The Dispeller of Dispute
(Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī)

(A dialectical masterpiece that defends emptiness (the Union of the Two Truths [U2T]) against the objections of realist philosophers. Awakening is the gradual realization of the inconceivable true nature of reality as it is as pointed out by the Union of the Two Truths about all phenomena, and acting more and more in accord with it. Awakening is the Middle way free from all extremes and middle; not accepting not rejecting conventional truths, dualities, triads... Being able to use them / act conventionally without using them / acting in absolute terms, without attachment / rejection, reification / extinction, effort / non-effort or absolute; thus more and more in accord with reality as it is.)

Introduction

PART 1 - The Arguments of the Opponents

Section 1: Logical Consistency of Nāgārjuna’s Statement (Verses 1–4)

Section 2: Denial of Epistemological Foundations (Verses 5–6)

Section 3: Self-Existence in Dharmas and Liberation (Verses 7–8)

Section 4: Consequences of Denying Self-Existence (Verses 9–10)

Section 5: Nature of Denial (Verses 11–16)

Section 6: Epistemological Grounds and Proof (Verses 17–20)

Conclusion of Part I: The Arguments of the Opponents (Verses 1–20):

PART II - Nagarjuna's Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents

Section 1: Inseparable Emptiness [T2] ⇐⇒ and Dependent Origination [T1] [U2T] (Verses 21–24):

Section 2: Refuting the Opponents’ Analogies (Verses 25–28)

Section 3: Nāgārjuna’s Non-Propositional Stance (Verses 29–30)

Section 4: Critique of Epistemological Sources (Verses 31–51)

Section 5: Refuting Self-Existence in Dharmas (Verses 52–56)

Section 6: Language and Emptiness (Verses 57–59)

Section 7: Nature of Denial and Emptiness (Verses 60–64)

Section 8: Refuting the Mirage Analogy (Verses 65–68)

Section 9: Temporality and Emptiness (Verse 69)

Section 10: Emptiness as the Basis of All Phenomena (Verse 70)

Conclusion of Part II: Nāgārjuna’s Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents (Verses 21–70):

Overall Conclusion

Conclusion

The Dispeller of Dispute (70 verses)

Last update: September 08, 2025

Introduction

Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī (The Dispeller of Disputes) stands as a cornerstone of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, embodying the profound insights of the Madhyamaka school, which Nāgārjuna is credited with founding. Composed likely in the 2nd century CE, this concise yet dense text is a dialectical masterpiece that defends the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] against the objections of realist philosophers, most likely from the Nyāya school or other Indian traditions that upheld the inherent existence (svabhāva) of phenomena.

Written in Sanskrit and structured as a series of 70 verses, the Vigrahavyāvartanī is divided into two parts:

1. 1. Part I (verses 1–20) presents the arguments of Nāgārjuna’s opponents, who challenge the logical and epistemological coherence of his rejection of self-existence, and
  2. Part II (verses 21–70) contains Nāgārjuna’s incisive responses, systematically dismantling their critiques while elucidating the Madhyamaka view.

The Vigrahavyāvartanī is situated within the broader context of Indian philosophical debates, where schools like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṃkhya argued for the reality of substances, categories, or essences, while Buddhist schools, including the Madhyamaka, emphasized the inseparability, interdependence, harmony, Union of the Two Truths: impermanence, interdependence [T1] ⇐⇒ and the absence of intrinsic nature [T2] [U2T].

Nāgārjuna’s project in this text is not to propose a new ontology but to deconstruct all claims to inherent existence [Tetralemma] ⇐⇒ revealing the interdependence [T1] ⇐⇒ and emptiness of all phenomena [T2] [U2T] — physical, conceptual, mental, individual, collective, or cosmic.

The Madhyamaka framework, as articulated here, rests on the principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which posits that all phenomena arise interdependently, conditioned by causes and circumstances [T1] ⇐⇒ and thus lack an independent, self-sustaining essence [T2] [U2T].

Emptiness, for Nāgārjuna, is not a nihilistic void but the very condition of interdependence, where phenomena exist conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ but are devoid of absolute, inherent existence [T2] [U2T].

The text’s title, Vigrahavyāvartanī, meaning “The Dispeller of Disputes,” reflects its purpose: to resolve philosophical conflicts by exposing the fallacies in realist positions and guiding practitioners toward the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad), which avoids all extremes and middles(s) about any duality / triad / quad…; ex. existence / eternalism / dependent origination, non-existence / nihilism / emptiness, both together / dualism, or neither / monism.

Nāgārjuna employs a rigorous dialectical method, using logical analysis, analogies (e.g., magical phantoms, mirages), and the tetralemma — a fourfold negation (not ‘this’, not ‘non-this’, not both, not neither, for whatever ‘this’ is) — to undermine absolutist views (without rejecting them).

His approach is non-propositional, meaning he avoids asserting a fixed thesis (without rejecting them), as any proposition would itself be subject to the same critique of emptiness.

This method aligns with the Madhyamaka Reasoning Generalization: Dependent Origination ⇐⇒ Emptiness ⇐⇒ Union of the Two Truths ⇐⇒ Illusory ⇐⇒ Tetralemma ⇐⇒ Middle Way ⇐⇒ One ⇐⇒ Cycle. These equivalences frame phenomena as dependently co-arisen, empty of inherent existence, conventionally valid yet ultimately illusory, and part of a non-dual, interdependent Cycle of Creation, Bondage, and Awakening.

