g., table) are interdependent [T1] (verse 1), lacking inherent differentness (verses 5–7), and their unification (perception) is empty [T2] (verse 8).

    • Parts-Composing-Wholes: Parts (e.g., table legs), composing (assembly), and whole (table) are not inherently distinct, as parts depend on the whole and vice versa (verses 5–6), making their unification empty [T2] (verse 8).

    • Opposite1-Opposing-Opposite2: Big-opposing-small is relational [T1]; big is not inherently different without small (verses 5–7), and their opposition is an empty [T2] unification (verse 8).

This logic applies to all your examples, as each involves factors presumed to be distinct or unified, which Nāgārjuna negates through interdependence and emptiness.
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e) Dyads vs. Triads

While Chapter 14 focuses on triads (e.g., seen-sight-seer), the arguments apply to dyads because:

• • • Relational Logic: Verses 5–7’s critique of differentness is general, applying to any two factors (e.g., subject-object, cause-effect). Difference requires another, negating svabhāva for both dyads and triads.

    • Unification’s Impossibility: Verse 8’s negation of unification for “one thing with that one thing” or “with a different thing” covers dyads (e.g., uniting subject with object) and triads, as the principle is universal.

    • Madhyamaka Precedent: Other chapters (e.g., Chapter 1 on conditions, Chapter 2 on motion) critique dyads like cause-effect or goer-going, showing Nāgārjuna’s arguments are not limited to triads. Your Chapter 13 titles (e.g., verse 7’s transcendence of all phenomena) support this universality.
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f) Middle Way and Two Truths

Nāgārjuna’s critique does not negate the conventional validity of dyads and triads [T1]. For example, subject-object, cause-effect, and actor-action-result function in everyday life (e.g., perception, karma, causality), as your Chapter 13, verse 6 title notes: “conventionally useful.” However, they are ultimately empty [T2], as their factors and unifications lack inherent existence, aligning with your verse 1 title: “Dependently Originated ⇔ Empty ⇔ Illusory.” The Middle Way [U2T] uses these frameworks conventionally without reifying them.
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Final Answer

Yes, Nāgārjuna’s critique of saṃsarga in Chapter 14 applies to all dyads and triads, including your examples (e.g., subject-relation-object, cause-causality-effect, actor-action-result, etc.). The verses’ logic—interdependence negating inherent existence (verses 1–2), incoherence of differentness (verses 3–7), and emptiness of unification (verse 8)—is universal, targeting any relational structure [T1] assuming distinct or inherently existent factors. Whether dyadic (e.g., subject-object, cause-effect) or triadic (e.g., perceiver-perception-perceived, parts-composing-wholes), these unifications are empty, existing only interdependent [T1] as conventional appearances [T1], ultimately illusory [T2] [U2T].
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Question: Clarifying verse 8

Q: About verse 8. What are "the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites".
Take the example of the triad (i) producer, (ii) production, (iii) product. I know they cannot be (a) different/separate, (b) identical/united, (c) both together, or (d) neither, and there is no fifth. <==> they are thus empty of inherent existence [T2] <==> thus dependently originated [T1] <==> that is the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] <==> they are thus illusory <==> thus we need the Middle Way to deal with them: not accepting them, not rejecting them.

Verse 8 Text

Text:

8. Unification is not possible by
[uniting] one thing with that one thing, (itself)
nor by [uniting] one thing with a different thing (another);
Thus,
– the becoming unified,
– the state of being united, and
– the one who unites
are not possible.
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Context of Verse 8

Verse 8 concludes Chapter 14’s analysis of saṃsarga, arguing that unification is impossible under any conception—whether combining identical or different things—because the factors involved (e.g., seen-sight-seer, desire-desirer-object) lack inherent existence (svabhāva). 

The verse builds on:

• • • Verses 1–2: Establishing that triads like seen-sight-seer or desire-desirer-object cannot combine, as their interdependence negates inherent distinctness.

    • Verses 3–7: Deconstructing “differentness” (distinctness), showing it is relational, not intrinsic, undermining the possibility of combining separate entities.

    • Verse 8: Generalizing the critique to all unifications,
      negating not only the act of uniting but also
      – the process (becoming unified),
      – the outcome (state of being united), and
      – the agent (one who unites),
      declaring them empty.

Nāgārjuna targets realist views, such as the Abhidharma’s, which posit that dharmas with momentary svabhāva combine to produce real phenomena (e.g., sensory contact, karmic results). He argues that Union (saṃsarga) and its components are illusory ⇐⇒ existing only interdependently within the conventional truth [T1] ⇐⇒ ultimately empty [T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ aligning with the Middle Way [Middle Way].
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Meaning of the Terms in Verse 8

The terms "the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites" refer to the conceptual and experiential components of saṃsarga, encompassing the process, result, and agent of any unification. In the context of the triad producer, production, product (e.g., an artisan crafting a pot), these terms can be understood as follows:

The Becoming Unified – the act of unification is [U2T]:

• • • Definition: This refers to the process or act of unification — the dynamic event where the factors (producer, production, product) are thought to come together to form a combined phenomenon. It is the ongoing activity of saṃsarga, the “coming into contact” or “combining” of the elements.

