Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
"Root Verses on the Middle Way" by Nagarjuna
Chapter 2 - Action/Motion [U2T-3S-motion].
Moving conventionally without moving in absolute terms.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
"Root Verses on the Middle Way" by Nagarjuna
Chapter 2 - Action/Motion [U2T-3S-motion].
Moving conventionally without moving in absolute terms.
Chapter 2 – Action/Motion [U2T-3S-motion]:
This chapter refutes independent/inherent/absolute action, motion/movement because the three spheres of action/motion/movement – actor/goer, action/movement, result/destination – cannot be inherently (i) dependently-arisen /existent /functional /changing /ceasing, (ii) non-dependently-arisen /non-existent /non-functional /non-changing /non-ceasing, (iii) both, or (iv) neither; cannot be inherently (i) different /separate /multiple /dual, (ii) identical /united /one /non-dual, (iii) both, or (iv) neither; cannot be inherently (i) permanent /continuous /eternal /’this’, (ii) impermanent /discontinuous /annihilated /’non-this’, (iii) both, or (iv) neither; etc. [Tetralemma] ⇐⇒ thus the three spheres are empty of inherent existence, never absolute [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ they are inseparable, dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S] ⇐⇒ and vice versa, one truth supports/implies/enables the other [U2T-3S] ⇐⇒ they are like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [Illusory]
⇐⇒ so we could use these models /concepts /dualities /triads / quads, like subject/relation/object, actor/action/result, cause/causality/effect, producer/production/product, goer/going/destination, perceiver/perception/perceived, knower/knowing/known, part/composing/aggregate, characteristic/characterizing/characterized, definition/defining/defined, origination/duration/cessation, before/during/after, past/present/future, and other dualities/triads/quads, including the two truths, conventionally/relatively, but never in absolute terms [U2T-in-action], using them without apprehending /opposing /unifying /accepting /rejecting /changing /increasing /decreasing /liberating anything in absolute terms.
There are no inherent action/motion/movement because we cannot find the true beginning/origination, middle/duration and ending/cessation of any thing, being, process or cycle; because all subjects/goers-at-origin are also objects/goers-at-destination, and because they are dependently co-arisen in a limitless and centerless cycle. The same for the objects/goers-at-destination.
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Last update: December 27, 2025
AI Art from: Stoneflower013
Source Text: Garfield, PTG, Streng, Batchelor.
A. Introduction
B. Analysis
C. Verses
D. Questions and Answers
E. Summary
F. Conclusion
Chapter 2 introduces the inseparable relativity [T1] and emptiness of inherent existence [T2] of action / motion / movement and rest, of goer, going and destination. It affirms that there is no inherent/absolute motion or rest. Meaning the three spheres of motion/rest – e.g., subject/goer, relation/going and object/destination – cannot be (i) identical/united/one/non-dual, (ii) different/separate/multiple/dual, (iii) both, or (iv) neither. Meaning there is no (i) continuity or (ii) discontinuity of any thing, being, process or cycle in the three times (before, during and after the actual action/motion); no (i) permanent or (ii) impermanent essence, self, or 5 aggregates. Instead of indulging in any to those four extreme positions (i-iv), Nagarjuna proposes a Middle Way free from all extremes (‘this’, ‘non-this’) and middle (both, neither), with nothing to accept/reject/change in absolute terms, only conventionally/relatively/temporarily if it helps on the path at this point.
The Madhyamaka logic is always similar [Tetralemma ⇔ Emptiness ⇔ Dependent Origination ⇔ Illusory ⇔ Middle Way ⇔ Acting-without-acting]: by showing that in the various dyads/triads/quads — e.g., subject/relation/object, cause/causality/effect, goer/going/destination, seer/seeing/seen, part/composing/whole, characteristic/defining/characterized, producer/production/produced, acquirer/acquiring/acquired —
the apparent opposites cannot be
(i) existent/real/identical/united/simultaneous/one/non-dual/’this’,
(ii) non-existent/non-real/different/separate/multiple/dual/’non-this’,
(iii) both, or (iv) neither, and there is no fifth [Tetralemma];
⇐⇒ this implies that the apparent opposites are empty of inherent existence, never absolute [T2/Emptiness];
⇐⇒ but dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truth/tools [T1/Dependent-Origination];
⇐⇒ one aspect/truth supports/implies the other [U2T];
⇐⇒ like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [Illusory];
⇐⇒ Pointing to the Middle Way free from all extremes;
⇐⇒ so we can use them conventionally/relatively but never in absolute terms [Acting-without-acting].
(Where ‘⇐⇒’ means one side implies the other.)
There is no inherent moving in the three times.
We cannot find the beginning of the activity in the three times.
The three spheres – goer, going, destination –
are not inherently existent, not completely non-existent, not both, not neither [Tetralemma].