1. 1. In Part I, the opponents challenge Nāgārjuna’s rejection of self-existence by arguing that his statement is either self-defeating (if it lacks inherent validity) or self-contradictory (if it possesses it). They claim that denying self-existence undermines epistemological foundations like direct perception and inference, renders language meaningless, and negates the possibility of knowledge or spiritual practice. These objections reflect a realist commitment to inherent existence, assuming that phenomena, knowledge, and language require fixed essences to function.
  2. In Part II, Nāgārjuna responds by demonstrating that his statement (even emptiness itself), like all phenomena, is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ yet conventionally effective [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ akin to an illusion negating another illusion.
    – He critiques the opponents’ reliance on epistemological sources (pramāṇas), showing they lead to infinite regress or circularity, and argues that self-existence in dharmas or language is incoherent, as all phenomena are relationally defined and impermanent.
    – His responses culminate in the affirmation that emptiness [T2] ⇐⇒ enables the conventional arising of phenomena [T1] [U2T] while negating their inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ embodying the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] — conventional reality (saṃvṛti-satya) [T1] ⇐⇒ and ultimate reality (paramārtha-satya) [T2] [U2T].

The Vigrahavyāvartanī is not merely a philosophical treatise but a soteriological tool, aimed at liberating the mind from attachment to fixed views. By revealing the true nature of all phenomena, Nāgārjuna guides practitioners toward a non-conceptual realization of reality as it is, where dualities (self/other, existence/non-existence, subject/object, relative/absolute, dependent-origination/emptiness) dissolve (without rejection) [T2] ⇐⇒ and the interconnected [T1] ⇐⇒ illusory nature of existence is embraced [U2T / Uopp].

The text’s relevance extends beyond its historical context, influencing later Buddhist thinkers like Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa, as well as contemporary philosophical discussions on ontology, epistemology, and language. Its emphasis on the Middle Way resonates with modern inquiries into non-duality, interdependence, and the limits of conceptual thought, making it a timeless contribution to global philosophy.

PART 1 - The Arguments of the Opponents

Summary of Part I: The Arguments of the Opponents (Verses 1–20): The opponents, likely Nyāya or other realist philosophers, challenge Nāgārjuna’s rejection of self-existence (svabhāva) by presenting a series of logical and epistemological objections.

1. 1. They argue that Nāgārjuna’s statement denying self-existence is either impotent (if it lacks self-existence) or self-contradictory (if it possesses self-existence), creating a logical dilemma (verses 1–2).
    They dismiss analogies like “Do not make a sound” or “denial of a denial” as inapplicable, claiming his thesis lacks a valid defining mark (verses 3–4).
  2. They assert that denying self-existence undermines direct perception and other sources of knowledge (pramāṇas) like inference, scripture, and analogy, rendering knowledge impossible (verses 5–6).
  3. The opponents defend the self-existence of “good” and liberative dharmas, suggesting inherent distinctions among phenomena (verses 7–8).
  4. They argue that without self-existence, names lose referents, and Nāgārjuna’s denial is incoherent unless it targets something real (verses 9–11).
  5. If self-existence is non-existent, his denial is redundant, akin to a child’s mistaken belief in “non-water” in a mirage (verses 12–13).
    They extend this to a sixfold structure (apprehension, what is apprehended, apprehender, denial, what is denied, denier), claiming that if apprehension is unreal, denial collapses, proving self-existence (verses 14–16).
  6. Finally, they argue that without self-existence, there are no grounds for knowledge, and Nāgārjuna’s denial lacks justification, while their affirmation of self-existence stands (verses 17–20).

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Section 1: Logical Consistency of Nāgārjuna’s Statement (Verses 1–4)

Summary: The opponents argue that Nāgārjuna’s claim that nothing has self-existence (svabhāva) is self-defeating. If his statement lacks self-existence, it cannot negate self-existence (verse 1). If it has self-existence, it contradicts his thesis, creating a logical inconsistency (verse 2). They reject analogies like “Do not make a sound,” where a sound prevents future sounds, as inapplicable, since Nāgārjuna’s denial is not a temporal prevention (verse 3). They also deny that his statement is a “denial of a denial,” asserting that his thesis lacks a valid defining mark (verse 4).

Conclusion: The opponents aim to trap Nāgārjuna in a logical dilemma: either his statement is impotent (lacking self-existence) or self-contradictory (possessing self-existence).
This reflects a realist perspective that assumes statements must have inherent validity to be meaningful, challenging
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka view that all phenomena, including statements, are empty of inherent existence [T2] and function dependently within conventional reality [T1] [U2T].

1. If self-existence (svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing thing,
Your statement, [itself] being without self-existence, is not able to discard self-existence.
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2. But if that statement has [its own] self-existence, then your initial proposition is refuted;
There is a [logical] inconsistency in this, and you ought to explain the grounds of the difference [between the principle of validity in your statement and others].
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3. Should your opinion be that [your statement] is like "Do not make a sound," this is not possible;
For in this case by a [present] sound there will be a [future] prevention of that [sound].
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4. If [your statement] were that: "This is a denial of a denial," that is not true;
Thus your thesis, as to a defining mark (laksanata) - not mine - is in error.