    • Example Application: In the context of an artisan (producer), crafting (production), and a pot (product), the becoming unified is the process of crafting — the act where the artisan’s effort, the activity of shaping clay, and the emerging pot are seen as uniting to produce the final product. For example, the artisan’s hands shaping clay on a wheel is the dynamic process where these factors appear to converge.

    • Madhyamaka Critique: Nāgārjuna argues that this process is not inherently real, as the factors lack svabhāva.
      – The artisan depends on the act of crafting and the pot,
      – the crafting depends on the artisan and the pot, and
      – the pot depends on the artisan and crafting (verses 1–2).
      Their “differentness” is relational ⇐⇒ not intrinsic (verses 5–7),
      – and unification cannot occur between identical or different things (verse 8).
      Thus, the act of crafting (becoming unified) is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ an illusory process ⇐⇒ arising interdependently [T1] [U2T].
      .

The State of Being United – the result produced is [U2T]:

• • • Definition: This refers to the result or condition of unification — the resultant state or phenomenon that appears when the factors are combined. It is the outcome of saṃsarga, the “united” entity or experience produced by the combination.

    • Example Application: For the triad, the state of being united is the completed pot as a product, the apparent result of the artisan’s crafting process. It is the moment when the pot is seen as a finished, unified object, seemingly arising from the combination of the artisan’s skill, the act of crafting, and the material (clay). For example, the finished pot sitting on the table represents this state.

    • Madhyamaka Critique: Nāgārjuna asserts that this state is empty, as the pot is not an inherently existent entity.
      – The pot depends on the artisan, the crafting process, and conditions like clay and firing (verses 1–2).
      – Without inherent differentness between the factors (verses 3–7), the pot cannot be a real “united” product of distinct dharmas.
      The state of being a pot is a conventional appearance [T1] ⇐⇒ empty of ultimate reality [T2] [U2T] (verse 8) ⇐⇒ like a mirage that seems solid but lacks substance [Illusory].
      .

The One Who Unites – the actor / instigator of the unification is [U2T]:

• • • Definition: This refers to the agent or subject presumed to initiate or facilitate the unification—the entity or force that brings the factors together. It is the perceived “doer” or “cause” of the saṃsarga.

    • Example Application: In the triad, the one who unites is the artisan (producer), seen as the agent who performs the crafting (production) to create the pot (product). For example, the artisan’s intention, skill, and effort are thought to unite the process and materials into the final pot.

    • Madhyamaka Critique: Nāgārjuna negates the inherent existence of the artisan as an independent agent.
      – The artisan is a dependently arisen composite of aggregates (form, consciousness, etc.), not a self-existent “unifier” (verses 1–2).
      – Without inherent distinctness from production and product (verses 5–7), the artisan cannot be a real agent of unification.
      The concept of “one who unites” is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ a conventional designation [T1] ⇐⇒ with no ultimate reality [T2] [U2T] (verse 8).
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Applying the Tetralemma and Madhyamaka Framework

Your framework — based on the tetralemma (not different/separate, not identical/united, not both, not neither, with no fifth possibility) — perfectly encapsulates Nāgārjuna’s critique in verse 8 and Chapter 14, aligning with the Madhyamaka view of emptiness ⇐⇒ dependent origination ⇐⇒ and the Middle Way. Let’s apply this to the triad producer, production, product and the terms in verse 8:

Tetralemma Analysis:

• • • Not Different/Separate: The producer (artisan), production (crafting), and product (pot) cannot be inherently different or separate, as each presupposes the others.
      – The artisan is defined by crafting and the pot,
      – crafting depends on the artisan and pot, and
      – the pot relies on both (verses 5–6: difference is relational).
      If they were truly distinct with svabhāva, they could exist independently, but they cannot (verse 3).

    • Not Identical/United: The factors are not inherently identical or fused into a single entity.
      – If they were, there would be no need to distinguish artisan, crafting, and pot, and unification would be redundant (verse 8: “not possible by uniting one thing with that one thing”).

    • Not Both Together: They cannot be both inherently different and identical, as this is logically contradictory (implicit in verses 6–7’s negation of inherent difference).

    • Not Neither: They cannot be neither different nor identical, as this would imply a fifth state outside relationality, which is impossible in dependent origination (verse 7: no “this” without difference).

    • No Fifth Possibility: The tetralemma exhausts all options, leaving no inherent basis for the factors or their unification (verse 8).
      .