The three spheres – goer, going, destination –
are not different/separate/multiple/dual, not identical/united/one/non-dual, not both, not neither [Tetralemma].
The three spheres – goer, going, destination –
are not permanent/continuous/eternal, not impermanent/discontinuous/annihilated, not both, not neither [Tetralemma].
The three spheres – goer, going, destination –
are thus empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S] [U2T-3S] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [Illusory].
The three stages of becoming – origination/beginning/coming, duration/middle/transformation, cessation/ending/going — relative to any composite/product
are not inherently existent, not completely non-existent, not both, not neither [Tetralemma].
The three times relative to any phenomena/dharmas – before/past, during/present, after/future –
are not inherently existent, not completely non-existent, not both, not neither [Tetralemma].
Acting without acting: So we can use those concepts conventionally/relatively but never in absolute terms; without attachment, reification, effort or absolute; without apprehending anything in absolute terms; non-dualistically, without opposing/uniting anything in absolute terms; without accepting/rejecting/changing anything in absolute terms; thus acting more and more in accord with the Middle Way free from all extremes and middle, and with the true nature of reality as it is (tathata, suchness) as pointed out by the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] and its corollaries [U3S / Uopp / U3T / UGM / U3K / U2T-2T].
There is no continuity or discontinuity of any being, thing, process, cycle, or karma, across the three times of any activity, association, aggregation, definition.
It is a limitless and centerless fractal cycle: All dharmas are both goer-at-origin and goer-at-destination; are multiple goers-at-origin and goers-at-destination depending on the perspective, all merely imputed by the mind in dependence of its past experience, conditioning, karma (individual, collective, cosmic).
It is like a limitless centerless empty fractal conditioning/causal/karmic cycle — the goer-at-destination becomes a new goer-at-origin: All phenomena/dharmas are both goer-at-origin and goer-at-destination; have/are an infinity of goers-at-origin and goers-at-destination in space, time and nature depending on the perspective; are ever changing, never the same for two consecutive infinitesimal moments. There is no first inherent/absolute goer-at-origin, no final inherent/absolute goer-at-destination, no middle inherent/absolute action/going /movement /displacement /change. Motion is conventionally/relatively functional/useful to navigate the world [T1], but never absolute [T2] [U2T]. Absolute planning and travel are impossible. The three spheres of motion – goer, going, destination – are interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed after the fact [T1-3S] ⇐⇒ empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’ [U2T-3S].
Garfield
Chapter 2 - Examination of Motion
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1. [A. The two arguments:
A1. There is no inherent ‘going/moving’ in the three times: before, during and after the going]
What has been moved is not moving.
What has not been moved is not moving.
Apart from what has been moved and what has not been moved,
Movement cannot be conceived.
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2. [A2. Opponent: A real ‘goer’ is changed by the real ‘going’ and this is visible by his real ‘activity /displacement’]
[An opponent objects:]
Where there is change, there is motion.
Since there is change in the moving,
And not in the moved or not-moved,
Motion is in that which is moving.
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3. [B. Arguments against
a ‘goer’ that change with its visible ‘activity/displacement’
B1. The emptiness of visible “activity /displacement”
The beginning of this ‘activity /displacement’ cannot be found]
How would it be acceptable
For motion to be in the mover?
When it is not moving, it is not acceptable
To call it a mover.
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4. For whomever there is motion in the mover,
There could be non-motion
Evident in the mover.
But having motion follows from being a mover.
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5. If motion is in the mover,
There would have to be a twofold motion:
One in virtue of which it is a mover,
And one in virtue of which it moves.
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If there were a twofold motion,
The subject of that motion would be twofold.
For without a subject of motion,
There cannot be motion.
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7. [B2. The emptiness of the ‘goer’: not existent, non-existent, both, or neither:
The goer (going) is not inherently existing [T2]]
If without a mover
It would not be correct to say that there is motion,
Then if there were no motion,
How could there be a mover?
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8. Inasmuch as a real mover does not move,
And a non-mover does not move,
Apart from a mover and a non-mover,
What third thing could move?
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9. [B3. The emptiness of the ‘going’
There is no real / inherent going [T2]]
When without motion,
It is unacceptable to call something a mover,
How will it be acceptable
To say that a mover moves?
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10. For him from whose perspective a mover moves,
There would be the consequence that
Without motion there could be a mover.
Because a mover moves.
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11. If a mover were to move,
There would be a twofold motion:
One in virtue of which he is a mover,
And one in virtue of which the mover moves.
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12. [B4. The emptiness of the origination, duration and cessation of the ‘going’
The origination of the going cannot be found]
Motion does not begin in what has moved,
Nor does it begin in what has not moved,
Nor does it begin in what is moving.
In what, then, does motion begin?
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13. Prior to the beginning of motion,
There is no beginning of motion in
The going or in the gone.
How could there be motion in the not-gone?