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Section 2: Denial of Epistemological Foundations (Verses 5–6)

Summary: The opponents argue that denying self-existence undermines direct perception, as Nāgārjuna would have to deny the reality of perceived objects (verse 5). This denial extends to other sources of knowledge (pramāṇas) like inference, scripture, and analogy, as well as their objects, since they rely on direct perception (verse 6).

Conclusion: The opponents assert that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of self-existence destabilizes all epistemological frameworks, rendering knowledge impossible.
From a Madhyamaka perspective, this critique misinterprets emptiness as nihilism (as opposite to conventional truths), whereas
Nāgārjuna views pramāṇas as conventionally valid [T1] ⇐⇒ but empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ functioning interdependently / relatively [T1] ⇐⇒ one truth supporting / implying the other [U2T].

5. If you deny existing things while being seen by direct perception,
Then that direct perception, by which things are seen, also does not exist.
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6. By [denying] direct perception inference is denied, as also Scripture and analogy.
[As well as] the points to be proved by inference and Scripture and those points to be proved by a similar instance (drstanta).

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Section 3: Self-Existence in Dharmas and Liberation (Verses 7–8)

Summary: The opponents claim that those who understand dharmas (phenomena or truths) recognize the self-existence of “good” dharmas, and the same applies to other types (verse 7). They assert self-existence in liberative dharmas (leading to liberation) and non-liberative ones, suggesting inherent distinctions among dharmas (verse 8).

Conclusion: This section reflects the opponents’ realist ontology, where dharmas possess inherent natures (e.g., good, liberative).
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka counters that such distinctions (dualities) are dependently arisen [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty, with no inherent essence [T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ aligning with the Middle Way that avoids reifying categories (not accepting, not rejecting).

7. The people who know the modes of the dharmas know [there is] a good self-existence of good dharmas.
As to the others, the application is the same.
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8. There is a self-existence of liberation in those [dharmas] mentioned as liberative modes of dharmas.
Likewise, there is that which is non-liberative, etc.

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Section 4: Consequences of Denying Self-Existence (Verses 9–10)

Summary: The opponents argue that without self-existence, there can be no “non-self-existence,” and names (concepts) would lack referents, as nothing exists without substance (verse 9). They challenge Nāgārjuna to explain what could have self-existence if dharmas do not, implying his position is incoherent (verse 10).

Conclusion: The opponents assume that denying self-existence leads to nihilism, where language and phenomena lose meaning.
Nāgārjuna’s framework of dependent origination, relative functionality [T1] ⇐⇒ and emptiness of inherent existence [T2] [U2T] posits that names and phenomena function conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ without inherent existence [T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ avoiding all extremes, like existence/eternalism, non-existence/nihilism, both/dualism, neither/monism.

9. And, if there would be no self-existence of dharmas, then that would be "non-self existence";
In that case the name (nama) would not exist, for certainly there is nothing without substance [to which it refers].
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10. If [one asserts:] That which is self-existent exists, but the self-existence of the dharmas does not exist,
One should give the explanation concerning that of which there is self-existence without dharmas.

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Section 5: Nature of Denial (Verses 11–16)

Summary: The opponents argue that denial requires an existing object, like denying a pot’s presence in a house, so Nāgārjuna’s denial of self-existence must target something real (verse 11). If self-existence is non-existent, his denial is redundant (verse 12). They compare his denial to a child’s mistaken belief in “non-water” in a mirage (verse 13).
They extend this to a sixfold structure (apprehension, what is apprehended, apprehender, denial, what is denied, denier), arguing that if apprehension is unreal, denial collapses, proving self-existence (verses 14–16).

Conclusion: The opponents frame Nāgārjuna’s denial as either affirming self-existence (if it targets something real) or being meaningless (if it targets nothing).
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka response would emphasize that denial, like all phenomena, is empty [T2] ⇐⇒ and operates conventionally [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ akin to an illusion negating another illusion ⇐⇒ aligning with the tetralemma’s rejection of extremes.

11. As there must be a denial of something that exists, as [in in the statement:] "There is not a pot in the house,"
That denial of yours which is seen must be a denial of self-existence that exists.
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12. Or if that self-existence does not exist, what do you deny by that statement?
Certainly, the denial of what does not exist is proved without a word!
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13. Just as children erroneously apprehend that there is "non-water" in a mirage,
So you would erroneously apprehend a non-existing thing as deniable.
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14. If this is so, then there is the apprehensions "what is apprehended" and the one who apprehends,
Also the denial, "what is denied" and the one who denies – six-all together.
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15. However, if the apprehension, "what is apprehended" and the one who apprehends do not exist.
Then is it not true that denial, "what is denied," and the one who denies do not exist?
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16. If denial, "what is denied," ant the one who denies do not exist,
Then all existing things as well as the self-existence of them are proved [since you have eliminated their denial].

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Section 6: Epistemological Grounds and Proof (Verses 17–20)

Summary: The opponents claim that without self-existence, there are no grounds for knowledge, undermining Nāgārjuna’s position (verse 17). If his denial lacks grounds, their affirmation of self-existence is valid without grounds (verse 18). They argue that grounds cannot be non-self-existent, as nothing exists without its own nature (verse 19). They reject the idea that denial precedes, follows, or is simultaneous with what is denied, concluding that self-existence is real (verse 20).