Madhyamaka Implications:

• • • Empty of Inherent Existence [T2]: Since the producer, production, and product lack inherent distinctness or unity (verses 1–7) [Tetralemma] ⇐⇒ [Emptiness] their unification and its components — becoming unified (crafting process), state of being united (finished pot), and one who unites (artisan) — are empty of svabhāva (verse 8). They do not exist as inherently real entities or processes.

    • Dependently Originated [T1]: The factors and their saṃsarga arise interdependently, existing conventionally as appearances due to causes, conditions, and mental imputation (verses 1–2). The artisan, crafting, and pot function in everyday life [T1] ⇐⇒ like a dream that seems real but lacks substance [Illusory].

    • Union of the Two Truths [U2T]: The conventional appearance [T1] and ultimate emptiness [T2] of the triad and its unification form a non-dual reality. The pot appears to result from the artisan’s crafting [T1] ⇐⇒ but is empty of inherent existence [T2], embodying the Middle Way [U2T].

    • Illusory: The unification is illusory, like a mirage or reflection, as it lacks intrinsic reality but appears real conventionally (your Chapter 13, verse 1: “Illusory / Deception”). The crafting process, finished pot, and artisan are empty appearances [T1] ⇐⇒ not ultimate truths [T2] [U2T].

    • Middle Way: The Middle Way approach neither accepts the triad or its saṃsarga as absolute (eternalism, reifying them as real) nor rejects them as non-existent or useless (nihilism, denying their conventional role). Practitioners use them conventionally (e.g., recognizing the pot’s utility) [T1] ⇐⇒ while aware of their emptiness [T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ leading to liberation through the realization of the true nature & dynamic of all phenomena [U2T].
      .

Example Application:

Imagine an artisan crafting a clay pot.
– The becoming unified (crafting process) is the act of shaping clay, which appears to unite the artisan’s skill, the action, and the emerging pot.
– The state of being united is the finished pot, seemingly a unified product of these factors.
– The one who unites is the artisan, perceived as the agent driving the process. Nāgārjuna argues:

• • • The crafting process is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ as it depends on the artisan, clay, and pot ⇐⇒ lacking inherent reality [T2] [U2T] (verses 1–2, 8).

    • The finished pot is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ a conventional designation [T1] arising from interdependent conditions ⇐⇒ not an inherently unified entity [T2] [U2T] (verses 3–7, 8).

    • The artisan is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ a composite of aggregates ⇐⇒ with no independent svabhāva [T2] [U2T], not a real “unifier” (verses 5–8).

    • The tetralemma applies:
      the factors are not inherently different (artisan depends on crafting and pot), not identical (they are conventionally distinct), not both, not neither, and there’s no fifth option, ⇐⇒ making their saṃsarga empty [T2] [U2T]. ⇐⇒ The Middle Way uses this triad conventionally [T1] (e.g., making pots for use) ⇐⇒ without reifying it [T2] ⇐⇒ recognizing its illusory nature [Illusory].
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Connection to Chapter 14 and Broader Context

Verse 8’s terms generalize Nāgārjuna’s critique of saṃsarga to all unifications, as seen in earlier verses:

• • • Verses 1–2: Triads like seen-sight-seer and desire-desirer-object are empty, as their unification is incoherent without inherent existence.

    • Verses 3–7: The relational nature of difference negates the possibility of distinct factors combining.

    • Verse 8: Extends this to all saṃsarga, negating the process (becoming unified), result (state of being united), and agent (one who unites), applicable to any triad or dyad (e.g., your examples like subject-relation-object, cause-causality-effect).
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Final Answer

In verse 8 of Chapter 14, "the becoming unified," "the state of being united," and "the one who unites" refer to the process, result, and agent of saṃsarga, respectively. For the triad producer, production, product (e.g., artisan crafting a pot):

• • • The Becoming Unified: The process of crafting, the act where the artisan’s effort, action, and emerging pot appear to combine, empty as it depends on interdependent factors (verses 1–2, 8).

    • The State of Being United: The finished pot, the apparent result of unification, empty as it lacks inherent reality (verses 3–7, 8).

    • The One Who Unites: The artisan, seen as the agent uniting the process and product, empty as a dependently arisen composite (verses 5–8).

These aspects are incoherent under the tetralemma — not different, not identical, not both, not neither, with no fifth possibility — ⇐⇒ as the factors lack inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ arise dependently [T1] ⇐⇒ form the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] ⇐⇒ and are illusory. ⇐⇒ The Middle Way neither accepts them as absolute nor rejects them, using them conventionally without making them absolute.

G. Exploration – Union of opposites [Uopp] in all of its variants

Q: Can we compare the 'Union' of the three spheres (seen, sight, and the seer) with the 'Union' of the two truths? And ultimately refute these 'Union' on the same reasoning?

In Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Chapter 14 examines the concept of "union" (saṃsarga) in the context of the three spheres — often rendered as the seen (dṛśya), sight (darśana), and the seer (draṣṭṛ) — which represent the interdependent triad of object, action/relation, and subject. These are emblematic of how phenomena are conventionally parsed into relational components, yet Nāgārjuna deconstructs any inherent basis for their unification.