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14. Since the beginning of motion
Cannot be conceived in any way,
What gone thing, what going thing,
And what non-going thing can be posited?
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15. B5. The emptiness of the three times relative to the ‘going’
The goer (not-going-yet) is not inherently existing, not completely non-existing either]
Just as a moving thing is not stationary,
A non-moving thing is not stationary.
Apart from the moving and the non-moving,
What third thing is stationary?
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16. If without motion
It is not appropriate to posit a mover,
How could it be appropriate to say
That a moving thing is stationary?
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17. One does not halt from moving,
Nor from having moved or not having moved.
Motion and coming to rest
And starting to move are similar.
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18. [B6. The goer and going are not the same, not different / separate]
That motion just is the mover itself
Is not correct.
Nor is it correct that
They are completely different.
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19. It would follow from
The identity of mover and motion
That agent and action
Are identical.
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20. It would follow from
A real distinction between motion and mover
That there could be a mover without motion
And motion without a mover.
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21. [C. What are they then ?
C1. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are not different/separate/multiple/dual, identical/united/one/non-dual, both, or neither [Tetralemma-3S].]
Examination of Motion
When neither in identity
Nor in difference
Can they be established,
How can these two be established at all?
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22. [C2. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S].]
The motion by means of which a mover is manifest
Cannot be the motion by means of which he moves.
He does not exist before that motion,
So what and where is the thing that moves?
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23. [C3. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S].]
A mover does not carry out a different motion
From that by means of which he is manifest as a mover.
Moreover, in one mover
A twofold motion is unacceptable.
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24. [D. Conclusions
D1. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are not existent, non-existent, both, or neither [Tetralemma-3S].]
A really existent mover
Doesn't move in any of the three ways.
A non-existent mover
Doesn't move in any of the three ways.
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25. Neither an entity nor a non-entity
Moves in any of the three ways.
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[D2. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are thus empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S] [U2T-3S].]
So motion, mover and
And route are non-existent.
Batchelor
Chapter 2 - Investigation of Coming and Going
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1. [A. The two arguments:
A1. There is no inherent ‘going/moving’ in the three times: before, during and after the going]
Then there is no going in what has gone; there is no going also in what has not [yet] gone. Motion is unknowable apart from what has gone and not [yet] gone.
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2. [A2. Opponent: A real ‘goer’ is changed by the real ‘going’ and this is visible by his real ‘activity /displacement’]
[An opponent objects:]
Where there is moving, there there is going. Furthermore, because moving is within motion -- and is neither gone nor not [yet] gone, therefore, there is going within motion.
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3. [B. Arguments against
a ‘goer’ that change with its visible ‘activity/displacement’
B1. The emptiness of visible “activity /displacement”
The beginning of this ‘activity /displacement’ cannot be found]
How can going be possible within motion? Because motion that is not going is impossible.
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4. For whomever there is going within motion, for him it will follow that there [could be] no going within motion, because there is going within motion.
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5. If there were going within motion, it would follow that going would be twofold: that by which one becomes someone in motion [in a place] and [that by which one] goes in that [place].
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6. If going were twofold, the goer also would be twofold, because going is impossible without a goer.
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7. [B2. The emptiness of the ‘goer’: not existent, non-existent, both, or neither:
The goer (going) is not inherently existing [T2]]
If there were no goer, going would be impossible. If there were no going, where could a goer be existent?
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8. When a goer does not go, a non-goer cannot go; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could go? [cf. v. 15]
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9. [B3. The emptiness of the ‘going’
There is no real / inherent going [T2]]
When a goer* is impossible without going, then how is it possible to say: "a goer goes"?
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10. To claim that a goer goes implies that there could be a goer who does not go, because it is asserted that a goer goes. [cf. v. 4]
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11. If the goer goes, it would follow that going would be twofold: that which reveals* the goer and that which goes once [one] has become a goer.
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12. [B4. The emptiness of the origination, duration and cessation of the ‘going’
The origination of the going cannot be found]
If a beginning of going does not exist in what has gone, [if] a beginning of going does not exist also in what has not [yet] gone [and if] there does not exist a beginning within motion, wherein is a beginning of going made?
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13. Before a beginning of going, there is not any motion or anything which has gone wherein going could begin. How can going exist in what has not [yet] gone?
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14. If a beginning of going is simply not apparent in any way, examine: what has gone? what is motion? what has not [yet] gone?
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15. B5. The emptiness of the three times relative to the ‘going’
The goer (not-going-yet) is not inherently existing, not completely non-existing either]
When a goer does not stay, a non-goer cannot stay; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could stay? [cf. v. 8]
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16. When a goer is not possible without going, how then is it possible [to say]: "a goer stays."
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17. There is no reversal of motion*, nor of what has gone [and] what has not [yet] gone. [Reversal of] going, engagement [to stay] and reversal [of staying] are similar to going.