Conclusion: The opponents demand inherent grounds for knowledge, assuming that without self-existence, epistemology fails.
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka counters that grounds are dependently arisen [T1] ⇐⇒ empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ and function within the conventional framework of the two truths [U2T] ⇐⇒ pointing to the Middle Way (not accepting, not rejecting).

17. Because of non-self-existence there is no proof of any grounds [of knowledge]; whence are your grounds?
There is no proof of a "point" possible for you if it has no grounds.
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18. If the proof of your denial of a self-existent thing is not a result of grounds of knowledge,
Then my affirmation of the existence of a self-existent thing is proved without grounds.
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19. Or if you maintain: "The real existence of grounds is such that it is a non-self-existent thing (asvabhava) this is not justified;
Because no thing whatever in the world exists lacking it own nature (nishvabhava).
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20. When it is mid: The denial precedes "what is denied," this is not justified.
[Denial] is not justified either later or simultaneously. Therefore self-existence is real.

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Conclusion of Part I: The Arguments of the Opponents (Verses 1–20):

The opponents’ arguments reflect a realist ontology that assumes phenomena, knowledge, and language require inherent existence to be meaningful.
They aim to trap Nāgārjuna in logical and epistemological dilemmas, portraying his doctrine of emptiness as nihilistic or incoherent.
From a Madhyamaka perspective, these critiques misinterpret emptiness as a denial of all reality (as opposite to conventional truths), whereas
Nāgārjuna posits that phenomena are dependently originated [T1] ⇐⇒ empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ and function conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ within the framework of the two truths [U2T].
The opponents’ reliance on self-existence aligns with extreme views (eternalism),
which Nāgārjuna will counter by demonstrating the interdependence and illusoriness of all phenomena, pointing to the Middle Way free from absolutes.

PART II - Nagarjuna's Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents

Summary of Part II: Nāgārjuna’s Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents (Verses 21–70):
Nāgārjuna refutes the opponents’ objections – without proposing a doctrine of his own.

1. 1. He establishes that phenomena, being dependently arisen [T1] ⇐⇒ are empty of self-existence [T2] ⇐⇒ uniting dependent origination with emptiness (one truth supports / implies the other) [U2T / U2T-2T] (verses 21–22).
    Using the analogy of a magical phantom negating another, he argues that his empty statement can negate self-existence without inherent existence, avoiding logical inconsistencies (verses 23–24).
  2. He rejects the opponents’ analogy of “Do not make a sound” and clarifies that his denial operates conventionally, like a phantom dispelling a false belief (verses 25–28).
  3. Nāgārjuna denies making propositional claims, framing his denial as a “non-apprehension of non-things,” thus sidestepping logical errors (verses 29–30).
  4. He critiques the opponents’ epistemological sources (pramāṇas), showing they lead to infinite regress, circularity, or absurdity (e.g., fire illuminating itself), as sources and objects are interdependent and empty (verses 31–51).
  5. He refutes self-existence in good, liberative, or other dharmas, arguing that relational or non-relational self-existence is incoherent and negates spiritual practice (verses 52–56).
  6. Nāgārjuna clarifies that language and names are empty [T2] ⇐⇒ functioning conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ without inherent referents [T2] [U2T] (verses 57–59).
  7. He reframes denial as a conventional act within emptiness, not an absolute negation (emptiness of emptiness),
  8. and defends the mirage analogy to show that apprehensions and denials are dependently arisen and empty (verses 60–68).
  9. He negates absolute temporal relations in causality, affirming emptiness across the three times (verse 69).
  10. Finally, he concludes that emptiness ]T2] ⇐⇒ enables conventional phenomena [T1] (one truth supports / implies the other) [U2T] while negating their inherent existence, encapsulating the Madhyamaka view (verse 70).

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Section 1: Inseparable Emptiness [T2] ⇐⇒ and Dependent Origination [T1] [U2T] (Verses 21–24):

Summary: Nāgārjuna argues that phenomena lacking self-existence [T2] ⇐⇒ due to their dependence on causes and conditions [T1] ⇐⇒ are empty [T2] [U2T] (verse 21). This “being dependent nature” is emptiness, as dependent phenomena lack inherent existence (verse 22). He uses the analogy of a magical phantom negating another phantom to illustrate that his statement, though empty, can negate self-existence (verse 23). Since his statement is not self-existent, it does not contradict his thesis or require explaining inconsistencies (verse 24).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna establishes the core Madhyamaka equation: dependent origination [T1] ⇐⇒ emptiness [T2] [U2T / U2T-2T]. His statement functions like an illusion within conventional reality, negating self-existence without possessing inherent existence, aligning with the Union of the Two Truths and the Middle Way.

21. If any thesis does not bear on the totality of causes and conditions, or on them separately,
Is not emptiness proved because of the fact that there is no self-existence in existing things (1)?
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22. The "being dependent nature" of existing things: that is called "emptiness."
That which has a nature of "being dependent" — of that there is a non-self-existent nature.
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23. Just as a magically formed phantom could deny a phantom created by its own magic,
Just so would be that negation.
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24. This statement [regarding emptiness] is not "that which is self-existent"; therefore, there is no refutation of my assertion.
There is no inconsistency and [thus] the grounds for the difference need not be explained.

