Padmakara Translation Group

Chapter 27 - An Examination of Views

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1. To think that in the ages past

One has existed or did not exist,

Or that the world is permanent and so forth—all these views

Depend upon an earlier limit.

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2. To think that in the ages yet to come

One will exist or else will not exist,

To think this world will have an end-all these views

Depend upon a later limit.

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3. The claim that "I existed in the past"

Is not acceptable.

For what existed in the past

Is not what is existing now.

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4. Perhaps you think the former self became the self existing now.

But that which they appropriate is not the same.

Aside from such appropriation,

What is this self of yours?

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5. You may say that there is no self

Apart from that which it appropriates,

And claim that what's appropriated is the self.

If so, this self of yours does not exist.

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6. The appropriated [aggregates] are not the self,

For these same aggregates arise and cease.

How could what's appropriated

Be itself appropriator?

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7. A self apart from the appropriated is not tenable.

For if it were distinct from them,

It should be apprehended separately,

And yet it is not apprehended.

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8. Thus the self is not distinct from the appropriated,

And it is not that which it appropriates.

There is no self without the latter;

Neither can we certify that it does not exist.

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9. To say that in the past

The self did not arise is inadmissible.

The self in this life is not alien

From what existed in a previous life.

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10. For if this present self were alien,

It would exist in absence of the previous self.

And the past self would persist,

And here there would be birth without a perishing in the past.

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11. This would entail annihilation; actions would not be conserved.

One would suffer the results of deeds

Another had performed:

This and other consequences follow.

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12. The self is not arisen from a state of nonexistence:

Fallacies would be entailed thereby.

The self would be produced

Or its arising would occur without a cause.

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13. Thus the views that, in the past,

One has existed or did not exist,

Or both or neither-

None of these are tenable.

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14. The views that, in the future,

One will come to be

Or else will not exist-

These are like the view related to the past.

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15. If the human were the god,

There would be permanence.

The god indeed would be unborn,

For in the permanent there is no birth.

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16. If from the god the man were different,

Then there'd be impermanence.

If the god and man were different,

Then a continuity would be untenable.

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17. If one part were divine

And one part human,

There would be impermanence and permanence,

And this is also unacceptable.

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18. If impermanence and permanence

Were both established,

One could claim establishment

Of both nonpermanence and nonimpermanence.

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19. If one came from somewhere

And then migrated elsewhere,

One's wandering has no starting point.

But this is not the case.

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20. If nothing permanent exists,

What is it that's impermanent?

What is it that is both impermanent and permanent,

And what is neither of these two?

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21. If this world had an end,

How could there be a further world?

And if this world had no end,

How could there be a further world?

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22. Since the aggregates' continuum

Is like the light shed by a lamp,

To say they have an end is incorrect—

As also that they are unending.

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23. If the past ones were destroyed

And if, depending on the same,

The subsequent did not arise,

The world indeed would have an end.

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24. If the past ones weren't destroyed

And if, depending on the same,

The subsequent did not arise,

The world indeed would be unending.

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25. If one part had an end

And one part were unending,

The world would have an end and yet be endless.

This indeed would be absurd.

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26. How could what appropriates

Be partially destroyed

And partly undestroyed?

Such a thing would be absurd.

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27. How could what's appropriated

Be in part destroyed

And partly undestroyed?

Such a thing would also be absurd.

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28. If the finite and the infinite

Were both established,

One could assert establishment

Of both nonfinite and noninfinite.

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29. And yet, since each and every thing is empty,

To whom and where,

And for what reason should the views

Of permanence and all the rest occur?

Garfield

Chapter 27 - Examination of Views

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1. The views "in the past I was" or "I was not"

And the view that the world is permanent, etc.,

All of these views

Depend on a prior limit.

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2. The view "in the future I will become other" or "I will not do so"

And that the world is limited, etc.,

All of these views

Depend on a final limit.

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3. To say "I was in the past"

Is not tenable.

What existed in the past

Is not identical to this one.

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4. According to you, this self is that,

But the appropriator is different.

If it is not the appropriator,

What is your self?

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5. Having shown that there is no self

Other than the appropriator,

The appropriator should be the self.

But it is not your self.

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6. Appropriating is not the self.

It arises and ceases.

How can one accept that

Future appropriating is the appropriator?

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7. A self that is different

From the appropriating is not tenable.

If it were different, then in a nonappropriator

There should be appropriation. But there isn't.

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8. So it is neither different from the appropriating

Nor identical to the appropriating.

There is no self without appropriation.

But it is not true that it does not exist.

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9. To say "in the past I wasn't"

Would not be tenable.

This person is not different

From whoever existed in previous times.

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10. If this one were different,

Then if that one did not exist, I would still exist.

If this were so,

Without death, one would be born.