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18. [B6. The goer and going are not the same, not different / separate]
It is inappropriate to say: "going and a goer are the same." It is inappropriate to say: "going and a goer are different."
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19. If whatever is going were a goer, it would follow that the actor and the act would be the same too.
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20. If going and a goer were conceived as different, there could be going without a goer and a goer without going.
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21. [C. What are they then ?
C1. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are not different/separate/multiple/dual, identical/united/one/non-dual, both, or neither [Tetralemma-3S].]
If things are not established as the same and as different, how can they be established?
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22. [C2. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S].]
That very going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because there is no [goer] before going, who would be going where?
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23. [C3. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S].]
[A going] which is other than the going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because it is impossible for going to be twofold within a single goer.
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24. [D. Conclusions
D1. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are not existent, non-existent, both, or neither [Tetralemma-3S].]
One who is a goer does not go in the three aspects of going. Also one who is not [a goer] does not go in the three aspects of going.
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25. One who is and is not [a goer] also does not go in the three aspects of going.
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[D2. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are thus empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S] [U2T-3S].]
Therefore, going and a goer and also that which is gone over do not exist.
Streng
Chapter 2 - An Analysis of "Going to" (change or movement) – 25 verses – The illusion of continuity through change or movement]
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1. [A. The two arguments:
A1. There is no inherent ‘going/moving’ in the three times: before, during and after the going]
[Nagarjuna:] That which is already gone to (gatam – goer after the going - iii)
is not that which is "being gone to" (gamyate);
more so, "that which is not yet gone to" (agatam – goer before the going - i)
is certainly not that "being gone to." (gamyate)
Also, the "present going to" (gamyamana – actual goer - ii)
without "that which is already gone to" and "that which is not yet gone to"
is not "being gone to".
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2. [A2. Opponent: A real ‘goer’ is changed by the real ‘going’ and this is visible by his real ‘activity /displacement’]
[An opponent objects:]
Where there is activity (cesta - visible activity) there is a "process of going" (gatis – real going process), and that activity (visible activity) is in the "present going to" (gamyamane - ii).
Then "process of going" (gatis - real going process) is inherent in the "present going to" (gamyamane - ii) [since] the activity (visible activity) is not in "that which is already gone to" (iii) nor in "that which is not yet gone to." (i)
.
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3. [B. Arguments against
a ‘goer’ that change with its visible ‘activity/displacement’
B1. The emptiness of visible “activity /displacement”
The beginning of this ‘activity /displacement’ cannot be found]
[Nagarjuna answers:]
How will the "act of going" (gamanam - visible 'activity/displacement') of "present going to" (gamyamana - ii) be produced,
Since both kinds of the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') [as applied to an active process and to the activity of going through space] simply are not produced (i.e. originating) in the "present going to" (ii)?
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4. [The problems with inherent independent ‘activity/displacement’.
There would be a going-process without a goer actually going]
Having the "act of going" (gamanam - visible 'activity/displacement') of "present going to" (gamyamanasya - ii) has necessarily resulted in a lack of "the present going to" (ii) of the "process of going" (gati - real going process),
For the "present going to" (gamyamana - ii) is the "being gone to" (gamyate).
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5. [There would be two kinds of visible ‘activity /displacement’]
[Recognizing] the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') of "present going to" (ii) results in two [kinds of] "acts of going" (gamanadvaya - visible 'activity/displacement'):
One by which there is "present going to" (gamyamana - ii), the other which is the "act of going" (gamana - visible 'activity/displacement').
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6. [There would be two goers]
Two 'goers' (gantarau) would fallaciously follow as a consequence of two "acts of going," (visible 'activity/displacement')
Since certainly the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') is not produced without a 'goer'.
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7. [B2. The emptiness of the ‘goer’: not existent, non-existent, both, or neither:
The goer (going) is not inherently existing [T2]]
If there is no going (gamana) (i.e. gamana = "act of going") without a 'goer' (gantara),
How will the 'goer' (ganta / self-existing subject) come into being when there is no "going" (gamana) (i.e. gamana = "act of going")?
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8. [The goer (going) is not completely non-existing either [T1]]
The 'goer' does not go (move);
consequently a "non-goer" certainly does not go (move).
What third [possibility] goes (moves) other than the 'goer' and "non-goer"?
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9. [B3. The emptiness of the ‘going’
There is no real / inherent going [T2]]
It is said: "The 'goer' goes" (moves)
How is that possible,
When without the "act of going" (gamana - visible movement) no 'goer' is produced?
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10. [The problems with an inherent going
There would be a goer without a going]
Those who hold the view that the 'goer' "goes" (moves) must [falsely] conclude
That there is a 'goer' without the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') since the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') is obtained (icchata) by a "goer."
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11. [There would be two kinds of 'activity/displacement']
If the 'goer' "goes" (moves), then two acts of going (visible 'activity/displacement') [erroneously] follow;
[One is] that by which the "going on" (ganta) is designated, and [the second is] the real 'goer' (ganta / self-existing subject) who "goes"(moves).