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Section 2: Refuting the Opponents’ Analogies (Verses 25–28)

Summary: Nāgārjuna rejects the analogy of “Do not make a sound” as inapplicable, as his denial of self-existence is not like sound negating sound (verse 25). If non-self-existent things could negate each other, self-existence would be proved, which is absurd (verse 26).
He likens his denial to a phantom dispelling a false belief in a phantom woman, valid within conventional reality (verse 27).
He accepts the conventional world for practical purposes [T1] ⇐⇒ where sound and other phenomena are not inherently real [T2] [U2T] (verse 28).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna clarifies that his denial operates conventionally, like illusions negating illusions, avoiding the opponents’ misconstrual of emptiness as nihilism (as opposite to conventional truths). This reflects the Madhyamaka view of phenomena as illusory yet functional, pointing to the tetralemma and Middle Way.

25. [Regarding] "Do not make a sound" — this example introduced by you is not pertinent,
Since there is a negation of sound by sound. That is not like [my denial of self -existence] .
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26. For, if there is prevention of that which lacks self-existence by that which lacks self-existence,
Then that which lacks self-existence would cease, and self-existence would be proved.
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27. Or, as a phantom could destroy the erroneous apprehension concerning a phantom woman that:
"There is a woman," just so this is true in our case.
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28. Or else the grounds [of proof] are that which is to be proved; certainly sound does not exist as real.
For we do not speak without accepting, for practical purposes, the work-a-day world.

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Section 3: Nāgārjuna’s Non-Propositional Stance (Verses 29–30)

Summary: Nāgārjuna denies making any propositional claim, as propositions would entail logical errors (verse 29). His denial of self-existence is a “non-apprehension of non-things,” not an affirmation or denial of inherently existing entities, even those perceived directly (verse 30).

Conclusion: By avoiding propositions/rejections, Nāgārjuna sidesteps logical traps, emphasizing that emptiness is not a thesis but a way of negating inherent existence. This aligns with the tetralemma (not this, not non-this, not both, not neither) and the Middle Way, free from extreme views (not accepting, not rejecting conventional truths).

29. If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error;
But I do not make a proposition; therefore I am not in error.
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30. If there is something, while being seen by means of the objects of direct perceptions, etc.,
[It is] affirmed or denied. That [denial] of mine is a non-apprehension of non-things.

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Section 4: Critique of Epistemological Sources (Verses 31–51)

Summary: Nāgārjuna challenges the opponents to prove their sources of knowledge (pramāṇas) without infinite regress (verses 31–32). He rejects their claim that sources are self-proved, as this leads to inconsistencies, like fire illuminating itself and others, or darkness darkening itself (verses 33–39). He argues that sources cannot be proved independently or in relation to objects, as this leads to circularity or interchange (verses 40–48). Using the analogy of a father and son mutually producing each other, he shows the absurdity of interdependent proof (verses 49–50). He concludes that sources are not proved by themselves, each other, objects, or nothing (verse 51).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna deconstructs the opponents’ realist epistemology, showing that pramāṇas are dependently arisen [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty of inherent existence [T2] [U2T]. This critique aligns with the Madhyamaka view that knowledge functions conventionally [T1] ⇐⇒ within the Union of the Two Truths [U2T], avoiding the extremes of inherent validity or nihilism.

31. And if, for you, there is a source [of knowledge] of each every object of proof,
Then tell how, in turn, for you there is proof of those sources.
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32. If by other sources [of knowledge] there would be the proof of a source — that would be an "infinite regress";
In that case neither a beginning, middle, nor an end is proved.
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33. Or if there is proof of those [objects] without sources, your argument is refuted.
There is a [logical] inconsistency in this, and you ought to explain the cause of the difference [between the principles of validity in your statement and others].
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34. That reconciliation of difficulty is not [realized in the claim:] "Fire illumines itself."
Certainly it is not like the non-manifest appearance of a pot in the dark.
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35. And if, according to your statement, fire illumines its own self,
Then is this not like a fire which would illumine its own self and something else?
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36. If, according to your statement, fire would illumine both its "own self" and an "other self,"
Then also darkness, like fire, would darken itself and an "other self."
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37. Darkness does not exist in the glow of a fire; and where the glow remains in an "other individual self,"
How could it produce light? Indeed light is the death of darkness.
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38. [If you say:] "Fire illumines when it is being produced," this statement is not true;
For, when being produced, fire certainly does not touch (prapnoti) darkness.
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39. Now if that glow can destroy the darkness again and again without touching it,
Then that [glow] which is located here would destroy the darkness in "every corner" of the world.
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40. If your sources [of knowledge] are proved by their own strength (svatas), then, for you, the sources are proved without respect to "that which is to be proved";
Then you have a proof of a source, [but] no sources are proved without relation to something else.
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41. If, according to you, the sources [of knowledge] are proved without being related to the objects of "that which is to be proved,"
Then these sources will not prove anything.
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42. Or if [you say]: What error is there in thinking, "The relationship of these [sources of knowledge to their objects] is [already] proved"?
[The answer is:] This would be the proving of what is proved. Indeed "that which is not proved" is not related to something else.
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43. Or if the sources [of knowledge] in every case are proved in relation to "what is to be proved,"
Then "what is to be proved" is proved without relation to the sources
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44. And if "what is to be proved" is proved without relation to to the sources [of knowledge],
What [purpose] is the proof of the sources for you—since that for the purpose of which those [sources] exist is already proved!
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45. Or if, for you, the sources [of knowledge] are proved in relation to "what is to be proved,"
Then, for you, there exists an interchange between the sources and "what is to be proved."
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46. Or if, for you, there are the sources [of knowledge] being proved when there is proof of "what is to be proved," and if "what is to be proved" exist when
The source is proved, then, for you, the proof of them both does not exist.
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47. If those things which are to be proved are proved by those sources [of knowledge], and those things which are proved
By "what is to be proved," how will they prove [anything]?
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48. And if those sources [of knowledge] are proved by what is to be proved, and those things which are proved
By the sources, how will they prove [anything]?
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49. If a son is produced by a father, and if that [father] is produced by that very son [when he is born],
Then tell me, in this case, who produces whom?
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50. You tell me! Which of the two becomes the father, and which the son-
Since they both carry characteristics of "father" and "son"? In that case there is doubt.
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51. The proof of the sources [of knowledge] is not [established] by itself, not by each other, or not by other sources;
It does not exist by that which is to be proved and not from nothing at all.