The chapter argues that union cannot occur between entities that are either identical (the same) or distinct (different), because difference itself lacks inherent existence (svabhāva). Without inherent difference, there is no ground for entities to "come together" or unite, nor for them to exist as separate priors. This leads to the refutation of inherent union, the process of uniting, and the unifier (verses 1–8). The reasoning is dialectical: assuming union presupposes difference, but difference relies on mutual dependence (one thing is different only relative to another), which collapses into emptiness (śūnyatā) when scrutinized.

The two truths (dvayasatya) in Madhyamaka philosophy — conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, the relative or apparent level of everyday phenomena) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, the emptiness of all phenomena) — are not posited as separate ontological entities but as two perspectives on the same reality. As Nāgārjuna elaborates in MMK Chapter 24 (especially verses 8–10), the ultimate is not a transcendent realm apart from the conventional; rather, emptiness is the true nature of conventional designations, and the two are interdependent. They form a non-dual "union" without being identical (which would negate their distinct functions) or entirely separate (which would reify duality). This is the middle way (madhyamā pratipad): "Whatever is dependently arisen, that is explained to be emptiness. That, being a dependent designation, is itself the middle way" (24.18).

A comparison between the "union" of the three spheres and the "union" of the two truths is apt and illuminating, as both involve relational constructs that Madhyamaka subjects to similar deconstructive logic. In Chapter 14, Nāgārjuna refutes union by showing that it cannot hold between the same (no need for union) or the different (difference is not inherent). 

Applied to the two truths:

• • • If the two truths are treated as inherently different (a view held by some realist schools or naive dualists), their "union" would require bridging two distinct entities. But, as in verse 5–6, difference presupposes mutual dependence — one truth is "different" only in relation to the other — yet without an independent "other," difference fails to establish (verse 7). Thus, no genuine unification is possible, as the presupposed separateness is illusory.

    • If they are treated as inherently the same (collapsing ultimate into conventional or vice versa, as in monistic extremes), union is redundant and meaningless, akin to uniting a thing with itself (verse 8).

    • Ultimately, reifying the two truths as entities capable of union (or separation) imputes inherent existence, which Nāgārjuna refutes across the MMK. The "union" of the two truths is thus not a literal merging but a pedagogical device pointing to non-duality (advaya), where distinctions dissolve in emptiness.
      Refuting any substantial union here mirrors Chapter 14: there is no inherent union, no process of uniting, and no unifier, because all such notions are empty.

This parallel underscores Madhyamaka's consistent method: dialectical negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha) exposes the incoherence of extremes (sameness/difference, existence/non-existence, dependent -origination/emptiness) to reveal the middle way. However, it's crucial not to misinterpret this as rejecting the Union of the two truths altogether — Nāgārjuna affirms their conventional utility (e.g., for teaching) while negating the ultimate reification of the two truths and their union.
In both cases, the refutation clears away conceptual proliferations (prapañca) to point toward śūnyatā, free from views of union or disunion. If one were to "refute" the union of the two truths on these grounds, it would not abolish the doctrine but refine it, preventing dualistic clinging. This aligns with Nāgārjuna's broader project, as seen in his Vigrahavyāvartanī, where even emptiness is empty, avoiding eternalism or nihilism.

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Q: Please rewrite this analysis while treating the two 'Unions' with the same approach, so it would be easier to compare.

In Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Chapter 14 critiques the concept of "union" (saṃsarga) by examining relational constructs that lack inherent existence (svabhāva). This approach can be directly paralleled to the "union" implied in the doctrine of the two truths (dvayasatya) — conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) — which Madhyamaka presents as interdependent perspectives rather than ontologically separate entities.
Below, I treat both "unions" with the same dialectical method: first outlining the apparent union, then applying Nāgārjuna's reasoning from Chapter 14 to refute it by showing the incoherence of union between entities assumed to be either identical or distinct.
This parallel highlights how Madhyamaka consistently refutes reified relations to reveal emptiness (śūnyatā), without rejecting their conventional utility.
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The Apparent Union of the Three Spheres (Seen, Sight, Seer)

In Chapter 14, Nāgārjuna analyzes the triad of the seen (dṛśya, object), sight (darśana, relation/action), and seer (draṣṭṛ, subject) as an example of how phenomena are conventionally divided into interdependent components that seem to "unite" in experience (verses 1–2).
This union is posited to explain perception: the seer unites with the act of seeing to apprehend the seen, much like desire unites the desirer with the desired, or other sense bases (āyatana) and impurities (kleśa). Without such union, these elements appear disconnected; with it, they form a coherent whole.
Proponents might argue that these spheres are distinct yet capable of combining, either pairwise or altogether, to produce relational phenomena.
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Refutation of the Union of the Three Spheres

Nāgārjuna refutes this by demonstrating that union presupposes difference, but difference itself is empty (verses 3–7).
If the spheres are inherently different (e.g., the seer as separate from the seen), unification requires bridging distinct entities — but difference only arises dependently: one thing is "different" only relative to another, without which it cannot exist as different (verse 5). Thus, a "different" thing cannot stand alone to enter union, as it lacks independence (verse 6); difference does not inhere in the different or the non-different (verse 7).
If the spheres are inherently the same, union is redundant, like uniting a thing with itself (verse 8).
Consequently, there is no basis for unification (saṃsarga), the process of becoming unified, the state of being united, or the unifier —  all are impossible without reifying empty distinctions.
This negation exposes the triad as mere dependent designations, empty of inherent union or separation, aligning with the middle way (madhyamā pratipad) free from extremes.
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The Apparent Union of the Two Truths (Conventional and Ultimate)

Similarly, the two truths are often construed as "uniting" in Madhyamaka to form a cohesive soteriological framework (as elaborated in MMK Chapter 24, verses 8–10).
Conventional truth encompasses everyday appearances and designations (e.g., cause-effect relations, self and other), while ultimate truth reveals their emptiness.
Their "union" is posited to avoid nihilism (denying convention) or eternalism (reifying ultimacy): the ultimate is not a separate realm but the true nature of the conventional, making them interdependent. Without such union, the truths seem opposed — convention as illusory and ultimate as transcendent — yet together they enable teaching and realization, where emptiness underpins appearances without negating them.
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Refutation of the Union of the Two Truths

Applying the same reasoning from Chapter 14, this union collapses under scrutiny, as it too presupposes untenable sameness or difference.
If the two truths are inherently different (e.g., as dual levels of reality, per some realist interpretations), unification requires connecting distinct entities — but difference is relational and dependent: conventional truth is "different" only relative to the ultimate, without which it cannot stand as different (parallel to verse 5). Thus, a "different" truth cannot exist independently to enter union (verse 6); difference does not inhere in the different or non-different truths (verse 7).
If the truths are inherently the same (collapsing one into the other, as in monistic views), union is superfluous, like uniting a truth with itself (verse 8).
Therefore, there is no basis for unification, the process of becoming unified, the state of being united, or the unifier — all are impossible without clinging to empty dualities.
This negation reveals the two truths as non-dual (advaya) designations, empty of inherent union or disunion, pointing to the middle way where distinctions dissolve in śūnyatā.
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Parallel Implications and Madhyamaka Insight

By treating both unions identically, the comparison becomes clear: each involves parsing reality into relational parts (triad or dyad) that seem to require unification for coherence, yet Nāgārjuna's dialectic exposes this as conceptual proliferation (prapañca). The refutation does not abolish the three spheres or two truths — conventionally, they function for analysis and liberation (e.g., perception guides ethics; two truths guide practice) — but prevents reification, avoiding extremes of identity or difference. This consistency across MMK chapters, echoed in works like the Vigrahavyāvartanī, affirms that even doctrines like the two truths are "empty" tools, fostering insight into interdependence without substantial bonds.

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Q: Expand this analysis by comparing the traditional meaning of 'union of inherently existing different separate things' to the true meaning of 'Union' as the inseparability, dependent co-origination, interdependence, co-definition, co-evolution, co-imputation by the mind, mere designation/naming, being conventional truths/tools, of apparent opposites <==> and thus their emptiness of inherent existence <==> their illusoriness.

The Refuted Traditional Meaning of 'Union': Combining Inherently Existing, Different, Separate Things

In traditional or naive realist views (often critiqued in Madhyamaka as akin to Sarvāstivāda or other substantialist schools), "union" (saṃsarga) is understood as the literal coming together of distinct, inherently existing (svabhāva-possessing) entities that are separate priors. These entities are reified as self-sufficient, with intrinsic natures independent of relations or mind — e.g., the seer as an autonomous subject uniting with the independent act of seeing to grasp a self-existent object, or conventional truth as a lower reality merging with a transcendent ultimate truth. This posits union as a bridge or synthesis between fixed opposites (subject/object, apparent/real), assuming their difference is absolute and inherent. Such a view implies eternalism: entities exist substantially before union, and their combination produces a new, real whole. Nāgārjuna refutes this in MMK Chapter 14 (and broadly in the text) by showing it leads to incoherence — difference cannot be inherent without dependence, rendering union impossible (as detailed below). This "union" is ultimately illusory because it clings to extremes, fabricating duality where none inherently exists.
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The True Meaning of 'Union': Inseparability, Dependent Co-origination, Interdependence, Co-definition, Co-evolution, Co-imputation by the Mind, Mere Designation/Naming, and Conventional Truths/Tools of Apparent Opposites ⇔ Their Emptiness of Inherent Existence ⇔ Their Illusoriness

In contrast, Madhyamaka's profound "Union" (non-dual advaya, often implied rather than literal saṃsarga) reveals apparent opposites not as separate entities to be united, but as inseparably co-arising through dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). This is the middle way: opposites (e.g., seer/seen, conventional/ultimate) are interdependent — each co-defines the other (one cannot be conceived without its counterpart), co-evolves in relational flux, and is co-imputed by the mind as mere designations or namings (prajñapti-mātra). They function as conventional truths/tools for navigation and liberation, without inherent existence (śūnyatā). This inseparability ⇔ emptiness ⇔ illusoriness forms a equivalency: because phenomena co-originate dependently, they lack svabhāva (emptiness), appearing like illusions or dreams — real enough conventionally but ultimately unreal when scrutinized. As Nāgārjuna states in MMK 24.18, "Whatever is dependently arisen, that is explained to be emptiness. That, being a dependent designation, is itself the middle way." This "Union" dissolves duality without positing a substantial merger, freeing from conceptual proliferations (prapañca) and pointing to nirvāṇa as the quiescence of such fabrications.
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The Apparent Union of the Three Spheres (Seen, Sight, Seer)

In Chapter 14, Nāgārjuna analyzes the triad of the seen (dṛśya, object), sight (darśana, relation/action), and seer (draṣṭṛ, subject) as an example of how phenomena are conventionally divided into interdependent components that seem to "unite" in experience (verses 1–2). This union is posited to explain perception: the seer unites with the act of seeing to apprehend the seen, much like desire unites the desirer with the desired, or other sense bases (āyatana) and impurities (kleśa). Without such union, these elements appear disconnected; with it, they form a coherent whole. Proponents might argue that these spheres are distinct yet capable of combining, either pairwise or altogether, to produce relational phenomena — aligning with the traditional meaning of union as bridging inherently separate things.
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Refutation of the Union of the Three Spheres

Nāgārjuna refutes this by demonstrating that union presupposes difference, but difference itself is empty (verses 3–7).
If the spheres are inherently different (e.g., the seer as separate from the seen), unification requires bridging distinct entities — but difference only arises dependently: one thing is "different" only relative to another, without which it cannot exist as different (verse 5). Thus, a "different" thing cannot stand alone to enter union, as it lacks independence (verse 6); difference does not inhere in the different or the non-different (verse 7).
If the spheres are inherently the same, union is redundant, like uniting a thing with itself (verse 8).
Consequently, there is no basis for unification (saṃsarga), the process of becoming unified, the state of being united, or the unifier — all are impossible without reifying empty distinctions.
This exposes the traditional "union" as flawed, revealing the true "Union" as the spheres' inseparability through co-dependence: they co-originate (e.g., no seer without seen), co-define each other (mutual imputation), and evolve interdependently as mind-designated tools — thus empty ⇔ illusory, functioning conventionally without inherent reality.
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The Apparent Union of the Two Truths (Conventional and Ultimate)

Similarly, the two truths are often construed as "uniting" in Madhyamaka to form a cohesive soteriological framework (as elaborated in MMK Chapter 24, verses 8–10).
Conventional truth encompasses everyday appearances and designations (e.g., cause-effect relations, self and other), while ultimate truth reveals their emptiness.
Their "union" is posited to avoid nihilism (denying convention) or eternalism (reifying ultimacy): the ultimate is not a separate realm but the true nature of the conventional, making them interdependent.
Without such union, the truths seem opposed — convention as illusory and ultimate as transcendent — yet together they enable teaching and realization, where emptiness underpins appearances without negating them — mirroring the traditional view of union as synthesizing separate opposites.
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Refutation of the Union of the Two Truths

Applying the same reasoning from Chapter 14, this union collapses under scrutiny, as it too presupposes untenable sameness or difference.
If the two truths are inherently different (e.g., as dual levels of reality, per some realist interpretations), unification requires connecting distinct entities — but difference is relational and dependent: conventional truth is "different" only relative to the ultimate, without which it cannot stand as different (parallel to verse 5). Thus, a "different" truth cannot exist independently to enter union (verse 6); difference does not inhere in the different or non-different truths (verse 7).
If the truths are inherently the same (collapsing one into the other, as in monistic views), union is superfluous, like uniting a truth with itself (verse 8).
Therefore, there is no basis for unification, the process of becoming unified, the state of being united, or the unifier — all are impossible without clinging to empty dualities.
This negates the traditional "union," illuminating the true "Union" as the truths' inseparability: they co-originate (ultimate as the emptiness of conventional), interdepend (co-evolve in teaching), and are co-imputed as designations/tools by the mind — thus empty of svabhāva ⇔ illusory, serving provisionally for insight without substantial existence.
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Parallel Implications and Madhyamaka Insight

Comparing the refuted traditional "union" (combining inherent separates, leading to duality and clinging) to the true "Union" (inseparability via dependence, yielding emptiness and freedom) clarifies Madhyamaka's method across both cases.
The traditional view reifies opposites as fixed, necessitating a contrived bridge that Nāgārjuna dismantles dialectically.
The true meaning, however, embraces apparent opposites as co-dependent illusions — mere conventional tools without inherent bonds or separations — fostering non-dual wisdom.
This does not abolish the three spheres or two truths (they guide practice conventionally) but refines understanding, preventing eternalism/nihilism.
As echoed in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, even "Union" itself is empty, a skillful means (upāya) to transcend views, aligning with the middle way where all proliferations cease.