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12. [B4. The emptiness of the origination, duration and cessation of the ‘going’
The origination of the going cannot be found]
The "state of going to" (gatum) is not begun in "that which is already gone to" (gatam - iii), nor in "that which is not yet gone to" (agatam - i);
Nor is the "state of going to" begun in "present going to" (gamyamana - ii).
Where then is it begun?
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13. [The three states of the goer relative to the limits of the going are not real; they cannot be found]
"Present going to" (ii) does not exist previous to the beginning of the "act of going," (visible 'activity/displacement')
nor does "that which is already gone to" (iii) exist where the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') should begin.
How can the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') [begin] in "that which is not yet gone to" (i)?
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14. [They are mere co-dependently arisen concepts, never absolute]
It is mentally fabricated what is "that which is already gone to" (gatam - iii), "present going to" (gamyamana - ii) and "that which is not yet gone to" (agatam - i);
Therefore, the beginning of the "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement') is not seen in any way.
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15. [B5. The emptiness of the three times relative to the ‘going’
The goer (not-going-yet) is not inherently existing, not completely non-existing either]
A 'goer' does not remain unmoved (na tistati); then certainly the "non-goer" does not remain unmoved.
What third [possibility] other than 'goer' and "non-goer" can thus remain unmoved?
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16. [The goer (continuing-the-going) is not inherently existing
The goer (not-going-anymore) is not inherently existing]
It is said that a 'goer' continues to be [a 'goer'].
But how can that be possible,
Since a 'goer'(ganta / self-existing subject) lacking the "act of going" (gamanam - visible 'activity/displacement') is simply not produced?
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17. [There is no permanent goer coming from any of the three times]
[The 'goer'] does not continue to be [a goer] as a result of "present going to" (ii) or "that which is already gone to" (iii) or "that which is not yet gone to,"(i)
For then the act of going (gamana - visible 'activity/displacement') [would be] origination while the "process of going" (gati - real going process) would be the same as cessation.
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18. [B6. The goer and going are not the same, not different / separate]
Thus it does not obtain that the 'goer' is simply "what is going" (gamana) (i.e. gamana = "act of going").
Likewise it does not obtain that: "Then the 'goer' is something other than what is in the "process of going" (gatis - real going process)."[32]
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19. [If the goer and the activity were the same]
And if the "act of going" (visible movement) and the 'goer' are identical,
The fallacy logically follows that the "person acting" (kartus) and the action (karma) are identical.
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20. [If the goer and the going/action were separate / different]
Alternatively, if the 'goer' is different from the "process of going" (gati - - real going process),
The "act of going" (gamana - visible 'activity/displacement') would exist without the 'goer' and the 'goer' would exist without the "act of going." (visible 'activity/displacement')
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21. [C. What are they then ?
C1. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are not different/separate/multiple/dual, identical/united/one/non-dual, both, or neither [Tetralemma-3S].]
Neither the identity nor the essential difference is established (siddhi) regarding the two [conceptions 'goer' and "act of going" (visible 'activity/displacement')].
If these two [alternatives] are not established, in what way is [this problem] to be understood?
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22. [C2. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S].]
The 'goer' is defined by that which is in the "process of going" (real going process);
he does not go to that [destination] which is determined by the "process of going" (real going process)
because there is no prior "process of going". (gati - real going process)
Indeed someone goes somewhere.
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23. [C3. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S].]
The 'goer' does not go to that [destination] other than that "process of going" (real going process) - by which he is defined as 'goer',
Because when one goes [somewhere] (i.e. else) two "processes of going" (real going processes) cannot be produced.
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24. [D. Conclusions
D1. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are not existent, non-existent, both, or neither [Tetralemma-3S].]
A real 'goer' does not motivate three kinds of "acts of going": [real, non-real, and real-and-non-real];
Nor does a non-real ['goer'] motivate three kinds of motion.
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25. Also, a real-non-real ['goer'] does not motivate three kinds of motion.
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[D2. The three spheres – goer, going, destination – are thus empty of inherent existence [T2-3S] ⇐⇒ dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1-3S] [U2T-3S].]
Therefore,
the "process of going" (gati - real going process),
the 'goer' (ganta / self-existing subject)
and "a destination to be gone to" (gantavyam)
do not exist (inherently).
Q: Is there anything else we should mention about chapter 2?
Answer 1: Your enthusiasm for tracing this cyclic pattern across the chapters is infectious, and I’m excited to dive deeper with you! Before we move on from Chapter 2, there are a couple of additional points worth highlighting that complement the dynamic interdependence and karmic cycle we’ve unpacked.
First, Nāgārjuna’s use of the tetralemma in this chapter — neither the "goer" goes, nor the "non-goer," nor both, nor neither — extends beyond just negating motion’s inherent existence. It’s a deliberate strategy to exhaust all logical possibilities, forcing us to confront the limits of conceptual thinking itself. This isn’t just about debunking movement; it’s a meditative tool to shift us from grasping at fixed entities (like a "goer" or "going") to recognizing the fluid, relational reality we’ve been exploring. The cyclic updating of goer-to-goer, step-by-step, fits here as a practical illustration of this fluidity, but the tetralemma reminds us that even this cycle can’t be reified into an ultimate truth.
Second, Chapter 2 subtly foreshadows broader implications for agency and identity, which tie into the karmic cycle you’ve identified. By showing that the "goer" and "act of going" can’t be separated or independently established, Nāgārjuna hints at the emptiness of a self that "moves" or "acts" — a theme that will likely deepen in later chapters (like Chapter 3 on perception or Chapter 18 on the self). The goer’s constant redefinition through movement parallels how karma updates the actor without a solid "self" enduring behind it, reinforcing that this triad (goer/actor, going/action, destination/object) is a process, not a set of essences. This sets the stage for analyzing how other phenomena — like seeing, time, or suffering — might also reveal this centerless, cyclic interdependence.
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Answer 2: Chapter 2 of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā serves as a pivotal extension of his critique of inherent existence, moving from causality in Chapter 1 to motion — a fundamental aspect of how we experience the world.
One additional point worth noting is how this chapter challenges our intuitive understanding of time and change. By deconstructing motion into temporal stages (not yet gone to, present going to, already gone to), Nāgārjuna implicitly critiques the notion of time as an inherently real framework, showing that these stages are mental constructs, dependently arisen, and thus empty of svabhāva. This sets the stage for later chapters (e.g., Chapter 19 on time) where he explicitly addresses temporality, reinforcing that time, like motion, lacks inherent existence.
Another key aspect is the chapter’s relevance to the Abhidharma’s momentary theory of dharmas. The Abhidharma posits that dharmas (fundamental elements) exist momentarily and change through processes like motion, each with a minimal svabhāva. Nāgārjuna’s analysis in Chapter 2 directly undermines this by showing that motion — and by extension, change — cannot be inherently real, thus challenging the Abhidharma’s foundational ontology. This critique is not merely destructive; it invites a profound shift in perspective, encouraging practitioners to see motion, time, and change as part of the interdependent web of phenomena, free from reification.
Finally, Chapter 2 exemplifies Nāgārjuna’s dialectical method, which avoids positing a positive theory of motion or reality. Instead, he uses reductio ad absurdum to expose the incoherence of inherent motion, reflecting the "emptiness of emptiness"—the idea that emptiness itself is not a thing to grasp but a tool to dismantle misconceptions.
This chapter, like Chapter 1, is not just an intellectual exercise but a meditative prompt, urging us to let go of fixed concepts and encounter the fluid, non-dual nature of reality directly, beyond the illusions of inherent motion, time, or agency.
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Q: Something about the cyclic nature of action / movement … co-evolution of the three spheres …
Answer 1: In Chapter 2 of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, "An Analysis of ‘Going To’ (Change or Movement)," the causal cycle from Chapter 1 — where effect-1 becomes cause-2, producing effect-2 — finds a parallel in the dynamic interplay of the "goer" and the "act of going." Just as an effect transitions into a new cause in Chapter 1,
here the "goer-1" engages in an "act of going" (movement),
which redefines them as "goer-2" (at a new starting position)
for the next phase of motion.
For instance, a person walking from point A to B (goer-1) performs the "act of going" (effect-1: reaching B), but reaching B updates their state to goer-2, who then initiates a new "act of going" toward point C (effect-2). The result of one movement isn’t an endpoint but folds into the next, creating a continuous cycle where the "goer", "going" and “destination” perpetually redefine each other.
Nāgārjuna argues that neither the "goer" nor the "act of going" nor the “destination” has inherent existence — motion cannot occur in the past ("already gone to"), future ("not yet gone to"), or even the present ("present going to") without collapsing into logical absurdities, like requiring two goers or two acts of going.
This mirrors Chapter 1’s boundless causal chain: just as a cause is an effect of prior conditions, the "goer" is defined by prior movement (resulting in his actual position), and each "act of going" becomes the condition for the next "goer" (at a new position; continually redefining the status of the goer; as in the case of the karmic cycle). There’s no independent / separate / permanent / inherently existing "goer" outside the process, nor a self-existent "going" apart from the goer — both are empty, existing only relationally within an infinite, centerless cycle of motion. The "result-1" (a moment of going) being included in the "goer-2" parallels how karmic actions update the actor, with no fixed entity enduring through the process. In both chapters, this interconnected flux — causality in Chapter 1, movement in Chapter 2 —
reveals a reality without a core [T2]
⇐⇒ where distinctions like cause/effect or goer/going
dissolve into mutual dependence [T1] [U2T],
reinforcing Nāgārjuna’s insight that
all phenomena are empty of inherent existence [T2]
⇐⇒ functioning only as provisional appearances in an endless dance of relativity [T2] [U2T].