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Section 5: Refuting Self-Existence in Dharmas (Verses 52–56)

Summary: Nāgārjuna argues that self-existence in good dharmas must be defined relationally [T1], making it “other-existence,” not self-existence (verses 52–53). Non-relational self-existence would negate spiritual practice, virtue, and worldly activities, as self-existent things would be eternal (verses 54–55). He rejects self-existence in bad, liberative, or undefined dharmas, arguing that all composite phenomena [T1] ⇐⇒ are empty [T2] [U2T], not inherently non-composite (verse 56).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna demonstrates that self-existence contradicts the relational, impermanent nature of phenomena [T1] ⇐⇒ reinforcing that all dharmas are empty [T2] ⇐⇒ and dependently originated [T1] [U2T]. ⇐⇒ This supports the Middle Way, avoiding eternalism and nihilism ⇐⇒ and the cycle of interdependence.

52. If those who know the modes of the dharmas say that there is good self-existence of good dharmas,
That [self-existence] must be stated in contradistinction to something else.
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53. If a good self-existence were produced in relation to [something else],
Then that self-existence of the good dharmas is an "other existence."
How then, does [self-existence] exist?
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54. Or if there is that self-existence of good dharmas, while not being related to something else,
There would be no state of a spiritual way of life.
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55. There would be neither vice nor virtue, and worldly practical activities would not be possible;
Self-existent things would be eternal because that without a cause would be eternal.
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56. Regarding [your view of] bad, "liberative," and undefined [dharmas], there is an error;
Therefore, all composite products (samskrta) exist as non-composite elements (asamskrta).

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Section 6: Language and Emptiness (Verses 57–59)

Summary: Nāgārjuna denies imputing real names to real things, as both names and referents [T1] ⇐⇒ are empty [T2] [U2T] (verse 57). He rejects the opponents’ claim that names are unreal, as this would imply a real or non-real referent, both of which are incoherent (verse 58). He notes that the emptiness of all phenomena has already been established, so the opponents’ critique misses his thesis (verse 59).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna clarifies that language is conventional [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty [T2] [U2T], functioning without inherent referents. This aligns with the Madhyamaka view of phenomena as illusory, co-imputed by the mind, and supports the tetralemma’s rejection of absolute linguistic categories.

57. He who would impute a really existing name to a really existing thing
Could be refuted by you; but we do not assert a name.
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58. And that [assertion]: "The name is unreal"—would that relate to a real or a non-real thing?
If it were a real thing, or if it were a non-real thing—in both cases your entire proposition is refuted.
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59. The emptiness of all existing things has been demonstrated previously;
Therefore, this attack is against that which is not my thesis.

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Section 7: Nature of Denial and Emptiness (Verses 60–64)

Summary: Nāgārjuna questions the opponents’ claim that self-existence exists apart from dharmas, as his thesis of emptiness is not questionable (verse 60).
If denial targets something real, it proves emptiness;
if it targets emptiness, it is incoherent (verses 61–62).
He denies negating anything, as nothing inherently exists to deny, refuting the opponents’ accusation (verse 63).
He clarifies that denying non-existence does not destroy objects but expresses their absence conventionally (verse 64).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna reframes denial as a conventional act [T1] ⇐⇒ within emptiness, not an absolute negation (emptiness is not opposite to conventional truths) [T2] [U2T]. This aligns with the Union of the Two Truths, where conventional actions are valid [T1] ⇐⇒ yet empty [T2] [U2T], and the Middle Way, free from affirming or denying inherent existence.

60. Or if [it is said]: "Self-existence exists, but that [self-existence] of dharmas does not exist"—
That is questionable; but that which was said [by me] is not questionable.
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61. If the denial concerns something real, then is not emptiness proved?
Then you would deny the non-self-existence of things.
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62. Or if you deny emptiness, and there is no emptiness,
Then is not your assertion: "The denial concerns something real" refuted?
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63. Since anything being denied does not exist, I do not deny anything;
Therefore, [the statement]: "You deny"—which was made by you—is a false accusation.
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64. Regarding what was said concerning what does not exist: "The statement of denial is proved without a word,"
In that case the statement expresses: "[That object] does not exist"; [the words] do not destroy that [object].

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Section 8: Refuting the Mirage Analogy (Verses 65–68)

Summary: Nāgārjuna defends the mirage analogy, arguing that apprehensions (like seeing water in a mirage) are dependently arisen ]T1] ⇐⇒ not self-existent, thus empty [T2] [U2T] (verse 66). Self-existent apprehensions cannot be negated, but dependent ones can, applying to the sixfold structure (verse 67). This refutes the opponents’ claim that his denial lacks a cause, as it mirrors the mirage’s dependent nature (verse 68).