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Q: Could we conclude that the refutation of the 'Union' in Chapter 14 applies to all 'Unions'. Ex. Union of the three spheres of any relation/action [U3S], Union of the opposites of any duality/triad/quad... [Uopp], Union of the Two Truths, Union of the Ground and its manifestations [UGM], Union of the three kayas [U3K], Union of the three times [U3T], Union of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa? It is not a union of different separate things, but the Union of the Two Truths about apparent opposites.

In Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), the refutation of "union" (saṃsarga) in Chapter 14 serves as a paradigmatic critique that extends beyond the specific example of the three spheres (seer, sight, seen) to dismantle any reified notion of union across Madhyamaka and broader Mahayana/Vajrayana frameworks. This chapter's dialectical logic — negating union between entities assumed to be inherently the same or different — reveals that all such "unions" cannot be substantial mergers of separate, self-existent things (svabhāva-possessing priors).
Instead, as you suggest, the true "Union" (non-dual advaya) is the inseparability of apparent opposites as understood through the two truths (dvayasatya): conventionally, they appear as distinct designations for pedagogical or functional purposes; ultimately, they are empty (śūnyatā) of inherent existence, co-arising interdependently via dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), co-definition, co-evolution, co-imputation by the mind, and mere naming (prajñapti-mātra). This equivalency — apparent opposition ⇔ inseparability ⇔ emptiness ⇔ illusoriness — frees from conceptual extremes (eternalism/nihilism, sameness/difference), pointing to the middle way (madhyamā pratipad) where proliferations (prapañca) cease.

Yes, we can conclude that Chapter 14's refutation applies universally to all "Unions" you mention, as they share the same structural vulnerability: positing relational constructs that, when scrutinized, collapse into non-dual emptiness.

Below, I expand the analysis by first recalling the refuted traditional meaning of union (as combining inherently existing, different, separate things), then applying Chapter 14's logic to refute it in each case, and finally illuminating the true meaning of "Union" as the two truths' perspective on apparent opposites — empty, interdependent, and illusory yet conventionally functional. 

This generalization aligns with Nāgārjuna's method throughout the MMK (e.g., Chapters 2 on motion, 5 on elements, 24 on truths), which deconstructs all compounded phenomena (saṃskṛta) to reveal their shared emptiness, and extends to tantric/Dzogchen elaborations where such "Unions" are skillful means (upāya) for realization.
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The Refuted Traditional Meaning of 'Union': Combining Inherently Existing, Different, Separate Things

As before, this naive or substantialist view (critiqued as akin to non-Madhyamaka schools like Sarvāstivāda) treats "union" as a real synthesis of distinct, independent entities with intrinsic natures. Apparent opposites (e.g., subject/object, ground/manifestation) are seen as separate priors that "come together" to form a higher whole, implying duality is ontologically basic.

Chapter 14 refutes this by showing union requires difference, but difference is not inherent — it arises dependently and thus lacks substance (verses 3–7). If entities are truly separate and different, they cannot unite without losing independence; if the same, union is redundant (verse 8). This leads to the negation of unification, the unified state, and the unifier, exposing the view as clinging to illusions.
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The True Meaning of 'Union': Inseparability of Apparent Opposites ⇔ Emptiness ⇔ Illusoriness via the Two Truths

In Madhyamaka, the profound "Union" is not a literal joining but the non-dual recognition that apparent opposites are inseparable from the outset: they co-originate dependently, interdepend for definition and evolution, and are imputed by the mind as conventional tools/namings for soteriology. Conventionally (saṃvṛti-satya), opposites appear distinct to facilitate analysis, ethics, and practice (e.g., distinguishing saṃsāra from nirvāṇa for path traversal). Ultimately (paramārtha-satya), they are empty of svabhāva, like illusions or mirages — arising without essence, yet functional without contradiction (MMK 24.8–10).

This "Union of the Two Truths about apparent opposites" (as you phrase it) is the core insight: opposites are not merged post hoc but are always already non-dual, their apparent duality a mere designation dissolving in śūnyatā. This prevents reification while affirming provisional utility, as in Dzogchen's view of unions as pointers to rigpa (pristine awareness).
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Application to Specific 'Unions'

Union of the Three Spheres of Any Relation/Action (U3S)

• • • Apparent Union: As in MMK Chapter 14, the three spheres (e.g., agent/action/object in seeing, desiring, or any karmic relation) seem to unite to produce coherent experience, with proponents viewing them as distinct yet combinable components.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: If inherently different/separate (e.g., seer independent of seen), union presupposes dependent difference, which fails (verses 5–7); if the same, it's superfluous (verse 8). No unification possible.