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Answer 2: Chapter 2 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā reveals the cyclic, interconnected nature of motion, where the goer, act of going, and destination(goer at a new position) co-evolve in a limitless and centerless continuum [T1] ⇐⇒ with nothing existing independently, separately, inherently, or individually within it.
Nāgārjuna begins by negating the idea that motion can occur inherently in any of the three temporal stages — not yet gone to, present going to, or already gone to —
showing that these stages are interdependent [T1]
⇐⇒ and lack svabhāva [T2] [U2T].
This interdependence extends to the three spheres of motion: (i) the goer (subject), (ii) the act of going (action), and (iii) the destination (object) (goer at a new position, or producer with updated karma). For example, a person walking (goer) engages in walking (act of going) to reach a location (destination), but upon arriving, that destination becomes a new starting point, making the person a goer again in a new cycle of motion. This reflects a cyclic process where each destination (effect) transforms into a new goer (cause) (goer at a new position, or producer with updated karma), perpetuating an endless chain of motion with no absolute beginning or end.
This cycle mirrors the karmic process, where each moment’s result feeds into the next moment’s cause, with no fixed identity persisting even for two infinitesimal consecutive moments. The goer is not a static entity — it changes with each step, conditioned by countless factors (physical, mental, environmental), and the act of going evolves as conditions shift, while the destination itself is a moving target, redefined by context and perspective. Nothing remains the same because everything is in flux, co-evolving within this interdependent web [T1]. For instance, in the Abhidharma’s momentary view, a goer might be a series of dharmas (e.g., body and consciousness) arising and ceasing each moment, but Nāgārjuna shows that even these moments lack inherent existence, as their arising depends on prior conditions, which are themselves empty [T2].
This limitless, centerless cycle — where everything is simultaneously a goer, act of going, and destination (goer at a new position, or producer with updated karma) [T1] ⇐⇒ underscores the emptiness of inherent existence [T2] [U2T]. There is no "first goer" to start the motion, no "final destination" to end it, and no "absolute" goer, act of going, or destination in the middle that exists independently of this relational flux. Each element has an infinity of conditions in nature, space, and time, making individual, independent, separate, or inherent existence an oversimplification of reality as it is. These concepts are relatively useful [T1] (we describe motion to navigate the world) ⇐⇒ but they are never absolute [T2] ⇐⇒ merely co-labeled, co-imputed, or co-imagined by the mind within the limitless and centerless karmic cycle (individual, collective, cosmic) [T1] [U2T].
Nāgārjuna’s insight invites us to see motion not as a fixed process but as a dynamic, dreamlike interplay of interdependent phenomena, pointing to the non-dual, interconnected nature of reality.
In Chapter 2 of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,
titled "An Analysis of ‘Going To’ (Change or Movement),"
[3. Dependent origination:] ⇐⇒ Nāgārjuna deconstructs the concept of action / motion [T1]
[2. Emptiness:] ⇐⇒ to reveal its lack of inherent existence [T2] [U2T],
extending the logic of emptiness from causation to the phenomenon of change.
[1. Tetralemma:] He begins by dividing motion into
three temporal aspects / stages
– (i) "that which is already gone to" (past),
– (ii) "that which is not yet gone to" (future), and
– (iii) "present going to" (present) —
and argues that none of these can sustain the "act of going."
The past and future are not currently "being gone to,"
while the present, if separated from past and future,
lacks a basis for movement.
When an opponent suggests that motion resides in
the "present going to" due to visible activity,
[1. Tetralemma:] Nāgārjuna counters that this leads to absurdities:
if motion occurs in the present, it implies two acts of going
(the activity and the displacement),
necessitating two goers, which is illogical.
[1. Tetralemma:] He systematically shows that
– a "goer" (subject / actor) cannot exist without "going" (action),
– nor can "going" (action) exist without a "goer" (subject / actor), and
– neither can be pinned down as independently real
neither a "goer" nor a "non-goer" moves, nor does any third option.
This analysis culminates in the CONCLUSION that:
[3. Dependent origination:] ⇐⇒ action / motion [T1], like causation in Chapter 1,
[2. Emptiness:] ⇐⇒ is empty of inherent existence [T2] [U2T];
[4. Illusory:] ⇐⇒ Like illusions, reflections, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yet not there’;
[5. Middle Way:] ⇐⇒ true understanding lies in the middle way beyond extremes.
[6. One:] ⇐⇒ Everything is primordially interconnected, pure, perfect, complete, divine, ‘One’ in the non-dual sense: not many, not one, not both together, not neither. They may be relatively useful conventionally [T1], but never absolute [T2] [U2T].