Conclusion: Nāgārjuna uses the mirage to illustrate that phenomena, including apprehensions and denials, are illusory ⇐⇒ and empty. This supports the Madhyamaka framework of dependent origination ⇐⇒ emptiness ⇐⇒ illusory ⇐⇒ reinforcing the tetralemma ⇐⇒ and Middle Way (not accepting, not rejecting).

65. Regarding the great censure formerly made by you through the instance of the mirage—
Now hear the ascertainment whereby that instance is logically possible.
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66. If that apprehension [of the mirage] is "something which is self-existent," it would not have originated presupposing [other things];
But that apprehension which exists presupposing [other things]—is that not emptiness?
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67. If that apprehension is "something which is self-existent," with what could the apprehension be negated?
This understanding [applies] in the remaining [five factors:
"what is apprehended,"
the one who apprehends,
the denial,
"what is denied,"
and the one who denies];
therefore that is an invalid censure.
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68. By this [argument] the absence of a cause [for denying self-existence] is refuted—on the basis of the similarity [with the foregoing]:
Namely, that which was already said regarding the exclusion of the instance of the mirage.

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Section 9: Temporality and Emptiness (Verse 69)

Summary: Nāgārjuna refutes the opponents’ claim that denial must precede, follow, or be simultaneous with what is denied, arguing that causality across the three times (past, present, future) is empty, affirming emptiness.

Conclusion: By negating/refuting absolute temporal relations (negating without negating), Nāgārjuna reinforces that causality is dependently arisen [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty [T2] [U2T] ⇐⇒ aligning with the Middle Way ⇐⇒ and the cycle of interdependence, free from temporal extremes.

69. That which is the cause for the three times is refuted from what is similar to that [given] before;
Negation of cause for the three times affirms emptiness.

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Section 10: Emptiness as the Basis of All Phenomena (Verse 70)

Summary: Nāgārjuna concludes that for one who accepts emptiness [T2] ⇐⇒ all phenomena prevail conventionally [T1] (one truth supports / implies the other) [U2T], but nothing prevails inherently, encapsulating the Madhyamaka view.

Conclusion: This verse summarizes the Madhyamaka synthesis: emptiness [T2] ⇐⇒ enables conventional phenomena (dependent origination) [T1] (one truth supports / implies the other) [U2T] while negating their inherent existence ⇐⇒ embodying the Union of the Two Truths ⇐⇒ the Middle Way ⇐⇒ and the non-dual, cyclical nature of reality.

70. All things prevail for him for whom emptiness prevails;
Nothing whatever prevails for him for whom emptiness prevails.

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Conclusion of Part II: Nāgārjuna’s Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents (Verses 21–70):

Nāgārjuna’s replies deconstruct the opponents’ realist assumptions, demonstrating that phenomena, knowledge, and language are dependently originated [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty of inherent existence [T2] (one truth supports / implies the other) [U2T]. His non-propositional stance and use of analogies (e.g., phantoms, mirages) align with the tetralemma, rejecting extreme positions (existent, non-existent, both, neither). By showing that all phenomena are illusory ⇐⇒ yet conventionally functional, Nāgārjuna upholds the Union of the Two Truths — conventional reality and emptiness — as inseparable and interdependent [U2T]. This synthesis points to the Middle Way, free from eternalism and nihilism, and situates all phenomena within a non-dual, limitless cycle of interdependence, guiding practitioners toward liberation through the realization of the Union of the Two Truths [U2T].

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Overall Conclusion

Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī systematically dismantles the realist assertion of self-existence by demonstrating that all phenomena, epistemological sources, and linguistic constructs are dependently originated [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty of inherent existence [T2] [U2T]. The opponents’ critiques, rooted in a realist ontology, misinterpret emptiness as nihilism, assuming that knowledge and language require inherent validity. Nāgārjuna counters by showing that phenomena function conventionally within the framework of dependent origination [T1] ⇐⇒ like illusions or mirages [Illusory] ⇐⇒ without inherent essence [T2] [U2T]. His non-propositional stance and use of analogies (e.g., phantoms, mirages) align with the tetralemma, rejecting extreme positions (ex. existent, non-existent, both, neither). The text culminates in the Madhyamaka vision of the Middle Way, where the two truths — conventional reality and emptiness — are inseparable, interconnected, and part of a limitless, non-dual cycle of interdependence. This framework liberates practitioners from clinging to absolute views, pointing to awakening through the realization of the Union of the Two Truths about all phenomena [U2T].

Conclusion

Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī (The Dispeller of Disputes) stands as a profound testament to the Madhyamaka school’s radical vision of reality (a vision that is not a vision), offering a rigorous defense of emptiness (śūnyatā) in the sense of the Union of the Two Truths [U2T] that transcends mere philosophical debate to serve as a transformative guide for spiritual liberation.

Through its 70 verses, divided into the opponents’ challenges (Part I, verses 1–20) and Nāgārjuna’s masterful responses (Part II, verses 21–70), the text systematically dismantles the realist assertion of self-existence (svabhāva), revealing the interdependent [T1] ⇐⇒ illusory ⇐⇒ and empty nature of all phenomena [T2] [U2T].

By engaging with the objections of likely Nyāya or other realist philosophers, Nāgārjuna not only refutes their claims but also articulates a Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad) that navigates between the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, pointing to a non-dual, dynamic reality where conventional [ T1] ⇐⇒ and ultimate [T2] truths are inseparably united [U2T].

This conclusion reflects on the text’s philosophical depth, soteriological purpose, and enduring relevance, situating its insights within the Madhyamaka Reasoning framework of Dependent Origination ⇐⇒ Emptiness ⇐⇒ Union of the Two Truths ⇐⇒ Illusory ⇐⇒ Tetralemma ⇐⇒ Middle Way ⇐⇒ One ⇐⇒ Cycle. (where ‘⇐⇒’ or ‘Union’ means: one side implies the other)

The Vigrahavyāvartanī achieves its aim of dispelling disputes by exposing the incoherence of inherent existence.
– In Part I, the opponents argue that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of self-existence undermines the logical validity of his own statement, destabilizes epistemological foundations like direct perception and inference, negates the reality of dharmas (phenomena or truths), and renders language and denial meaningless. Their critiques presuppose a realist ontology where phenomena, knowledge, and words require fixed essences to function, framing emptiness as a nihilistic denial of reality (as opposed to conventional truths).
– Nāgārjuna, in Part II, turns these objections into opportunities to clarify the Madhyamaka view. He demonstrates that his statement, though empty of inherent existence [T2] ⇐⇒ functions conventionally [T1] [U2T] ⇐⇒ like a magical phantom negating another [Illusory], sidestepping logical dilemmas (verses 21–24). He critiques the opponents’ epistemological sources (pramāṇas), revealing their interdependence and susceptibility to infinite regress or circularity (verses 31–51). He refutes self-existence in dharmas, language, and causality, showing that all phenomena are relationally defined, impermanent [T1] ⇐⇒ and empty [T2] [U2T] (verses 52–69). The text culminates in verse 70, a succinct encapsulation of the Madhyamaka vision: “All things prevail for him for whom emptiness prevails; nothing whatever prevails for him for whom emptiness prevails.” This paradoxical statement affirms that emptiness [T2] ⇐⇒ enables the conventional arising of phenomena [T1] (one truth supports / implies the other) [U2T] while negating their inherent existence, embodying the Union of the Two Truths — conventional reality (saṃvṛti-satya) [T1] ⇐⇒ and ultimate reality (paramārtha-satya) [T2] [U2T].

The philosophical power of the Vigrahavyāvartanī lies in Nāgārjuna’s non-propositional stance and dialectical method.
– By refusing to assert a fixed thesis, he avoids the trap of reifying his own position, as any proposition would itself be empty and subject to critique.
– His use of the tetralemma — not this, not non-this, not both, not neither — deconstructs absolutist categories (e.g., existence/non-existence, self-origination/other-origination, subjectivism/objectivism/processism), exposing their logical contradictions.
– Analogies like magical phantoms and mirages illustrate that phenomena, including apprehensions and denials, are illusory ⇐⇒ yet conventionally effective, arising dependently [T1] ⇐⇒ without inherent essence [T2] [U2T].

This aligns with the Madhyamaka Reasoning Generalization: phenomena are dependently co-arisen, co-defined, and co-imputed by the mind ⇐⇒ empty of inherent existence ⇐⇒ and like reflections or dreams, “there, yet not there.” ⇐⇒ Nāgārjuna’s approach thus points to the Middle Way, free from extremes of affirming or denying, where nothing is to be grasped, rejected, or purified in absolute terms — only engaged relatively, conventionally, as part of the path to awakening.

Beyond its logical rigor, the Vigrahavyāvartanī serves a soteriological purpose, guiding practitioners toward liberation by dismantling attachment to conceptual fixations (conventional truths). The realization of emptiness dissolves dualities (without rejecting them) — self/other, real/unreal, permanent/impermanent, subject/object, samsara/nirvana, dependent-origination /emptiness ⇐⇒ revealing the non-dual, interconnected nature of reality. This is the “one” in the Madhyamaka framework, not a monistic unity but a primordial equality and purity where all phenomena are empty, perfect, and divine in their interdependence. ⇐⇒ The text’s emphasis on the cycle — described as a timeless, centerless, holographic flux of creation, bondage, and awakening — underscores that samsara and nirvana are not separate realms but two perspectives on the same empty, interdependent reality. By understanding phenomena as part of this karmic-like cycle, practitioners can transcend clinging to inherent existence, cultivating wisdom and compassion that embrace the conventional world without reifying it.

Ultimately, the Vigrahavyāvartanī is a call to awaken to the true nature of reality [U2T], where emptiness [T2] is not a negation but a liberating affirmation of life’s fluidity and interconnectedness [T1]. Nāgārjuna’s genius lies in his ability to wield logic as a tool for transcendence, dismantling rigid views to reveal a reality that is primordially pure, complete, and free from extremes.

By embracing the Union of dependent origination [T1] ⇐⇒ and emptiness [T2] [U2T], practitioners are invited to participate in the limitless cycle of existence with both wisdom [T2] ⇐⇒ and compassion [T1] together [U2T], realizing that all phenomena, though illusory, are sacred expressions of the non-dual, centerless whole. The Vigrahavyāvartanī thus remains a timeless beacon, illuminating the path to liberation through the profound simplicity of the Middle Way.