    • True Union: Inseparability of apparent opposites (agent/object) via co-dependence — each co-defines the other as mind-imputed designations. Conventionally, useful for analyzing karma; ultimately empty ⇔ illusory, revealing non-dual awareness free from grasping.
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Union of the Opposites of Any Duality/Triad/Quad... (Uopp)

• • • Apparent Union: In dualities (e.g., self/other, existence/non-existence) or multiplicities (triads like body/speech/mind, quads like the four noble truths), opposites appear as separate poles that must unite for wholeness, as in some dialectical philosophies.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: Assumes inherent difference for union, but difference is relational/empty (verses 3–7); sameness makes union unnecessary (verse 8). Applies to any n-tuple, as MMK broadly critiques tetralemmas (catuskoti).

    • True Union: Apparent opposites co-arise interdependently, co-evolving as conventional tools (e.g., for debate or meditation). Their emptiness ⇔ illusoriness means no real opposition — non-dual from the two truths' view, dissolving extremes like in MMK Chapter 25 on nirvāṇa.
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Union of the Two Truths

• • • Apparent Union: Conventional (appearances) and ultimate (emptiness) seem like separate levels merging into a unified doctrine.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: If different/separate, dependent difference collapses (verses 5–7); if same, redundant (verse 8). No substantial unification.

    • True Union: Inseparability as co-imputed perspectives — conventional designations underpin ultimate insight, co-originating without duality. Empty ⇔ illusory, yet tools for teaching (MMK 24.18), embodying the middle way.
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Union of the Ground and Its Manifestations (UGM)

• • • Apparent Union: In Dzogchen/Mahamudra, the ground (gzhi, primordial basis) and its manifestations (e.g., thoughts, phenomena) appear as separate — pure essence vs. dynamic display — requiring union for realization.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: If inherently different/separate, union relies on empty difference (verses 3–7); if same, unnecessary (verse 8). Prevents reifying ground as eternalist substrate.

    • True Union: Inseparability through co-dependence — manifestations arise from/define the ground as mind-imputed play (lila). Conventionally, tools for pointing to rigpa; ultimately empty ⇔ illusory, non-dual like space and clouds.
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Union of the Three Kayas (U3K)

• • • Apparent Union: The three bodies (dharmakaya as truth-body, sambhogakaya as enjoyment-body, nirmanakaya as emanation-body) seem distinct aspects of buddhahood uniting in enlightened activity.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: If separate/different, unification impossible without inherent difference (verses 5–7); if identical, redundant (verse 8). Critiques substantialist views of kayas.

    • True Union: Co-originating interdependence — each kaya co-defines the others as conventional designations for buddha-nature. Empty ⇔ illusory, functioning as tools for tantric visualization, revealing non-dual enlightenment.
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Union of the Three Times (U3T)

• • • Apparent Union: Past, present, and future appear as separate temporal segments uniting in timeless awareness, as in some sutras on impermanence.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: If inherently different/separate (e.g., past distinct from future), dependent difference fails (verses 3–7); sameness negates union (verse 8). Echoes MMK Chapter 19 on time.

    • True Union: Inseparability via co-evolution — times interdepend as mind-imputed constructs. Conventionally, useful for understanding change; ultimately empty ⇔ illusory, pointing to timeless emptiness.
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Union of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa

• • • Apparent Union: Cyclic existence (saṃsāra) and liberation (nirvāṇa) seem like opposites — suffering vs. peace — merging in non-dual realization.

    • Refutation via Chapter 14: If separate/different, no bridge possible (verses 5–7); if same from the start, no need for union (verse 8). Aligns with MMK Chapter 25.

    • True Union: Co-dependent inseparability — saṃsāra as deluded view of nirvāṇa, co-arising as designations. Empty ⇔ illusory, conventionally distinct for path practice; ultimately non-dual, as "saṃsāra is nirvāṇa" when seen through two truths.
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Broader Implications for Madhyamaka and Beyond

Chapter 14's refutation generalizes because all "Unions" involve apparent opposites parsed into relational constructs, vulnerable to the same dialectic of sameness/difference. This does not reject these concepts — they remain vital conventional tools (e.g., for Vajrayana empowerments or Dzogchen trekchö) — but refines them as empty designations, preventing clinging. As Nāgārjuna notes in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, even refutations are empty, ensuring no new reification.

Ultimately, all such "Unions" converge on the Union of the Two Truths about apparent opposites: their inseparability reveals śūnyatā, fostering liberation from dualistic illusions.