[1. Tetralemma:] Nāgārjuna rejects both the identity of the "goer" and "going"
(which collapses the actor into the action)
and their essential difference (which implies independent existence),
leaving no coherent ground for understanding motion as intrinsically real.
The three spheres of action / motion:
(i) the "process of going (relation / action),"
(ii) the "goer" (subject / actor) and
(iii) the "destination" (object / result)
[3. Dependent origination:] ⇐⇒ are mere mental fabrications [T1],
[2. Emptiness:] ⇐⇒ lacking self-existence [T2] [U2T]
[3. Interdependence:] ⇐⇒ because they depend on each other (interdependence) [T1]
[2. Emptiness:] ⇐⇒ without a foundational starting point (origination), middle (duration) or endpoint (cessation).
Echoing Chapter 1,
[4. Illusory:] ⇐⇒ he portrays movement as dreamlike
[3. Dependent origination:] ⇐⇒ apparent [T1]
[2. Emptiness:] ⇐⇒ yet insubstantial [T2]
[1. Tetralemma:] ⇐⇒ neither fully existent nor non-existent [nor both, not neither].
This chapter reinforces the Madhyamaka view that all phenomena,
including change, are relational constructs,
inviting us to release attachment to fixed notions and
recognize the interdependent [T1] ⇐⇒ empty nature of reality [T2] [U2T].
We can analyse ‘motion’ / ‘dependent origination’ in terms of the three spheres of any relation/action (physical, conceptual, mental), and in terms of the opposites of any duality, triad, quad … Why? Because that is the way our ordinary conditioned dualistic conceptual mind(s) operates/creates; and because our goal is to transcend (without rejecting) it by realizing the way it naturally functions and the real nature of its fabrications.
There is useful relative conventional dependent origination (causality) [T1] ⇐⇒ but it is never absolute, never reality as it is [T2] [U2T]. There are no independent/absolute/inherently-existing/sure causes, conditions, causal relations and effects about anything anytime. Reality as it is is not causal nor dual in absolute terms. So we can use those concepts conventionally/relatively [T1] but never in absolute terms [T2] [U2T-in-action]; without attachment, reification, effort or absolutes; without apprehending anything in absolute terms; non-dualistically, without opposing/uniting anything in absolute terms, without accepting / rejecting / changing anything in absolute terms; thus acting more and more in accord with the Middle Way free from all extremes and Middle, acting more and more in accord with reality as it is (tathata, suchness) as pointed out by the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] and its corollaries [U3S / Uopp / U3T / UGM / U3K / U2T-2T].
Union of the Two Truths [U2T]: All phenomena/dharmas are empty of inherent existence, never absolute, not really dependent, originating/coming, conditioned, existent, changing, increasing, decreasing, ceasing/going, /liberated [T2] ⇐⇒ precisely because they are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflection, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yer not there’ [Illusory] ⇐⇒ not inherently existent/functional, not completely non-existence/non-functional, not both, not neither; not different/separate/multiple/dual, not identical/united/one/non-dual, not both, not neither; not permanent/continuous/eternal, not impermanent/discontinuous/annihilated, not both, not neither; not dependently-arisen [T1-only], not empty of inherent existence [T2-only], not both truths together and in opposition [2T], not neither of the two truths [1T]; not ‘this’, not ‘non-this’, not both, not neither, and there is no fifth, for whatever ‘this’ is [Tetralemma]. They are conventionally relatively functional and useful but never in absolute terms.
Union of opposites [Uopp]: The opposites of any duality/triad/quad (including the three spheres [3S] of any relation/activity, self-others [opp], the three times [3T], the two truths [2T], the Ground and its manifestations [GM], the three kayas [3K], the four noble truths, the 12 links or dependent oritination, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa [opp]) are empty of inherent existence, never absolute, not really dependent, originating/coming, conditioned, existent, changing, increasing, decreasing, ceasing/going, afflicted/liberated [T2] ⇐⇒ precisely because they are dependently co-arisen, interdependent, co-defined, co-evolving, co-imputed by the mind, mere designations/names, conventional truths/tools [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ like illusions, reflection, mirages, dreams, echos, ‘there, yer not there’ [Illusory] ⇐⇒ not inherently arising/existent/functional/changing/ceasing, not completely non-arising/non-existent/non-functional/non-changing/non-ceasing, not both, not neither; not different/separate/multiple/dual, not identical/united/one/non-dual, not both, not neither; not permanent/continuous/eternal, not impermanent/discontinuous/annihilated, not both, not neither; not dependently-arisen [T1-only], not empty of inherent existence [T2-only], not both truths together and in opposition [2T], not neither of the two truths [1T]; not ‘this’, not ‘non-this’, not both, not neither, and there is no fifth, for whatever ‘this’ is [Tetralemma]. They are conventionally relatively functional and useful but never in absolute terms.