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11. Annihilation and the exhaustion of action would follow;

Different agents' actions

Would be experienced by each other.

That and other such things would follow.

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12. Nothing comes to exist from something that did not exist.

From this errors would arise.

The self would be produced

Or, existing, would be without a cause.

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13. So, the views "I existed," "I didn't exist,"

Both or neither,

In the past

Are untenable.

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14. To say "in the future I will exist or

Will not exist,"

Such a view is like

Those involving the past.

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15. If a human were a god,

On such a view there would be permanence.

The god would be unborn.

For any permanent thing is unborn.

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16. If a human were different from a god,

On such a view there would be impermanence.

If the human were different from the god,

A continuum would not be tenable.

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17. If one part were divine and

One part were human,

It would be both permanent and impermanent.

That would be irrational.

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18. If it could be established that

It is both permanent and impermanent,

Then it could be established that

It is neither permanent nor impermanent.

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19. If anyone had come from anyplace

And were then to go someplace,

It would follow that cyclic existence was beginningless.

This is not the case.

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20. If nothing is permanent,

What will be impermanent,

Permanent and impermanent,

Or neither?

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21. If the world were limited,

How could there be another world?

If the world were unlimited,

How could there be another world?

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22. Since the continuum of the aggregates

Is like the flame of a butterlamp,

It follows that neither its finitude

Nor its infinitude makes sense.

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23. If the previous were disintegrating

And these aggregates, which depend

Upon those aggregates, did not arise,

Then the world would be finite.

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24. If the previous were not disintegrating

And these aggregates, which depend

Upon those aggregates, did not arise,

Then the world would be infinite.

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25. If one part were finite and

One part were infinite,

Then the world would be finite and infinite.

This would make no sense.

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26. How could one think that

One part of the appropriator is destroyed

And one part is not destroyed?

This position makes no sense.

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27. How could one think that

One part of the appropriation is destroyed

And one part is not destroyed?

This position makes no sense.

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28. If it could be established that

It is both finite and infinite,

Then it could be established that

It is neither finite nor infinite.

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29. So, because all entities are empty,

Which views of permanence, etc., would occur,

And to whom, when, why, and about what

Would they occur at all?

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30. I prostrate to Gautama

Who through compassion

Taught the true doctrine,

Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.

Batchelor

Chapter 27 - Investigation of Views

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1. Those views such as "I occurred or did not occur in the past," "the world is permanent," are dependent on the extreme of Before.

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2. Those views such as "I will occur or not occur at another time in the future," "the world has an end," are dependent on the extreme of Later.

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3. It is incorrect to say: "I occurred at a time in the past." Whatever occurred before, that is not this.

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4. If you think that that became me, then that-which-is-clung-to would be something else. What is your self apart from that-which-is-clung-to?

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5. Were you [to say] that there exists no self apart from that-which-is-clung-to, if the very that-which-is-clung-to were the self, your self would be non-existent.

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6. The very that-which-is-clung-to is not the self: it arises and passes away. How can that-which-has-been-clung-to be the one that clings?

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7. It is not correct for the self to be other than that-which-is-clung-to. If it were other, with nothing to cling to, then something [i.e. the self] fit to be apprehended would not be apprehended.

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8. In that way, it is not other than that-which-is-clung-to nor is it that-which-is-clung-to. The self is not not that-which-is-clung-to, nor can it be ascertained as nothing.

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9. It is incorrect to say: "I did not occur at a time in the past." Whatever occurred before, this is not other than that.

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10. If this were other, it would arise even without that. Likewise, that could remain and be born without dying in that [former life].

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11. Cut off and actions wasted, acts committed by others would be experienced by someone else. Such would be the consequences.

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12. There is no occurence from what has not occured. In that case faults would follow: the self would be something made or even though it occured it would be uncaused.

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13. Therefore, "the self occured, did not occur, both or neither:" all those views of the past are invalid.

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14. "I will occur at another time in the future," "I will not occur:" all those views are similar to [those of] the past.

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15. If the divine were human, then there would be something permanent. The divine is utterly unborn, because there is no birth in permanence.

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16. If the human were other than the divine, then there would be no permanence. If the divine and the human were different, there could be no continuity [between them].

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17. If one part were divine and one part were human, there would be both permanence and no permanence. But that is not reasonable.

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18. If both permanence and impermanence were established, you would have to assert non-permanence and non-impermance as established.

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19. If something came from somewhere and went somewhere, then samsara would be without beginning. That is not the case.

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20. If there were nothing permanent at all, what thing could be impermanent, permanent and impermanent, free of both?

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21. If this world had an end, how would the next world come to be? If this world had no end, how would the next world come to be?

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22. Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end is unreasonable.

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23. If the former perished and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would have an end.

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24. If the former did not perish and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would not have an end.

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25. If one part had an end and one part did not have an end, the world would be with and without an end. That too is unreasonable.

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26. How can one part of the one-who-clings perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable.

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27. How can one part of that-which-is-clung-to perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable.

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28. If both the presence and absence of an end were established, you would have to assert non-presence and non-absence as established.

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29. And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth?

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30. I bow down to Gautama, whose kindness holds one close, who revealed the sublime dharma in order to let go of all views.

Streng

Chapter 27 - An Analysis of the Views (drsti) About Reality (dogmas) - 30 verses

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1. Those [views] relating to the limits of the past reality are: "The world is eternal," etc.,

[And "I have existed in the past," "I have not existed in the past," etc.]

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2. The assertion: "I will not become something different in a future time,"

"I will become [something different]," and the alternative, etc., are relating to an end [in the future].

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3. [The assertion:] "I existed in a past time (1)" does not obtain,

Since this [present being] is not (i.e. "ii" is not the same as "i") that one who [was] in a former birth.

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4. Were he [in a previous birth], that individual self (atma) which he acquires [in coming into existence] would be different.

Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without acquisition (upadana)?

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5. If it were held that: "There is no individual self without the acquisition,"

Then the individual self would be [only] the acquisition or it is not an individual self [at all].

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6. The individual self is not the acquisition, since that [acquisition] appears and disappears.

Now really, how will "he who acquires" become "that which is acquired?

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7. Moreover, it does not obtain that the individual self is different from the acquisition.

If the individual self were different, it would be perceived without the acquisition; but [in fact] it is not so perceived.

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8. Thus that [individual self] is not different from nor identical to the acquisition.

The individual self is not without acquisition; but there is no certainty that "It does not exist."

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9. [The assertion:] "I have not existed in a past time (2)" does not obtain,

For that one [now living] is not different (i.e. "ii" is not different than "i") from that one who was in a former birth.

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10. If that [present person] were different, he would exist in exclusion of that [former] one.

Therefore either that [former person] persists, or he would be born eternal!

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11. -- note 4 : Verse 11 is not available in the Sanskrit test, but it is known from the Tibetan translation

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12. There is no existing thing which is "that which has not existed prior." Therefore, the error logically follows that

Either the individual self is "what is produced" or it originates without a cause.

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13. Thus the view concerning the past which [asserts] "I have existed (1)," or "I have not existed (2),"

Both ["existed and not existed"] (3) or neither (4): this does not obtain at all.

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14. [The views:] "I will become something in a future time (1'),"

Or "I will not become (2') [something]," etc. (3') (4'), [should be considered] like those [views] of the past.

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15. If "This is a man, this is a god" [obtains], then eternity (i) exists,

For god is unproduced, and certainly something eternal would not be born.

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16. If man is different from god, there would exist something non-eternal (ii).

If man is different from god, then a continuity does not obtain.(i.e. they cannot be different)

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17. If one part were divine and another part human, (i.e. a man with an eternal soul)

Then there would be something non-eternal [together with] that which is eternal (iii); but that is not possible.

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18. If something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,

Then, no doubt, something "neither eternal nor non-eternal (iv)" is proved.

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19. If someone, having come from somewhere, in some way goes somewhere again,

Then there would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but this is not the case.

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20. If someone who is eternal does not exist, who will exist being non-eternal,

Or who being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two [characteristics]?

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21. If the world would come to an end, how would an other-world come into existence?

If the world would not come to an end, how would an other-world come into being?

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22. Since the continuity of the "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) [from one moment to the next] functions like flames of lamps,

[The view:] "both having an end and not having an end" is not possible.

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23. If the former ["groups"] would disappear, those [new] "groups" which are dependent on those [former] "groups" would not arise;

Therefore, the world would come to an end (ii).

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24. If the former ["groups"] would not disappear, these [new] "groups" which are dependent on those [former] "groups" would not arise;

Therefore, the world would be eternal (i).

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25. If one part were finite and the other were infinite,

The world would be both finite and infinite (iii); but this is not possible.

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26. Therefore, how can it be that one part of "one who acquires" [karma] will be destroyed, (i.e. the body – man?)

And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the very subtle mind -- the divine part?) This is not possible.

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27. How, indeed, can it be that one part of the acquisition [of karma] (i.e. the learning stored in the body) will be destroyed,

And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the learning stored in the mind) That, certainly does not obtain.

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28. If the [view] "both finite and infinite" were proved,

Then no doubt, "neither finite nor infinite" (i.e. nothing at all) could be proved.

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29. Because of the emptiness of all existing things,

How will the views about "eternity," etc., come into existence, about what, of whom, and of what kind?

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30. To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma

For the destruction of all views—to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence.